JPRS 80625

21 April 1982

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2529

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in <u>Government Reports Announcements</u> issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the <u>Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications</u> issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2529

CONTENTS

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS	
Arab League Structure, Organizations Outlined (THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY, 20 Mar 82)	1
Maghreb Cooperation Discussed (al-Sarraj Muhammad Munir, Rashid Khashanah; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 1-7 Feb 82)	(
Briefs Surface-to-Surface Missiles Modified	11
PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS	
Future of Unified Currency Reviewed ('Adnan Karimah; AL-HAWADITH, 19 Mar 82)	12
ALGERIA	
Energy Policy Examined; Gas Termed Decisive Factor (Y. Ould Moussa; REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, 12-18 Feb 82)	14
BAHRAIN	
Liberation Front Member Discusses Opposition, Government Crackdown (AL-SHAHID, 6 Jan 82)	20
EGYPT	
Transfers Among High-Ranking Security Officers Announced (AL-AHRAM, 8 Mar 82)	27
Muslim Scholar Expresses Views on Education, Role of Religion (Shaykh Muhammad Mutawalli al-Sha'rawi Interview; AL-MUSAWWAR, 11 Dec 81)	29

	(Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus Interview; AL-MUSAWWAR, 11 Dec 81)	48
	Conference Discusses Devices for Consumer Protection (Husayn Shahbun; AL-AHRAM, 8 Mar 82)	61
	Comments on Cheese Scandal, Corruption (Ahmad Baha' al-Din; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 16 Feb 82)	64
	Study Concerning Rural Economic Development ('Abd al-Mun'im 'Uthman; AL-AHRAM, various dates)	69
IRAN		
	Khomeyni's Problems, Army's 'Future Role' Analyzed (Giorgos Mitralias; OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS, 18 Mar 82)	77
	Egyptian, French Presidents 'Warned' by Premier Musavi (JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, 8 Mar 82)	81
	Universities Reorganizing on Islamic, Non-Western Lines (ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW, Mar 82)	84
ISRAEL		
	Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Comments on Israeli Occupation (Sa'd al-Din al-'Alami Interview; ARABIA, Jan 82)	86
	Background of Golan Druze Discussed (Ya'acov Friedler; THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE, 26 Feb 82).	88
	Jordan Valley Area Said Free of Strife (Abraham Rabinovich; THE JERUSALEM POST, 26 Mar 62)	92
	West Bank Town Improves Irrigation System (Cal McCrystal; ARABIA, Jan 82)	94
KUWAIT		
	Nature of Press Coverage of Recent Events Discussed (AL-MUSTAQBAL, 13 Mar 82)	96
LEBANO	N	
	Bashir al-Jumayyil's Political Strategy Assailed (Amil Khuri; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 28 Mar- 4 Apr 82)	100
	Clashes in South May Lead to Wider Conflict	
	(Ibrahim al-Buriawi: AL-HAWADITH, 5 Feb 82)	103

.

LIBYA

A1-0	Qadhdhafi Criticizes U.S. Policy in Speech	106
	(AL-FAJR AL-JADID, 4 Mar 82)	100
PEOPLE'S DE	EMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN	
Step	os To Increase Efficiency of Military Service Discussed (14 UKTUBAR, 21 Jan 82)	111
Ecor	nomic Measures Emphasize Holding Deficit Down (AL-SIYASAH, 4 Feb 82)	113
Annu	(14 UKTUBAR, 2 Feb 82)	116
SAUDI ARABI	IA A	
0i1	Minister Promises Price Resurgence, End to Glut (Shaykh Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani Interview; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 30 Jan 82)	117
Nati	ion Plans for Prosperity in Post-Petroleum Era (Hisham Nazir Interview; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 6 Feb 82)	125
Fina	ance Minister Discusses Various Domestic, Foreign Projects (Muhammad Aba-al-Khayl Interview; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 13 Feb 82)	133
Deve	elopment Programs To Continue Despite Oil Market Conditions (AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 4 Mar 82)	141

ARAB LEAGUE STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATIONS OUTLINED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 660, 20 Mar 82 pp 12-15A

[Text] March 22, 1982 will mark the 37th anniversary of the Arab League, the intergovernmental regional organization which groups 22 Arab countries. On this occasion, a review of the Arab League's objectives, purposes, problems and structure is made.

Background The Arab League was formally established on March 22, 1945 by seven Arab states, in Cairo. The seven states were: Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen.

It now counts 22 member-states, including Egypt whose membership was, however suspended after President Sadat's trip to Israel. The collective population of these member-states is about 155 million. They inhabit an area totalling some 14 million square kilometers--extending from the Atlantic Ocean in the West to the Arabian Gulf in the East. Of the 22 states, 14 are in Asia, 7 in Africa and, for its part, Egypt spans both continents.

Purposes and Objectives The purpose and objective of the Arab League are summarized in Article 2 of the Pact:

"The League has as its purpose the strengthening of the relations between the member-states, the coordination of their policies in order to achieve cooperation among them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. It has also as its purpose the close cooperation of the member-states, with due regard to the organization and circumstances of each state on the following matters.

- "(A) Economic and financial affairs, including commercial relations, customs, currency and questions of agriculture and industry.
- "(B) Communications, including railroads, roads, aviation, navigation, posts and telegraph.
- "(C) Cultural affairs
- "(D) Nationality, passports, vias, execution of judgements and extradition of criminals

- "(E) Social affairs
- "(F) Health problems"

Structure

--The Council: The principal decision-making body is the Arab League Council. It is normally held at the Foreign Ministers' level. However, during summit conferences it is elevated to level of the Heads of State or their representatives. Two ordinary sessions—in March and September—are held every year. But an extraordinary session can be called at any time provided at least two member—states request it.

Cairo was the permanent seat of the Arab League, but ever since the Arab breakup with Egypt, the seat and headquarters were transferred to Tunis where Council sessions are now held. But, according to Article 10 of the Arab League Pact, the Council may meet in any Arab city. Each member-state presides over the meetings by rotation and in alphabetical order. The Council's resolutions are adopted by unanimous vote on substantive issues and by a simple majority on other issues.

The task of the Council as stipulated in Article 3, is the realisation of the League's objectives and to supervise the execution of agreements "which the member-states conclude on the questions enumerated in Article 2 of the Charter, or an any other question." The Council also decides "upon the means by which the League is to cooperate with the international bodies to be created in the future in order to guarantee security and peace and regulate economic and social relations."

Stemming from the Council, which is the League's highest body, are five specialized councils, ten permanent committees, 20 organizations besides the Administrative Court and the Financial Control Authority.

-- Specialized Councils:

- 1. The Joint Defense Council: Its members are the Arab Foreign Ministers and the Arab Defense Ministers. This Council deals with all matters concerning the implementation of the provisions of the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the member-states. The treaty provides, among other things, for the collective defence of the contracting states against aggression on any one of them.
- 2. The Economic and Social Council: This council replaced, in 1977, the Economic Council which was established under Article 8 of the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty to submit recommendations for the realisation of all such aims for economic cooperation as are set forth in the performance of its duties. The principal tasks of the Council are: to guide any joint action in the economic field that the member-states may plan; to supervise the coordination of Arab economic plans; to lay down and follow up the implementation of Arab economic policies; to look after the functioning of the relevant Arab organization; and to organize the economic relations of

the contracting Arab states with other Arab countries and foreign economic groupings. The Council holds two ordinary sessions—in February and September—every year and has a number of permanent and ad hoc committees to assist it.

- 3. The Arab Information Ministers' Council: This Council holds an annual ordinary session in February to discuss and approve the Arab information strategy and programmes which are prepared by the Arab League General Department for Information and approved by the Arab Permanent Committee on Information.
- 4. The Arab Health Ministers' Council: Arab Health Ministers, or their representatives, meet once a year to discuss matters and supervise the coordination of cooperation among all member-states. The Council must also implement agreements concluded between the Arab League and the World Health Organization.
- 5. The Arab Youth Ministers' Council: This council was established in 1977. Its main function is to work for the unification of Arab efforts in youth and sporting activities, with a view to creating a strong and healthy generation.

-- Permanent Committees

The Arab League's ten permanent committees assist the Specialized Councils in the fulfillment of their duties, and are government [as published] by Article 4 of the League's Charter. The Article states that "For each of the questions listed in Article 2 there shall be set up a special committee in which the member-states shall be represented. These committees shall be charged with the task of laying down the principles and extent of cooperation. Such principles shall be formulated as draft agreements to be presented to the Arab League Council for examination preparatory to their submission to the aforementioned states."

According to Article 18 of the Internal Regulations of the Council, "The Council shall refer the question on the agenda to the committees, each according to its competence, for study and the submission of a report thereon containing their recommendations." The Committees "may also submit to the Council any recommendations or suggestions that may arise in the course of their discussions," in accordance with Article 12 of the Internal Regulations.

The Chairmanship of these Committees is governed by Article 5 of the Internal Regulations. "The Council shall appoint for each of the Committees referred to in the Charter, a Chairman for a period of two years, subject to renewal."

The ten Permanent Committees are the following: Political Committee; Information Committee, Committee on Human Rights, Committee for Social Affairs; Committee for Legal Affairs; Committee for Communications; Committee for Statistics; Committee for Administrative and Financial Affairs; Committee for Meteorology; Military Committee.

--Organizations

The Arab League has at present 20 organizations, most of them established after 1960. The Organizations perform tasks similar to those performed by the United Nations Specialized Agencies, and have, in fact, proved to be instrumental in effecting some form of unity among the Arab states.

- 1. Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (1970)
- 2. Arab Organization for Administrative Science (1969)
- 3. Arab Labour Organization (1971)
- 4. Arab Economic Unity Council (1964)
- 5. Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (1968)
- 6. Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (1973)
- 7. Arab Institution for Space Communications
- 8. Arab Organization for Agricultural Development (1969)
- 9. Arab Centre for the Study of Dry regions and Arid Lands
- 10. Arab Organization For Social Defence Against Crime (1965)
- 11. Arab Organization for Specifications and Standards (1965)
- 12. Arab Academy for Maritime Transport
- 13. Arab States Civil Aviation Council (1968)
- 14. Arab States Broadcasting Union (1969)
- 15. Arab Postal Union (1954)
- 16. Arab Telecommunication Union (1957)
- 17. Arab Financial Institution for Economic and Social Development
- 18. Arab States Industrial Development Centre (1969)
- 19. Arab Cities Organization (1967)
- 20. Arab Monetary Fund.

--The Administrative Court: It comes under the purview of the League Council and has been established to provide legal recourse to the League's personnel. Five member-states nominate a senior judge each to the Court's Bench for a specified period of time.

--Financial Control (Audit) Authority: It also comes under the purview of the League Council and is made up of several senior accountants from the various member-states. Its major task is to examine the financial files of the League to ensure that the League's funds are administered according to regulations.

-- The General Secretariat:

The General Secretariat is the pivotal organ of the Arab League. Its functions, as specified in the League Charter as well as in the Internal Regulations of the Council, include maintenance of records, collection of data and statistics, and printing and circulation of all documents, reports, resolutions and minutes of meetings to the member-states.

The secretariat is also entrusted with the task of keeping in contacts with the member-states and the various organs of the Arab League. It prepares the draft budgets and assists the Councils and the committees in the performance of their work by preparing for them technical reports and data which enable them to acquaint themselves with the subjects under discussion.

The secretariat general is headed by the Secretary General who is appointed by the Arab League Council for a five-year term which is renewable. This post is currently held by Tunisia's Chedli Klibi. His three predecessors were: Abdel Rahman Azzam (1945-1952); Abdel Khaleq Hassouna (1952-1972) and Mahmoud Riad.

CSO: 4500/141

MAGHREB COOPERATION DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 248, 1-7 Feb 82 pp 23-25

[Article by al-Sarraj Muhammad Munir and Rashid Khashanah: "Qadhdhafi Strengthens the Alliance with Algeria, Prepares for Conciliation with Tunisia"]

[Text] Three important meetings occurred concerning the Arab Maghreb at the end of January. The first was the meeting of the Libyan leader, Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, and the Algerian president, Chadli Benjedid; the second was the surprise visit of al-Qadhdhafi to the Tunisian city of Qabis, where he met with the prime minister, Muhammad Mzali; the third was the Moroccan king's meeting with French President Francois Mitterrand in Paris.

It is clear that the climate, resulting from the efforts to reconvene the second part of the Fez summit, has thrown its harmonious shadow over bilateral relations between the governments of the region, even though the approaching date of the African summit, to be held in Tripoli, forms an additional factor to encourage the governments of the Arab Maghreb toward rapproachement and accord.

The Algerian-Libyan summit opened a new era in relations between the two countries. The thing that gives them a distinctive cast is the Arab and African climates that stimulate unrest for Algeria and Libya, more so than al-Qadhdhafi's unionist efforts. With regard to Libya, al-Qadhdhafi's visit to Algeria came at a time of increased tension in American-Libyan relations. In the fact of Washington's economic pressures against the Jamahiriyah, Algeria declared its solidarity with its neighbor. The summit also coincided with the coolness of Tripoli's relations with those who have been labelled moderates in Africa and the Arab World. In Africa, the problem of Chad still exists, after the withdrawal of the Libyan forces, where Husayn Habre, who only a short time ago was a "rebel," has begun to appear as a strong man, and who owes his probable success to Washington, through Egypt and Sudan. It is well known that Algeria strongly supports the government of national unity, led by Goukouni Weddeye, and rejects any form of military interference in the struggle. Therefore, in Col al-Qadhdhafi's opinion, it is qualified to play an important role in improving Libya's diplomatic position in Africa in light of the approaching date of the African summit.

In the Arab World, there is more and more talk about phase two of the Fez summit, and that the Israeli authorities are making headway with their schemes

and are planning surprises. This compels Algeria and Libya, within the framework of the "Steadfastness Front," to study the best ways to strengthen this front and to confront the American attack (which is still in its beginning stages.)

American Military Activity

With regard to Algeria, the officials stressed the connection between the visit's timing and the United States' military activity in the southern Mediterranean and in Algeria's neighbors -- a reference to Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. They ask how far President Reagan will go in his support for Morocco, which stirs up great fears about the possibility of internationalizing the Sahara problem, and consequently, justifies the need to strengthen their alliance with Libya. It is worth noting that six units belonging to the American Sixth Fleet, including two nuclear aircraft carriers, the Eisenhower and the Nimitz, were in the port of Tan lers. The American Ambassador to Morocco stated that "this presence carries no political or strategic significance." But he reiterated that his country "supports Morocco which has great importance to the United States' vital interests. Morocco can rely on us. American naval forces constitute dynamic protection to defend the United States and its friends. They are always ready to every contingency, especially to defend the Straits of Gibralter because of its great strategic importance."

The Unit Plan

It is clear that this American military activity is only one of the United States' new political factors in the area as a whole. All of these matters form common ground for the two countries. Accordingly, one can only consider the unity plan, which al-Qadhdhafi proposed to Algeria, from the aspect of unifying the Arab ranks against Israel and the United States. This was the emphasis that the Libyan leader placed upon it.

Algerian officials have been quietly discussing the plan. They believe that Arab unity is first and last a question for the people. The rank and file who dictate policy to the leadership in this regard must be consulted. Any unionist action on the political level must be preceded by unionist steps on the cultural, economic and social levels, provided that the unity be in stages.

It appears that al-Qadhdhafi did not propose unity of an immediate merger type, since after lengthy discussions, he acceded to the Algerians' wish and accepted the principle of gradual unity, in which both countries vould maintain their political and administrative forms of government. It was agreed to hold a joint meeting sometime next month in the Jamahiriyah between the General People's Congress and members of the Algerian government, to discuss the two countries' problems and to adopt mutual and unified resolutions for implementation by the two countries. It is expected that that meeting, and other meetings to be held at the end of March, will be a "sign" of steps toward Libyan-Algerian unity, according to what official Libyan sources have said.

It is expected that Syria will have a share in this new bloc, since unity between Syria and Libya still exists. If we review the Arab countries that are candidates for unity with the Jamahiriyah, we find that Algeria is the most willing from a number of aspects: Algeria and Libya both belong to North Africa and share a vast common border, even though Tunisia forms a sort of geographic wedge between them. In addition, both countries have revolutionary forms of government, based on a long struggle against colonialism. Both countries share, to an adequate extent, a mutual leadership position in regard to the Middle East issue. Over and above that, they are two of the major natural gas and crude oil producers and have been members of OPEC for a long time. They frequently cooperated in matters of oil policy and are in agreement regarding crude oil pricing.

Nevertheless, the Algerians have not so far had firm ties with revolutionary Libya, in the manner that one might expect because of the mutual interests and their mutual approach to many issues. The late Algerian president, Houari Bumeddiene was never prepared to relinquish Algeria's independence, which was gained after long hardships in the battle for Arab unity. On the contrary, he was not happy about accepting Col al-Qadhdhafi as a partner in any type of unity. It was enough to recognize him as a man who might become a leader of the Arabs. As for President Chadli Benjedid, during the last 3 years, he has shown a tendency to follow the policy of his predecessor with respect to the Jamahiriyah.

Therefore, the news, which the Libyan officials announced regarding Algeria, suggested that a major change has occurred in the thinking of Algerian leaders, despite their strict secrecy. What that proves might be found in the results of the joint meetings during the next few weeks. No matter what the case may be, the Libyan leader's first goal was to establish the strategic alliance between his country and Algeria. Perhaps the most important tool in this alliance is the "Hasi Mas'ud Declaration," which the two countries signed in 1975 and which committed the late president Boumeddiene and Col al-Qadhdhafi to the mutual offer of military assistance in the event of an attack on either of the two nations. If this is the case, there is no doubt that the reactivation of this declaration will be the first indicator of the extent of this alliance's strength, and consequently, the liklihood of these two countries becoming united.

Libya and Tunisia

Aside from this new era between Algeria and Libya, relations between the other Maghrebi capitals are making progress toward a relaxation slowly simmering on the fire, despite the continuation of disputes that have been pending for years. Among the signs of this relaxation was the Moroccan foreign minister, Muhammad Boucetta, accompanying the Arab League secretary general on his visit to Algeria, and al-Qadhdhafi's visit to Tunisia for the first time since 1974.

However, the relaxation is still in the preparatory stages of a reconciliation, and has not yet reached the stage of complete forgiveness. Al-Qadhdhafi's meeting with Tunisian Prime Minister Muhammad Mzali, which lasted 2 hours,

did not deal with the outstanding political issues between the two parties, the most important being the dispute over the continental shelf, which has been submitted to the International Court of Justice, and the existence of camps in Libya, where Tunisians are being trained, but was confined to a discussion of economic questions and the development of commercial exchanges.

There is no doubt that the element of surprise attached to this visit played an important role in the lack of preparation for its success from the political standpoint. The Tunisian authorities were expecting the Libyan leader to go through Tunisia from Algeria to the Jamahiriyah through the southwest part, not the souteast. Accordingly, the banners were hung in the cities through which it was expected his caravan would pass. The ministers of interior and defense went to the Tunisian-Algerian border to meet the guest, but everyone was surprised when al-Qadhdhafi's airplane arrived at Munastir airport, the birth place of President Bourguiba, who is undergoing treatment in the United States. From there, the Libyan leader went to Safagis (Sfax) to meet with four Tunisian ministers, and from there he went to Qabis, where Mzali was on a tour of southern cities. This change in the direction of the trip influenced the results of the discussions. They were not subject to prior preparation, and the meetings between the ministers had not been prepared for. However despite that, they did result in an important matter for the two countries' relations, since they removed what the Libyan foreign secretary last year called the psychological barrier between the two governments, especially since the visit came only 4 days before the second anniversary of the Oafsah incident on 27 January 1980. It was also the first time the Libyan leader has visited Tunisia since that incident.

From this standpoint, al-Qadhdhafi's visit recalls the discussions of 'Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki with Mzali in Tunis a year ago. They achieved the first step toward reconciliation, but the Libyan secretary of foreign liaison told AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI that the two governments had agreed upon a program of continuous contacts and that they had agreed upon a visit by the Tunisian prime minister to the Jamahiriyah in 1981 to preside over the Joint Supreme Tunisian-Libyan Committee. However, the visit has not taken place.

If we were to take stock of relations between the two countries in the first year of reconciliation, we would find that it is more of an economic harvest than a political one. The 1981 accomplishment was to revive the previous economic agreements and the signing of some new agreements, on the occasion of the Tunisian minister of national economy's visit to Tripoli and the visit of his Libyan counterpart to Tunis. If the dispute over Tunisia's joining the OAPEC caused a slight jolt to the course of reconciliation, it is evident that, in the field of economics, this course is still a candidate for continuation, because the Tunisian politician who will visit Tripoli in the next few days is the minister of transportation and communications.

Observers feel that the Libyan side's reluctance to fulfill Tunisia's demands is what will prevent the two countries from reaching full reconciliation and has caused the difference in reactions with regard to al-Qadhdhafi's visit to Tunisia. This was emphasized by the newspaper AL-'AMAL, the

spokesman for the ruling al-Destour Party. It commented on it by saying: "We are enticed this time by the hope that the Libyan president's visit and the friendly conversations that he held with Tunisian officials can be included within the framework of the new climate, which has prevailed in bilateral relations since the formation of the Mzali government."

This position was the sole official comment issued as a result of al-Qadhdhafi's visit, since the two sides did not issue a joint communique or a press statement. This was the same case after the Algeria visit.

Hassan II in Paris

Aside from these contacts and meetings that occurred in the Arab Maghreb area, another diplomatic event happened on the other side of the Mediterranean, which has had an important influence on relations among the nations of the area. King Hassan II went to Paris, after the visit which Mzali made to the French capital, and following the period of estrangement between Mitterrand's socialist government and Rabat, as a result of the Casablanca incidents last June, and the solidarity of the ruling Socialist Party in France with the Moroccan opposition, as well as President Mitterrand's visit to Algeria.

This is a part of France's efforts to regain its position in the area, after other powers, and especially the United States, have begun to compete with Paris and shake up its traditional role and status. These French efforts will certainly continue, especially since French Premier Mauroy is preparing to officially visit Tunisia at the end of February. Whatever the purpose of this French competition with other international powers to woo the Maghrebi nations and to play a major role in solving the Western Sahara problem, by offerring good offices between Algeria and Rabat, the current efforts toward reconciliation are putting the relaxed situation into the column of permanent things in the area, since it is the only option available to the governments to expunge the specter of tension and war that has plagued the region for more than 6 years. Some signs predict the continuation of the relaxed climate, most importantly the invitation extended by the Tunisian government to the Libyan leader to visit Tunis, after Bourguiba's return from the United States, and Mzali's announcement that he is once again prepared to visit the Jamahiriyah.

These developments in the Arab Maghreb intersect with the efforts being made to restore to normal the relations between Amman and Damascus and the efforts to clear the air between Riyadh and Tripoli, and Baghdad and Tripoli, in preparation for the resumption of the Fez summit by achieving a minimum of solidarity.

7005

CSO: 4504/218

BRIEFS

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES MODIFIED--Well-informed Arab sources said that the Palestinian resistance has recently upgraded certain types of medium-range surface-to-surface missiles. The sources specified that the technical apparatuses of the resistance have made modifications to this type of missile in order to enable it to reach targets within Israeli cities should a confrontation with Israel take place in the near future. [Text] [London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 111, 27 Mar 82 p 10]

CSO: 4404/417

FUTURE OF UNIFIED CURRENCY REVIEWED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1324, 19 Mar 82 p 45

/Article by 'Adnan Karimah: "The Unified Dinar before the Travelers' Checks!"/

/Text/ It seems that the luncheon meeting the Federation of Arab Banks held at the Summerland Hotel in Beirut this 6 March did not bear fruit: its purpose was to entice the proprietors of banks operating in Lebanon to subscribe to \$15 million of capital in the Arab Financial Services Company, which will be Visa's partner in issuing Arab travelers' checks. Most bankers were observed to be unenthusiastic about contributing capital to a degree where the luncheon turned into a criticism of the steps that have been taken in this sphere.

Some bankers cast doubt on the economic feasibility of the project, which holds that the market for travelers' checks exceeds \$35 billion a year, of which 11 percent (or about \$4 billion) is in Arab countries, and that sales in the first year will be an estimated \$800 million. One banker wondered about the degree of truth to this study, the degree to which it conformed to the real state of the banking and financial market, and the sources it relied on in estimating anticipated first year sales.

Some other bankers cast doubt on the success of the project, since it is not based on essential premises in the Arab nation; they said it would be necessary to unify Arab currency and issue a unified Arab dinar before issuing the travelers' checks.

A third group of Lebanese bankers, being adamant about their Lebanese identity, said, in rebuke, "It would have been proper to choose Lebanon as headquarters for the travelers' check company, because Lebanon has advantages and capabilities, rather than choosing the town of Abu Dhabi in the state of the Arab Emirates."

Thus the secretary general of the Federation of Arab Banks, Dr Zuhayr al-'Ashshi, suffered a disappointment he had perhaps not been anticipating from the Lebanese banks, especially since the federation had adopted Beirut as one of its head-quarters.

Even the federation's activity was the object of criticism by the Lebanese banks. Since a second headquarters for the federation was established in Abu Dhabi, most of the activity has moved there. The greatest indication of that is the fact that

the quasi-permanent residence of the secretary general is in the capital of the state of the Arab Emirates. Some bankers broached the need to have the federation's board of directors, who are to meet next April, convene in Lebanon, considering that the security situation does not constitute an obstacle.

However, it appears that Dr al-'Ashshi was not concerned with the Lebanese bankers' stand and their lack of enthusiasm to subscribe to the capital of the Arab Financial Company, which is taking part, along with the foreign firm Visa, in issuing Arab travelers' checks, on grounds that the shares of the Gulf bankers who agreed to subscribe, especially in the Arab Emirates, exceed the sum needed to cover the capital, which could be as much as \$20 million.

The real problem does not lie in finding the money; one should realize that the smallest bank in the Gulf can pay the needed amount. Rather, it is connected to the most important goals of Arab travelers' checks, which is to underline the Arab personality in financial markets and limit the constant demand for free currencies, supplying Arab currencies in a manner which will result in stabilization of their prices in the market. On top of that, the checks will help facilitate payments among Arab countries.

Will the Federation of Arab Bank checks facilitate these objectives?

It is enough to point out that two important countries have stayed away from these checks in order to judge that they will fail.

First, Saudi Arabia, economically the biggest Arab country, whose market, in size, accounts for 50 percent of the Arab market It is not content to avoid participating in the federation's checks: its banks, with the Monetary Authority, have started preparing to issue Saudi travelers' checks.

Second, Lebanon, which is the freest Arab country in terms of money and could play a great role in marketing the travelers' checks, especially since it is a tourist country with financial and commercial relations that are open to the world.

Finally, the question remains: who will market the Federation of Arab Bank checks? Where? Who will make them an alternative to such Arab checks as those of Saudi Arabia, those of Iraq, issued by the al-Rafidayn Bank, and foreign checks such as those of American Express or Thomas Cook?

11887

CSO: 4404/384

ENERGY POLICY EXAMINED; GAS TERMED DECISIVE FACTOR

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 938, 12-18 Feb 82 pp 8-11

[Article by Y. Ould Moussa]

[Text] During the first 2 months of 1982, Algeria has entered a new stage of implementing the energy policy drawn up in December 1980 by the Central Committee, in which gas is an essential and decisive factor.

In signing a long-term agreement with Gaz de France for Algeria to supply 9.18 billion cubic meters per year over a period of 20 years, SONATRACH [National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons] achieved a goal for which our country has shown a constant and unflagging desire: to develop its energy resources in accordance with the principles of energy security and our development policy. In April 1981, the Belgian company Distrigas also concluded an agreement with SONATRACH for delivery of 5 billion cubic meters of gas per year, similarly directed toward mutual and reciprocal interests and the application of the principles of conservation and development of our hydrocarbon resources.

The growth of the natural gas market has been very rapid over the past few years, and has accelerated since mid-1979 in reaction to crude oil price trends. Natural gas, of increasing interest to both producers and consumers, is no longer a marginal stake in the energy debate, but has become a significant component.

On the one hand, importing countries are giving it a growing role in their energy budget forecasts, both out a concern to diversify sources and due to technical considerations.

On the other hand, hydrocarbon-exporting countries are trying to define an overall gas policy and to articulate it together with oil policy as a function of the overall development of energy markets.

In recent times, the persistence of a contradictory twofold trend can be observed in market development. First of all, the tendency is growing to establish a relatively homogeneous international gas market, itself a part of the world energy market.

At the same time, producers and consumers still find themselves in much more specific situations than is the case in oil matters.

Although the principle of readjustment in relation to oil prices has gained over time and testing, the methods for this readjustment are still at the center of discussion. For what is a fair and profitable price for gas?

If fact, for our country, gas should bring a price that is favorable to the development of this resource, and as far as price is concerned, time is and has been on our side. The stake today is to negotiate for the future in order to be able to control the broad trends of international development and to partake of it for our economy and for the conservation of our resources.

Of course, prices count today in any negotiations, but it is still necessary to negotiate trends and movement, and not to freeze at levels which are assumed to be "profitable" but which may later only prove harmful to the national interest and to export revenues.

Forecasts for 1990 confirm the trend toward a growth in gas consumption in Western and Eastern Europe, while Japan and various Third World countries are emerging as significant consumers.

Gas will play a larger role in covering the energy requirements of Western countries--up to 25 percent of their supplies.

Movement toward an economy where natural gas plays a major role is therefore indisputable; this trend has not failed to influence prices, their method of establishment, and conditions for developing bids.

The growth in the world energy market should help to remove the major obstacle to the development of research in the production and extraction of natural gas: i.e., the overly high cost of investments and the corresponding low level of gas revenues as compared to oil revenues. This growth is fundamental, since what is the use of exporting gas if the operation is not obviously profitable?

Also, consumers' as well as producers' sudden awareness of the necessity for and reality of gas development would favor a more realistic price policy.

Producers, controlling their deposits, are refusing to waste and, as is the case in Algeria, are supporting the development and realization of the potential of gas resources.

As for consumers, they are more aware of the specific uses of gas and therefore of the nature of effective and more or less immediate substitutes, and of the increasing need to save natural gas for special rather than ordinary uses.

Developments in this regard have led, with difficulty of course, to bringing producers and consumers closer together in the evaluation of equivalents.

Finally, despite fluctuating economies, the size of fixed installations and distribution networks encourages, more than in the past, stability and long-term concerns in contract negotiations among parties.

As recent history has shown, this has not eliminated the possibility of rediscussing existing agreements or relations, but it has imposed a specific negotiating climate and introduced specific parameters.

So far, although adjustment mechanisms have worked, they have done so only partially and with delays, and furthermore they have not been able to take modified equivalents into account. They therefore have been doubly unsatisfactory.

In seeking a viable and lasting solution to the price question, our country has played a leading role in remaining faithful to the principles of national sovereignty and the true sense of international cooperation based on mutual and reciprocal interests.

The Soundness Of a Principle

Such are the facts that have characterized the development of the gas issue for our country, and more generally, everything that guided Algerian policy on hydrocarbons, which remains closely linked to our development policy.

The policy has always favored transforming non renewable energy resources into productive assets which would enable true economic independence now and in the future.

In this context, our country became resolutely involved in the struggle to recover its natural resources in 1971, taking in hand all sectors related to the development of hydrocarbons and placing them in the service of the fundraising effort undertaken by the Algerian nation.

The raising of petroleum revenues for development was thus the ultimate goal of a series of battles whose consequences were very difficult for our economy, since we had just put an end to an established order in this area. In independent Algeria, it was no longer a question of allowing the riches of the Algerian subsoil to remain in the hands of foreign entities whose reasoning had nothing to do with the Algerian revolution's options and choices.

The nationalization of hydrocarbon resources, accomplished in 1971, was not sufficient in itself, since development of our resources called for action on the international level quite soon. From 1971 to 1973, events reinforced the chances for success of international action, thanks to the more pronounced emergence of OPEC and the assertion by the nonaligned nations of a series of principles and objectives: improvement of trade terms, development and control of resources, and a regrouping of the exporting developing countries into an association of producers.

This movement supporting the legitimate claims of the Third World countries found its culmination, as far as approach and action were concerned, in the

September 1973 session of the summit on nonaligned nations in Algiers, which saw the adoption of an extensive platform and the birth of a slogan: the new international economic order.

The October 1973 war and the awakening of the Arab nation, using petroleum as a weapon for the first time, precipitated the creation of favorable conditions for revaluation of the price of petroleum.

Also, Algeria's international action in regard to energy must be considered a direct extension of our internal policy of mobilizing and developing our natural resources in the interest of the economic growth and progress to which our people aspire, at the cost of immense sacrifice and efforts which often are painful.

This summary of the situation which prevailed for petroleum, as a means of achieving economic independence, is necessary today for all those, wherever they may be, who have short memories or do not want to see or hear.

For in fact, although the conditions were certainly different for gas, the battle and the stakes remained the same, were of the same nature, and had the same significance for our country.

Thus, it was the same principle which guided Algeria's action when it was a matter or gas. Today, all the positions regarding gas that are reached with difficulty are derived from this same principle—i.e., that national sovereignty and international cooperation can, when the will exists, be combined.

Algerian ideas concerning gas have gained ground despite the obstacles and vicissitudes generated by the lingering behavior and attitudes of nations that have never come over to Algeria's side.

The difficulties in obtaining from gas what was obtained from oil were similar: lack of an international market, massive and costly investments, political conditions, the nature of international economic relations, etc.

Indexing, adjustment, parity, and energy equivalents were the most commonly used jargon terms in an intensive debate where the stakes were as high on the political level as on the economic level for each of the parties.

Today, with a second agreement—after Distrigas (Belgium)—being signed by Gaz de France, the complete soundness of a principle and a struggle are being corraborated and realized.

You don't sell gas the way you do potatoes. The interdependencies of the world economy and their current nature have caused Algeria to display a constant desire only to exercise and assert its rights which are: to handle its own resources, to raise funds from them for its economic and social development, and to deal as equals with all its partners.

Gas: Mutual Interests

When the gas battle began to take shape in 1979, there was a general outcry. All of Europe reproached the Belgians for having accepted the Algerian proposals on a 20-year agreement for the delivery of 5 billion cubic meters per year starting in 1982.

It was through this agreement that the principle of energy equivalents between crude oil and liquified natural gas prices was confirmed. It will be subsequently required of all trading partners for long-term agreements, with an indexing method allowing gradual alignment of the price of gas to the price of oil.

Algerian gas was sold to various European purchasers (France, United Kingdom, Spain, Italy) at prices between \$3.50 and \$3.60 per million BTU's at the beginning of 1980.

The application of indexing clauses and lower price level in France than on the spot market in Rotterdam in 1980 led to particularly low indexed price compared to what we wanted—approximately \$3.00 per million BTU for gas sold in France.

Spain paid approximately \$4.00, and England, which concluded a small contract, [paid] \$3.15.

More than price, it is the readjustment that our country intends to base permanently on the trends in resources whose production it controls.

In any case, the movement toward an increasing value for gas through parity with crude oil, then subsequently through alignment on the prices of higher and higher level substitutes, points to the future and is taking shape over time.

The Algerian proposals for modifying the price structure based on the decisions of several countries which have increased their gas prices: Mexico, \$4.47; Abu Dhabi, \$5.39; and Canada, \$4.50.

The contract recently concluded between Gaz de France and SONATRACH brought an end to 2 years of tough ne otiations. Its results are: delivery by Algeria of 9.18 billion cubic meters per year over a 20-year period at a price slightly over the world rate.

It will be indexed on a sample composed of prices of eight crude oils.

Algeria is transporting 50 percent of the exports destined for France.

What must be recognized in this agreement is that France is assured of having gas available for 20 years according to a method of alignment which guarantees the security of its supply and the predictability of the cost. As for Algeria, it is only exercising a right in exporting its gas to stable partners at a price which assures it revenues that reflect the efforts agreed to by its people and international energy realities.

In fact, the Algerian-French contract is the very model of the transformation of an unconscionable bargain into a bilateral contract.

Business is best when the two parties are satisfied.

When the political desire exists, when objective consideration of the energy market and its development is conducted in a straightforward manner, it is proven that common ground can be found and that the full meaning and spirit of the expression "mutual interests" can be conveyed.

For our country, the principle of conserving energy requires that gas take over for oil in financing the economic effort, on the one hand, and particularly in keeping intact the capacities of the national production apparatus whose energy consumption will grow rapidly in the years to come. Conserving our oil for the future needs of the national economy requires that our gas be sold under the best conditions to all those who know how to see the trees in the forest and who understand the future requirements of international relations.

Implementation of North-South Dialogue

One of the meanings which can be derived from the concluding of the Algerian-French agreement is the desire on the part of the new socialist government to impelment a North-South dialogue through acts intended to change relations between developed and developing countries. During President Francois Mitter-rand's visit to Algeria, the joint political desire to succeed was expressed, especially as France intends to obtain the economic means necessary to mark its true commitment to mutual advantage and well-understood interests.

In Cancun, President Chadli Bendjedid showed that Algeria has always been ready to work toward a fundamental change in international economic structures and relationships. This attitude is one of the principles of our foreign policy and of the meaning given to international cooperation.

For our country, gas must be developed, since the very heavy investments agreed to by the Algerian people cannot serve the interests of just anyone.

The new climate which has been established between Paris and Algiers, stripped of all neocolonial character, has brought about the pleasing and mutually beneficial outcome of an episode of cooperation between two countries and shows, if such is necessary, the state of health of the new Algerian-French relationship, as it expresses an equal inclination on the part of Algeria and France to reach a more balanced rapport in the broader context of North-South relations.

The international implications of the signing of this gas agreement show, on the one hand, that when one is sure of one's sound rights, one never fails, and that, on the other hand, guaranteeing the future as far as energy is concerned is possible when political clearsightedness and economic realism are not lacking. The implementation of the North-South dialogue requires this. Some have understood this; others expect to do so.

9693

CSO: 4519/128

LIBERATION FRONT MEMBER DISCUSSES OPPOSITION. GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN

Tehran AL-SHAHID in Arabic No 77, 6 Jan 82 pp 22-24

[Interview with one of the leaders of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, held in Beirut by AL-SHAHID's correspondent: "More Than 1,000 Arrested Within a Few Days"; date of interview not given]

[Text] All Segments of the Population Participated in the 1954-56 Uprising, and the Mrsses Began [Their Demonstrations] at Their Mosques.

The Reactionary Regime in Bahrain Is Drawing Upon Zionist Expertise in the Realms of Espionage and Torture of the Freedom-Fighters.

On the map Bahrain might seem to be no more than a dot in the middle of the Gulf. However, the role which it plays is much greater than its geographical size. This is the conclusion reached by AL-SHAHID's correspondent who interviewed one of the leaders of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain in Beirut. And when you read this interview, you will come to the same conclusion, and consequently you—as did we—will see nothing unusual in the scope of recent events in Bahrain and will not be surprised by future events.

[Question] Why does Bahrain appear to be a tool in the hands of the informational media of the tyrants whenever they try to discredit the Islamic revolution in Iran? One day they claim that Iran is demanding Bahrain, and the trumped-up media campaign concerning this matter is still going on. The next day they claim that Iran has prepared sabotage groups to operate in Bahrain. Why is this island the source of all this attention? And why are conspiracies such as these always launched by Bahrain's regime?

[Answer] Bahrain has an important strategic position. Here I am not referring to its geographical position, although its geographical position is also important. What I have in mind is [its position for] setting the direction for the message of Islam—a message which is being launched again today. Historically Bahrain was one of the few countries which, without any battles being fought, chose Islam and embraced the new message. After that units of the armies of Islam set out to liberate Iran

from the tyrant kings who were ruling Iran at that time, and then these armies carried the new message to and beyond Central Asia. Its masses acted as vanguards for protecting this religion from the conspiracies aiming to destroy it, distort it, or falsify its essence. These conspiracies which Islam was subject to at different times have continued to crop up. But the masses of Bahrain, together with their many revolutionary sons, have taken heroic stances in their confrontation with these conspiracies. In fact, one of the tyrants who was ruling [Bahrain] in the name of Islam at one time undertook to fill up 'Ayn al-[Sjur), one of the most important water wells in Bahrain, when his conspiracies did not succeed in stopping the Muslim people's movement there. This proved to be very costly to the Bahrainis because it meant the disappearance of their agriculture, which was the backbone of their economy at that time.

In modern times—and let us consider this to be the period since World War I—there have been continuous uprisings by the masses of Bahrain. This same grievance on the part of the masses found expression in the uprising of 1932. The uprising was undertaken by sailors, fishermen, and divers who were protesting the corruption which had come to Bahrain along with the foreigners. One of the "orientalists" who visited Bahrain at that time said that "the stores selling refreshments boycotted him and would not sell him anything because he was a foreigner."

Then there was the 1954-56 uprising in which various sectors of the population participated. During that time the largest strike in the area occurred. The strike went on for a full week and embraced all trades and professions. During this time the masses held their meetings in mosques and their demonstrations started at the mosques. Later on there were uprisings in the sixties, and throughout the seventies there were uprisings nearly every year.

With the victory of the Islamic revolution at the end of the seventies, there was a merging of the aspirations of the people of the area, which these people had been trying for centuries to achieve—and this includes the Muslim people of Bahrain—with the reality of the Islamic regime which had actually been established by the Islamic revolution which had been victorious in Iran. The struggle then took on a new direction, a new thrust, and more advanced approaches.

This change was also matched by a similar change in methods utilized by the ruling regime in Bahrain to suppress its masses, to hold them back, and to destroy their aspirations which had been asserted. These means and methods [utilized by the ruling regime in Bahrain] were seen in the development of its intelligence apparatus and in the fact that it drew upon various expertise (including Zionist expertise) in the realms of esiponage and torture of freedom-fighters. All of the continuous propaganda which has been waged against the Islamic revolution in Iran represents nothing more than one of the elements of change in the means and methods used by teh [Bahraini] regime to slander the Islamic revolution and create a psychological barrier between the Muslim masses in Bahrain, who have seen that their aspirations and their model are embodied in the

Islamic regime which is being established in Iran, and this victorious revolution. This propaganda is also trying to justify the repression and unofficial state of emergency which has been declared against the [Bahraini] masses, and in addition to all of this this propaganda is attempting to prepare a political atmosphere which would permit foreign troops to intervene and put down the Islamic revolution-on the pretext that the Islamic revolution is conspiring against Bahrain and the Gulf area. The atmosphere there is also being prepared for the establishment of complete coordination between the nations of the area concerning intelligence, exchange of information, and pursuing and hunting down freedom-fighters. Why was it that such coordination, if only on a very simple level, did not exist before the victory of [the Islam c revolution in] Iran? Why is this coordination taking place now, and in this form? It can safely be said that this coordination is in the forefront of the plans which the imperialists have concerning their conspiracy against Iran. The basic premise [of the imperialists] is that there is a uniform danger which now threatens all of the pro-American regimes in the area. As for recent events in particular, it is noticeable that they occurred after the victories which our brethren in Iran had achieved against the army of Saddam Husayn. The magnification of these events has the sole objective of reestablishing a new front against Iran even though such a front is not prepared to face Iran (neither militarily, nor in terms of human resources, nor in terms of the U.S.'s desire to keep the oil-well areas from being exposed to the dangers of this confrontation). This leads us to believe that such a front is being prepared to support direct U.S. intervention on the pretext of protecting these regimes--especially after the most advanced of the U.S. conspiracies (the Iraqi war which has been forced on Iran) has already headed down the road to failure.

What we wish to reaffirm here is that Iran will now be hastening the march of the masses toward victory, not only in Bahrain, but in the whole area, and, in fact, in the whole world. Juhayman in the Arabian Peninsula, Khalid al-Islambuli, who executed Sadat on 6 October, and the revolutionaries who forced the Bourguiba regime to prohibit the veil [sic] in Tunisia-all of these people were expressing century-long aspirations and a similar struggle to establish an Islamic regime. The Iranian victory has heated up the arena, intensified the struggle and confrontation, and brought closer to home the theory of victory by providing, on the international level, exemplary experience in terms of the struggle to achieve victory and establish a new regime (the first Islamic constitution in modern times). To prove this we could refer to the statement by the Irish revolutionaries concerning their ties (which are more than material ties) to the Islamic revolution. They are being inspired by its theory of martyrdom to achieve victory for a cause, and this was something which also occurred with the revolutionaries of Nicaragua before that, with the blacks in the U.S. and Britain, and with the students of South Korea who nearly brought down the South Korean regime 2 years ago.

For this reason it was necessary, as far as the imperialists were concerned, that all of these conspiracies be totally coordinated and be directed toward dealing a blow to the oppressed Muslim masses and to their ever-rising revolutions.

In addition to this, it was necessary for the imperialists to slander the revolutionary and civilizational model provided by Iran, and to picture it as being dominated by savages, and consequently, characterized by anarchy, blood, and conspiracy against existing regimes.

[Question] To what degree have the conspiracies engaged in by the authorities in Bahrain succeeded in achieving their goals?

[Answer] To the same degree that the conspiracies of the Al Khalifah overlords there have been successful, to the same degree that the Tabas operation, for example, was a success, or to the same degree that efforts were successful to detach Kordestan [from Iran], bring about a military coup d'etat [in Iran], or [to bring to a successful conclusion] the war which Iraq has forced upon Iran!

As for the domestic scene in Bahrain, Bahrain's masses knew where they were headed and knew where the road led. They knew that they were waging their historic struggle and playing their historic role. This was a struggle which their forefathers had done their part in, and which their sons would also do their part in. They knew what they wanted, whom they were fighting against, and who their friends were. For this reason they were not fooled by the regime's propaganda about the sectarian nature of the Islamic revolution—since they live under one of the worst sectarian regimes in the world, which is disrupting their unity—and about their sectarian classification. Nor were they fooled by the claims that Iran had designs on Bahrain since they knew that this was nothing more than a lot of nonesense trumped up by the Western news media and would never get beyond that stage.

This is how one could categorize the claims that Iran sent sabotage groups to threaten the stability of "a peaceful country, to create anarchy there, and to deprive its citizens of the achievements which its regime had carried o t for them"!!

All the people of Bahrain know that those committing the sabotage are the members of the ruling family and their mercenaries who threaten peaceful people with death if one of them refuses to allow his daughter to marry (for only one night) one of the shaykhs. Every Bahraini knows at least one story about the crimes committed by the Amir, the prime minister, or Muhammad, the Amir's elder brother, who has once again started violating young women and destroying families. These are not merely stories which people tell to entertain themselves and to laugh at their rulers. These are real stories. Those who tell these stories know the victims of this anarchy which the Al Khalifah regime is spreading all over Bahrain. They know names, addresses, and all of the other details. They actually have lists of names of girls who have been violated by members of the ruling family—especially by "ali ibn Khalifah, the son of the prime minister, who is being groomed for an important position in the regime.

This is one aspect of the sabotage being waged by the Al Khalifah gang which is in Bahrain only because of murder, terror, and reliance on foreign powers (Britain, then the U.S.). As for achievements carried out by the regime for the masses, the only projects engaged in by the regime have been for the benefit of the services sector, and Bahrain's economy has become mainly a services-sector-oriented economy. This services sector is a non-productive one and serves to concentrate wealth in the hands of the Al Khalifah regime and those benefiting therefrom, such as the owners of the factory manufacturing plastic materials, paper handkerchief manufacturers, owners of hotels, owners of banks, brokers, and producers of soft drinks.

The way to achieve wealth in Bahrain is to participate in projects dealing with the manufacture of consumer goods. Any project concerning real production is doomed to failure. In fact, basically such projects are not allowed to be implemented!! One of the regime's projects which the "saboteurs" had in mind to threaten was the project involving the building of horse stables for Bahrain's ruler and ruling family. The cost of constructing a single such stable is millions [of Bahraini dinars]. (The reason is that the stables are centrally air conditioned and provided with fresh drinking water, and the normal drinking water which is drunk by the people of Bahrain is from artesian wells.) Where are the projects for munufacturing and production? Even the alumi: um plant is a consumeroriented project because it depends totally on importing its raw materials from abroad.) Where is the petrochemical industry which raises the prices of crude oil several-fold by breaking the crude oil down into its derivatives? Furthermore, where are the projects which will guarantee the future of the coming generations or even the future of the children who are being born right now? When these children are 9 years old, they will discover that no more oil can be gotten out of the oil wells of Bahrain. (According to the latest estimates of oil reserves, Bahrain's oil reserves are the smallest among the OPEC nations. They are expected to last for only 9 more years.) Why has there been destruction of agriculture?! Why have the wells been filled up (just as the tyrants of old did)? Why have the date trees been cut down, and why have housing complexes been built for the foreigner mercenaries who are working in the regime's various apparatuses and intelligence services? These, then, are the achievements of the regime which it is feared that the masses will do away with by means of Iran's "conspiracies"!! All of this has concerned Bahrain's domestic situation. How about Bahrain's foreign policy? We have already mentioned that teh conspiracy has a foreign dimension and that it is basically being hatched abroad. The media campaign against Iran has not achieved any success in terms of dealing a blow to this revolution and the Islamic movement in the region. As we have said, all of the U.S. conspiracies against the revolution have failed. The Al Khalifah regime has directly participated in these conspiracies.

As we have already mentioned, it has done so through its informational media. It has also done this materially: Some of the airplaines which took part in the Tabas operation started out from Bahrain. Furthermore, Iraqi naval vessels (destroyers) have anchored in Bahrain's ports. In addition to this, Bahrain's hospitals have opened their doors to the Iraqi wounded to be treated there.

The Islamic revolution is still making continuous progress. This is happening both in Bahrain itself and in the rest of the Middle East, such as in Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, the Arabian Peninsula, and Iraq.

[Question] How do you explain the widespread statements of solidarity and support for the recent arrests and acts of repression in Bahrain?

[Answer] These declarations of support were expected from the client regimes which are bound by a common destiny and were no surprise to the oppressed Muslim peoples of the world. They were also something which was expected from those who are concerned with being able to survive in order to continue their joint operation of (to varying degrees) swindling and stealing our Muslim people's capital and property. They were also expected from the poets and half-educated people whom God cursed in his Book and who put out the press of the ruling authorities both in Bahrain and in the rest of the region, especially in Saudi Arabia. Such people describe the revolutionary heroes in Bahrain in the same terms that they describe the revolutionary heroes who were martyrs in [Saudi Arabia's] Eastern Province and who carried out the operation at the Holy Mosque in Mecca 2 years ago. So there is nothing new about these declarations of support, and most likely it is the CIA.) The new element which should be mentioned here, and which reassures us about the future of the Islamic revolution in Bahrain, is the fact that there has been broad-based mass support for the Islamic movement. What does it mean when such huge numbers (estimated at more than 1,000 so far) of people are arrested from among the ranks of a nation whose population is not more than 300,000? The huge number of recent arrests reminds us of Iran's situation shortly before the victory of the revolution there, when the jails were crammed with revolutionaries. It also reminds us of Sadat's jails which he filled up only a few weeks before he was executed.

Another new element in this issue is the fact that the authorities are embarking upon the stupidity of executing some of those arrested. (So far five of them are in critical condition and have been taken to the hospital's emergency ward.) We hereby warn [Bahrain's] authorities of the consequences of embarking upon such a stupid course. We call upon all Muslims in the world, the Islamic movements, and forces of struggle and liberation in the world to join in solidarity with our Muslim nation and to prevent the crimes which the corrupt regime in Bahrain intends to embark upon. We also wish to remind this regime of the fate of those who were killed by the thousands, and who were stronger and more influential than [this regime]. is. In spite of this, the masses ground them up in seconds. In the mourning processions this year, the Muslim masses in Bahrain chanted the following slogan: "I warn you, I warn you. Believe me, the worse your tyranny becomes, the shorter your life will be."

A regime such as this deserves to be executed and liquidated by our freedom-fighting masses. "Those who are victorious after being the victims of injustice shall be rewarded. But the fate of those who commit injustice against people and who desire the lands of others to which they have no right shall be painfully tormented."

[End of interview]

AL-SHAHID: "We, on behalf of this Islamic media organization, also declare our solidarity with your Muslim people and we add our voice to your voice, calling upon all clear consciences to support the Mulsim people of Bahrain."

9468

CSO: 4404/244

TRANSFERS AMONG HIGH-RANKING SECURITY OFFICERS ANNOUNCED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 8 Mar 81 p 1, 8

[Article: "Police Transfers: Three Assistant Ministers, 8 Security Directors, 32 Deputy Security Directors and 33 Assistant Security Directors Included in Limited Transfers and Appointments Involving High-Ranking Police Officers"]

[Text] It has been decided to appoint Maj Gen Ahmad Bulbul assistance minister of interior for the minister's office affairs, Maj Gen Husayn Zaki assistant minister for the Sinai and Maj Gen Muhammad 'Abdall h assistant minister for the canal and east delta area.

Hasan Abu Basha, the minister of interior, has issued a decree commissioning the following eight major generals to work as security directors [in the governorates' security directorates]: Muhammad Ra'fat in al-Qalyubiyah, Muhammad Fadi 'Umar in the New Valley, 'Ali Nur al-Din in al-Jizah, Mustafa al-A'sar in the Red Sea, Muhammad Hindi in al-Fayyum, Wahab 'Abd al-Muta'al al-Sa'idi in Bani Suwayf, Faruq Nur al-Din in Aswan and Jabir Nazlawi in Southern Sinai.

The decree also commissions Maj Gen Muhammad Nafi' to the post of director of Officers Affairs Administration, Maj Gen Muhammad Fu'ad to the post of director of the Prisons Administration, Maj Gen Ahmad Harun to the post of director of the Tourism and Antiquities Administration, Maj Gen Yusuf al-Sabban to the post of director of the Ceneral Department of Personnel Affairs and Mag Jen 'Abd al-Hamid Badawi to the post of director of the Criminal Evidence Investigation Department.

Hasan Abu Basha, minister of interior, has issued a decree providing for provisional appointments and transfers affecting 32 major generals holding the positions of deputy security directors and deputy directors in the ministry's main directorates and departments. The appointments and transfers will go into effect as of the 17th of the current month of March. The major generals involved are:

Lutfi 'Abd al-Fattah 'Atiyah, deputy commander of the central security forces; Muhammad Hilmi Salamah and Ahmad Rasikh, deputy directors in the General Directorate of Administrative Affairs; 'Abd al-Tawwab Rashwan, deputy director of the General Inspection and Control Directorate; al-Sayyid Ahmad Muhammad, deputy director of the Public Security Department; Muhammad Shawqi Munaysi,

deputy director of al-Jizah security; Shafiq Amin 'Abduh, deputy director of the Ports Security Department; Muhammad Sabir Musa, deputy director of the Cairo Airport General Security Directorate; Mahmud 'Abd al-Majid Mahbub, deputy director of the Civil Status Department; Muhammad Muhammad al-Mughir, deputy director of the General Police Supply Directorate; Muhammad Kamil al-Samahi, deputy director of Port Said security; Hindi Ahmad Hindi, deputy director of Damietta security; Anwar 'Abd al-Hamid Nassar, deputy director of the Criminal Evidence Investigation Department; Tal'at al-Sharif, deputy director of the Civil Status Department; Jamal 'Awad, deputy director of Southern Sinai security; Shukri al-Shafi'i, deputy director of Ismailia security; Midhat [family name illegible], deputy director of the General Personnel Affairs Department; Nazmi Nadim, deputy director of the General Police Supply Directatorate; Muhammad al-Najdi, deputy director of the General Traffic Department; Ahmad Qandil, deputy director of al-Fayyum security; Ahmad Sa'id 'Uthman, deputy director of Matruh security; Isma'il Zayid, deputy director of Northern Sinai security; Fathi 'Abd al-'Aziz, deputy director of al-Shaykh security; Fathi Fathallah, deputy director of al-Sharqiyah security; Isma'il Hatatah, deputy director of al-Buhayrah security; Muhammad Rida Sulayman, deputy director of the Civil Defense Department; Faruq Muhammad Wahbah, deputy director of al-Minya security; Shukri Mikha'il, deputy director of Suez security; Husni Ghanayim, deputy director of New Valley security; Rif'at Nasr, deputy director of Aswan security; Muhammad Khalid Hamdi, deputy director of the East Cairo area security; and Kamal al-Din Salim, commander of the Police Superintendents Institute.

The minister of interior has issued another decree providing for provisional transfers and appointments affecting assistant security directors. The appointments and transfers went into effect as of yesterday and involve the following 33 major generals, brigadier generals and colonels:

Brig Gen Sayyid Rif'at al-Jundi, to Cairo; Maj Gen Jalal Hamdi, to Alexandria; Maj Gen Nabih Anis Jirjis, to Port Said; Maj Gen Rif'at Zakariya Hasan, Col al-Sayyid Salam and Col Zikra Qaladah Tadrus, assistant directors of al-Qalyubiyah security; Brig Gen Ahmad Shindi, to al-Minufiyah; Maj Gen Nazmi 'Abd al-Hamid and Brig Gen Ibrahim Thabit, assistant directors of al-Gharbiyah security; Maj Gen Ahmad Shawkat, to al-Daqahliyah; Brig Gens Muhammad al-Shammuti, Muhammad 'abd al-Samad Shahin and Samir Jirjis Sa'd, assistant directors of al-Sharqiyah security; Maj Gen 'Abd al-Qadir Hamzah and 'Ali Kamal 'Awni, assistant directors of Damietta security; Brig Gen 'Izz al-Din Bajir, to Kafr al-Shaykh; Brig Gen 'Abd al-Ghani Salim Jad, to al-Buhayrah; Maj Gen Mahmud al-Tunisi, To Suez; Brig Gen Mustafa Kamil Taha, to Southern Sinai; Brig Gens Kamal al-Din Mustafa and Mahmud Hamdi Nassar, to al-Fayyum; Brig Gen Nasif Fanus to Bani Suwayf; Brig Gen Muhammad Sadiq Khalilah, to al-Minya; Maj Gens 'Als Zayn al-'Abidin al-Tantawi to Qina and Fawzi 'Abd al-Latif to Aswan; Brig Gen Yusuf Ramzi to Matruh; Col Hasan Hamdi, police chief for Itay al-Barud District, and Lt Col Muhammad Mustafa Hasan, police chief for Minuf District.

It has also been decided to entrust the duties of assistant police director to the following officers, in addition to their original duties in the departments in which they work:

Brig Gens Ahmad Matar in Ismailia, 'Adil Sayyid al-Mujabbir in Suez, Muhammad Rashad Amin in Kafr al-Shaykh, Muhammad al-Sayyid 'Azzuz in al-Minya and Muhammad Yusuf Farraj in Sawhaj.

8494

CSO: 4505/231

MUSLIM SCHOLAR EXPRESSES VIEWS ON EDUCATION, ROLE OF RELIGION

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 2983, 11 Dec 81 pp 22-26, 84

[Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Mutawalli al-Sha'rawi, prominent advocate of Islam, by Dr Husayn Mu'nis: history professor: "Radicalism Comes From Degeneration; Nothing Is Right When It Is Far From God's Path; There Is No Noble Work and No Menial Work, Issue Is for Each of Us To Do His Work Well"; date and place not specified]

[Text] This is a debate between His Eminence Shaykh Muhammad Mutawalli al-Sha'rawi and Dr Husayn Mu'nis, arranged by AL-MUSAWWAR. It is a dialogue between the prominent advocate of Islam and the history professor who has lived as a writer in al-Hilal House newspapers for nearly 30 years.

The debate has focused on important issues, including the issues of youth, education, women, the Islamic sects and even the recent Fez conference. In the debate, Shaykh al-Sha'rawi discussed divine revelations. He also acknowledged that for 60 years of his life, he was unable to meet the masses. He also confessed that he left no Arabic book unread but that in recent years he has only read the honorable Koran. Here are the details of what took place in this debate:

[Question] Where do you see the mistake in the recent incidents staged in Egypt by the radical groups?

[Answer] The fault lies with those affiliated with Islam. Regrettably, they only remember Islam when a tremor shakes one or another aspect of their life. When they look around for the cause of this tremor, they find--very proudly--that the reason is the obstruction of one of the dictates of Islam. Were Islam embraced in its entirety, such gaps would not develop. But when Islam is embraced in bits and pieces, it is not of much use to us in such cases. This is why we fail to find the desired solution. Religion [Islam] has solutions for all of man's problems, provided it is embraced in its entirety and not in bits and pieces. What happens is that during our exercise of government, a hole appears and we try to patch it. Then another hole appears and we look for a means to patch it and fail again because we only consider the spot where the first or second hole has appeared. But if we embrace Islam in its entirety, none of this would happen.

We and Youth Problems

Speaking of youth problems, for example, I find that we think of youth problems only after we have suffered from juvenile delinquency, youth radicalism and youth ignorance of religious affairs. What is surprising is that those committing these delinquent acts attribute them—and attribute themselves—to Islam. This means that those who speak in the name of religion are ignorant of religion.

I have said repeatedly that we must define the phase in which we can educate. The stage in which education is useful and beneficial is childhood because the youth phase is a phase of strength and of maturity. Once the youth's development is complete, how can we educate him? Education is supposed to take place in the childhood phase and in the teenage years so that we can reap its fruits when the teenager reaches the phase of youth. But when we let children grow into youths with their independent personalities and their inclinations and faults, it becomes difficult for us to organize their life and to correct the crookedness caused by the inadequacy of religious education because we have missed the educating phase. At this time, the only alternative left to us is firmness and disciplinary action because we have missed the educating phase. Here, we make another mistake because violence is not a commendable means of education.

When we want to set a course for educating children, not youth, I say that Islam differs from all the methods dealing with education because the methods dealing with education are man-made and in man-made methods we see the problem only after the catastrophe occurs, meaning that people become aware of the flaw only after they are afflicted by it. But the method of Islam, which is a divine method, deals with matters with advance planning made by the Creator, may He be praised. This is divine planning. In my opinion, we must go beyond educating children to educating those who are in charge of educating children. Children exist in every family. Islam focuses primarily on the family and offers us the sound bases along which matters must proceed from the beginning in forming the family. In Islam, the family begins with the selection of a virtuous wife because women are married usually for family, lineage and beauty. All these are transient appearances. Why? because they are short-lived. Beauty withers, prestige changes and money is not lasting. The religious rule with which Islam starts is a growing, flourishing and everlasting rule. God's prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, says: "Win a religious woman and you will pat yourself on the back." He also says: "If a man comes to you and you approve of him as a husband, then marry him." When a man asked the prophet to whom he should marry his daughter, the prophet told him: "Marry her to a religious man because if he loves her he will honor her and if he hates her he will not be unfair to her."

Therefore, it is my view that a family formed on this sound religious basis can be assured of the strength of its children. In such a family, children can be raised on sound bases. The proof of this is that when a small child in a virtuous family hears the voice of the caller calling for prayers he hastens to bring his father his prayer rug. In such a family, the child develops many good habits. He always tries to imitate his father and listens to all the good religious conversations that take place in his home, thus gaining a strong immunity that protects him when he reaches puberty. But what happens usually is that we fail to create the right

atmosphere for children when they are young, and we delay their religious education until they are confused with things and until matters are complicated for them when they reach puberty. In this case, it is natural that they will misbehave.

It is well-known that sound religious education begins with the virtuous man who chooses a virtuous woman and who does not approach her until he mentions the name of God. He thus lays a good foundation. When his virtuous wife gives birth, he chooses a good name for the child and the wife pays attention to nursing him. Islam has shown us the method of good education. The prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, said: "Bring him up for 7 years, educate him for 7 years and be his friend for 7 years." This means that if the child makes a mistake in the first 7 years, he is to be corrected gently. In the next 7 years, if he makes a mistake he is to be punished. Then comes the fierce phase of the third 7 years. In these years, the child must be befriended and must be always surrounded by his parents' care. This reduces the chances of his falling into the company of evil friends and developing bad habits. In this critical phase of his life, religion surrounds him with a fence of care and guidance.

Modern Influences in Education

Then come the things that influence education. In the past, the educational influences were limited and we could restrict them to the family and the teacher. But with the progress of time, there are countless influences, such as the press, the radio, movies and television. Therefore, under circumstances in which the influences are numerous, controls must be developed. In this many-sided age, there is the street and there are the media and other varied things that cause vacillation. At present, we are content with teaching the student the sciences. In the past, the student studied with a limited number of people. In that case, influence was almost uniform. But now the student sees so many ceachers a day, not to mention a year. In these days, there is no teacher who pours his soul into the student. Rather, this teacher instills something in the student and that teacher obliterates it. It is not like in the past when the teaching was done by the shaykh who poured his soul into the student and who was a model for the student. It was said then that such and such a student graduated on the hands of such and such a shaykh, meaning that the shaykh was the one who educated the student. This being the case, the student tried to be a true image of the shaykh. But now, the student forgets who taught him because the teachers are so numerous. The problems have also multiplied. The result is the shakiness and the instability that we notice in the character of the youth.

[Question] This reminds me of Yahya ibn Yahya al-Laythi, a prominent Andalusian scholar who studied with Malik. After completing his studies, Yahya stayed with Malik for another year. He was asked about the reason for this and he said: I am studying his character. Imagine that!

[Answer] Of course, of course. But such things have now come to an end. There is another thing, namely, that people confuse religious education with any secular education. Most of the time, people cannot distinguish the two. We teach the child any science and we only try to convey the information to his mind. Afterwards, the student himself will be eager to apply this information to his life

because it is beneficial to him in his material life and because it makes it easier for him to meet all his needs, even his carnal passions. The secular method of education is confined to conveying information, as we have said. But sound religious education requires the teacher to build the character and identity of the youth and to control his actions in a manner that enables the youth to develop his personality. Then the youth will not need you to tell him do this and don't do that. This means that religious education is not just teaching but also rectifying. This is religion and this is its method. Does the failure lie in the fact that the youth have not been taught or in the fact that they have not acted on what they were taught? Thus, I want religious education to be of two kinds: one that teaches the subject matter and one that teaches how to apply it behaviorally. If we succeed in the first, i.e., in teaching the subject matter, and fail in teaching the second, i.e., in teaching behavior, then our education is worthless. This is why the Koran came as a way and the prophet came as a practical example. There is a difference between the method as a theory and the method as a behavioral application. What algebra, geometry or chemistry demand of students is to know them, i.e., absorb the information pertaining to them. But the student will still need somebody to tell him do this and don't do that. This somebody tells you do this when he knows that you don't want to do it and don't do that when he knows that you want to do it. Therefore, this is another process that requires more than mere knowledge. It requires a man who takes charge of teaching and educating and who acts as an example. From observing this model, the youth can tell whether he has done right or wrong.

[Question] I have actually noticed that as a model, the teacher or the father is the most important thing in education.

[Answer] If a good example exists, we do not even need the information. The individual can get it by conventional means.

[Question] Our people say that God knows secrets and what is in the heart. As long as they know this, why do they lie? God knows. If I, as a creature, know, then how about Him who created me and "Who knows secrets and what is deeper than secrets?" How do people dare lie after all this?

[Answer] If the individual encounters no liar in real life, he would not know the word "lying." How could he know it? Youths know these vices because they have seen them. Moreover, we find that one act of bad behavior destroys books. For example, the student is taught truthfulness, manliness and moral courage. The door bell rings and the father tells his son: "Son, tell whoever has rung the bell, 'my father is not here.'" Here, everything has collapsed and the child reaches the firm conclusion that what you are taught is not what is done, that the two are different and that what you are taught is one thing and what is done is another. As long as behavior is separated from the word, then everything has come to naught and duplicity has emerged. Unfortunately, we live in this atmosphere. Another thing that doesn't help upbringing nowadays is that this upbringing is entrusted to people other than the mothers, such as maids. I can get my child 10 maids but I cannot get him a mother's heart.

There are also those who say that a child can be brought up without a family and by associations or individuals who care for him. No, in certain years of his

life, the child wants his own mother and he is not willing to share this mother with a brother who is only 1 year older than him. Why? Because the child wants his mother for himself. Yet, there are those who say we can open a nursery or a kindergarten. Can one woman take care of bringing up 10 children? No.

As a result, the child gets no proper upbringing. I also say that we, the educators, should recognize that man has the longest childhood. Why? Because he has the deepest message. Man's childhood has been prolonged because his message is great. The greater the purpose, the longer the childhood. For example, a radish's childhood is only a few days whereas a mango's childhood is 7 years. The longer the childhood of a thing is, the greater its value. God, may He be praised, says: "Until your children reach puberty." This means that childhood ends only when puberty is reached. Childhood is long because man is assigned to master the universe. He is a master afflicted with free choice and afflicted with passions. The other creatures are slaves with no passions and no choice. To animals, all things are instinctive. But a child must be brought up well.

[Question] This is what we forget when we bring up our children at home and in school, especially at home. What can we do to give children a good upbringing at home?

[Answer] We first educate those who raise them, namely, the father and the mother. We must also warn the parents that inasmuch as they fail to give their children the rights they owe them, they will suffer so much pain and difficulties from their children. Parents must know this well. They must know that God will not forget any failure on the father's part concerning his son's right. This is why we often notice that a child is well-behaved with people outside his house and vicious with his family at home. This is because the parents have failed him. Had they not, he would revere them. This is why it is as if [Ahmad] Shawqi, may his soul rest in peace, was dealing with such cases when he wrote his verses:

An orphan is not the one whose parents have died and left him abject;

An orphan is the one whose mother has abandoned him and whose father is busy.

These days, the mother has abandoned and the father is busy. So how do we bring up children?

Women and Outside Work

[Question] It sounds as if you don't see much good in letting women work?

[Answer] This is impossible. This way we deceive each other and we deceive women and the result is what we see. Maybe there is still some conservatism because the problem has not become general yet. When the affliction becomes general, we will realize our mistake. Women think that their activity can go beyond raising children. But it is not so. If women understood the value of their activity at home, they would find that there is not enough time for it. If the woman understands

her duty as a wife, a mother and an educator, she would find that time is too short for it. Besides, I have already said that a woman must feel that she is married to a man who is better than she and who deals with all mundane matters while she confines her cooperation to him. A man may till the land, plant it or breed livestock on it. This is his work. But a woman's work is with man, the noblest thing in existence. Once a man said to me: You always reject in what you say the wise proverb saying that there is a woman behind every great man. I told him: Brother, if you truly understood the proverb, you would not cite it. Behind, not beside and not in front of, every great man, there is a woman, meaning that she is established firmly in his manliness, does for his manliness what he needs and gives him the energy to do what 10 men cannot do. The proverb says "behind" and not in front or next to. She is behind him for the protection his manliness offers and she is behind him to give him a home, comfort and tranquility. If the woman gives man all these things, she gives him the energy to do the work of 10 men and she encourages him to work. This means that if we want to succeed in raising children, we must abide by the course of Islam from A to Z and not allow any gaps in the Islamic education so that I will not be compelled on certain occasions to come and demand a solution from Islam because such an action would indicate that I have missed the opportunity that enables me to derive the full benefit from religion.

[Question] This means that we must embrace Islam as a whole?

[Answer] We embrace Islam partially and when we get into trouble, we say: Help, O Islam. What is surprising is that the countries in which such troubles develop say that Islam is the cause of the troubles. I say that this is untrue and that the troubles developing in certain countries are a testimony to Islam. This is because these countries have not built the movement of their life along the lines of Islam. Therefore, it is natural for troubles to develop. This is a testimony to Islam. For example, when it is said that the courts and family life are full of divorce cases, some people say that this is caused by Islam. But in this case, I am pleased with such statements because those seeking divorce did not enter into marriage according to Islamic practice. How could things go right for them? It is impossible.

Islam Condemns Violence

[Question] In the past, there was only one judge in Cairo. Now there are hundreds of judges. How do you explain this?

[Answer] I wonder, why all this number and when does a judge come into existence? I answer by saying that a judge comes into existence whenever there is litigation. Islam makes man his own judge and executive power also. Did the prophet, God's peace and prayers be upon him, build a jail in his day? Of course not. Rather, he built what is more deterrent than a jail. It is very easy to take a criminal and isolate him from people. But the prophet, with his calm method of education, put the wrongdoers in the jail of their conscience and made them fight themselves. Take, for example, the story of Lubabah ibn al-Mundhir when he committed a mistake in carrying out what the prophet had instructed him to do while negotiating with the Bani Qurayzah tribe. When Lubabah realized that he had made a mistake, he

tied himself to a mosque pillar and swore to stay there until the prophet himself untied him. In fact, he did remain tied to the pillar until the prophet pardoned him. People went to Lubabah's father to tell him the good news and the prophet himself went and untied Lubabah. Look, for example, at what God, may He be praised, did to the three men who refused to join the prophet in the Tabuk battle, namely, Ka'b ibn Malik, Mararah ibn al-Rabi' and Hilal ibn Umayyah. The prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, ordered his companions not to speak to the three men and it was as if he jailed them, though they were free to come and go as they wished. All the people boycotted the three men and even their own wives refused to have anything to do with them. This made the world feel very small to the three and caused them deep pain. Hilal ibn Umayyah's family even told his wife that his condition was getting worse. Even though Umayyah was an old man, his wife did not permit herself to go and take care of him. The three men remained in this situation for 55 days and life became hard for them until God, may He be praised, pardoned them and the phrases of the atonement chapter were revealed to the prophet: "God has pardoned the prophet, the emigrants [from Mecca to Medina] and the supporters who followed him in the hour of hardship and He has pardoned the people who failed on that hour. He is a merciful and compassionate God for those who have strayed." Islam condemns violence and works to sensitize people's conscience so that this conscience can control their behavior and protect them from straying from the right path.

[Question] This means that the basis of education is the family and that women's involvement in work is the cause of the disintegration taking place in the family. But there are those who say that a woman has to work to help her husband.

[Answer] These are unreasonable justifications. It is said that the wife helps with household expenses. This is because people demand a life above the movement, meaning that they demand a life beyond their capacity. The principle is that life proceed in tune with the movement. Whoever wants to improve his life must intensify his activity. I must know my income level first and then live within the standard of this income.

I have said that our fault is that we have taught our children to start their life where their parents' life has not ended. This means that the youth wants to begin his marital life in a house equipped with all the means of comfort and luxury whereas his father started from the beginning and was still unable to attain this luxury.

We know that in the past every individual tied his life to a certain type of work from which he earned his livelihood and his pleasure. I have said that people were happier in the past. What made a man wake up in the morning to drain cesspools? Such men used to go around, carrying their buckets in their hands and imploring: "O opener of gates of livelihood, O omniscient." This means they were imploring God to give them a cesspool to drain. Had not such men been committed to earning their livelihood and the livelihood of their wives and children, they would have never gone to work. But what made that kind of work good to those men was their livelihood—a livelihood that God turned into a love of their work. If given success by God, such men did not abandon their work but rather expanded it, buying a donkey or horse—drawn cart and continuing to live in the same way. Thus, such men worked ceaselessly.

If there is no strong resolution binding the masses' life activity with the work from which they earn their livelihood and if there is no respect for the work, whatever its value or form, troubles will develop and problems will come.

Governments and Flattering of the Masses

[Question] We want you to talk in greater detail about the governments' flattering of the masses.

[Answer] When communism entered Egypt, it interfered in the people's sources of livelihood, which God had given them. We were asked to provide people with housing, educate them, employ them and give them everything. This is what we have not been able to do yet and this is what we are still gravely suffering from.

[Question] Does God require governments to provide housing for their people?

[Answer] Governments don't work but choose those who do the work. When the government gets actively engaged in something, we must know that it will not be accomplished. The government brings others to do the work and supervises them. Imagine, the government selling grilled fish! This is strange and surprising. Who said that the government should grill fish? Aren't we going to wake up? We must wake up. We are hearing these days resolutions with which we are happy. We have actually heard some resolutions that please us because they abolish previous resolutions. Where were we when the previous resolutions were issued?

[Question] It is noticed that foreign societies that are more advanced than we are do not cling to the system of university and educational qualifications to which we cling.

[Answer] This is happening because people think that certain work is honorable. The truth is that the honor is not in the work but in doing the work well. Each man's worth is in what he does. There is no noble work and menial work.

This is why Islam does not differentiate between one kind of work and another but differentiates between one worker and another.

There is the story of the Frenchman who was a union chairman and then became a parliamentary deputy and a minister. When he became minister, problems began to confront him. A worker wanted to ridicule the minister and so said to him: "Remember that you were a bootblack at one time." The French minister answered with a word I wish every Muslim would say: "Yes, but I did my work well." Here lies the issue to which the Muslims must cling, namely, that there is no noble work and menial work. The whole issue lies in doing one's work well.

Regrettably, we in Egypt view the street sweeper's job incorrectly. Imagine what Egypt's condition would be if the sanitation workers went on a weeklong strike! Meanwhile, if the cabinet is obstructed for a week, nothing will happen. What makes certain jobs trivial is our contemptible view of them.

That Religion May Be Entirely for God

[Question] Does this mean that we should let problems alone until they solve themselves?

Answer my opinion, the human intellect can achieve a solution that helps a man overcome his problem and that agrees with Islam. Islam doesn't prevent man from finding solutions to his problems with his human intellect. But such solutions are reached only after numerous experiments from which people suffer and which are modified here and there. To spare themselves trouble and to find comfort, people must accept the rule of Islam. But they have strayed from this rule, even though Islam has spared us the trouble of experimenting from the start. When I was in America, an orientalist said to me: You say in your Koran--I interrupted to tell him that it is not our Koran but God's Koran--that Islam "shall prevail over all religions, even if its enemies and even if the infidel hate to see it prevail." Here we find today that 14 centuries have passed for Islam, that it has not prevailed over other religions and that numerous religions still exist. I said to the orientalist: Do you think that "shall prevail over all other religions" means that all people will be Muslims? What God means by his words "even if its enemies and even if the infidel hate to see it prevail" is to point out that there will be atheism and there will be infidelity. God's words "it shall prevail over other religions" mean that there will be a battle. There will not be just one side and Islam will not exist all by itself. Rather, as the phrase is understood to mean, the other religions will continue to exist until eternity. But you will be compelled, by virtue of the pressure that developments will exert on you, to modify man's ways in such a way as to agree with Islam and thus Islam will prevail, if not in the form of religion then in the form of a system. is what is happening at present. We find, for example, that developments have exerted pressure even on those who are in the heart of the Vatican and who used to be opposed to divorce, compelling them to legalize divorce.

Have they legalized divorce because they are Muslims or because people have exerted such pressure on them that they have found no alternative to permitting divorce? Thus, Islam has prevailed and its prevalence through legislation by a non-Muslim is more effective than when it is by a Muslim. When the legislation is made by a Muslim it is made as a result of the pressure of religion whereas when it is introduced by a non-Muslim, it is introduced as a result of the pressure of need.

[Question] Many of the nations that have now become advanced achieved their progress with the methods of Islam, even though they are not Muslim nations.

[Answer] They have embraced Islam as a system because it is better.

[Question] This is true. I have found that the Japanese follow the dictates of conscience in their dealings, even though they do not know that there is a God. It is as if they thank God without knowing that they are thanking Him.

[Answer] Yes, this is a kind of thanks, ignorant thanks. Islam is the religion of nature and not of philosophers. It is simple. Don't they know that He Who created all creatures is better aware of their condition. But they have insisted

on being more knowledgeable than God and they have tried to change the world according to their whims. This is impossible. This is why we will continue to be hypocritical. The bane of government in many countries of the world is that rulers rule only for their time and nothing beyond, meaning that the ruler concerns himself with solving contemporary problems only, leaving other problems without a solution. These are the accumulated problems. The problems we are encountering are not problems left behind by one person but problems that have accumulated through the generations.

[Question] Yet, they seek solutions with opinions outside the framework of Islam.

[Answer] Naturally.

[Question] They say we want British law or communism. Why, when we have Islam and when we find that Abu Bakr al-Siddiq [first caliph after the prophet] was surprised at how easy it was to run people's affairs?

[Answer] Instinct, it is a matter of instinct.

[Question] When 'A'ishah was asked about the prophet's character, she said: "His character is the Koran."

[Answer] This is enough. It proves the point.

[Question] Why have these contradictions appeared only in this age?

[Answer] We were under occupation and the sole goal of enlightened thought was to achieve independence.

Then people went abroad on scholarships and those were the ones who knew the problems and their solutions. When they tried to transfer the picture they found abroad, they did not adapt it to their environment. They did not adapt what they had learned. Some of them said that religion is against progress. They got this idea from Europe. It is true that the Europeans' religion opposes progress. The church has, for example, arrested thought.

[Question] There is no religion there now. There is a system.

[Answer] They came here and created the problem from which we are suffering at present. The reason is that they did not look at issues from the Islamic viewpoint.

[Question] This is true. We find an example of this in Rifa'ah al-Tahtawi who viewed the West with an Islamic eye.

[Answer] Naturally, because he went while saturated with Islam. When the others brought the yeast from Europe, things spoiled.

Islam and Contemporary Political Sects

[Question] What is your view of the political sects attributed to Islam?

[Answer] I have spoken of this at a symposium. I said: Every living thing comes from water, so don't pollute the water so that you do not ruin it and don't pollute Islam so as not to make something else of it. If water is polluted, it is no longer water. Let us not color Islam with any sect. If you pollute Islam, it is as if you have imposed your whims on it. Each man colors according to his wishes. God, in His wisdom, has made water colorless, tasteless and odorless.

[Question] If we realized that the grain of wheat that God has created constitutes a complete source of nutrition, we would not exert efforts to make white flour because white flour is not a complete food.

[Answer] However, people have lately realized this. It used to be said that such and such a man eats wheat and avoids pure flour.

[Question] This is true, because God has created things complete.

[Answer] When the Koran speaks of the grain from which we get this food, it says "the grain with its shell." The Koran wants to say that the value of the grain of wheat is in its skin. Without the shell, the grain of wheat doesn't contain the full benefit that God has put in it.

[Question] When you shell rice and eat it, it turns into harmful food.

[Answer] Immediately.

[Question] But if rice is ground with its shells, it forms a complete food.

[Answer] This is why I paused at the "grain with its shell." This is the issue. When we give bran to livestock it is because they deserve it. Animals do not swerve from God's path.

[Question] God has created things complete in themselves.

[Answer] We ruin them with our intervention.

Sunna and Shi'ite

[Question] Islam is Islam. Even in the issue of the Shi'ites, we find that the difference is over succession to the caliphate.

[Answer] Political words. The meaning of the sects is disagreement over that which the lawgiver permits us to disagree. What is serious is that you have considered your viewpoint the right one and this has made your viewpoint the right one. If we both realize that the matter is left up to the lawgiver, then this would be the right thing and no corruption would result. God has made the lawgiver the indisputable judge of that which creates differences leading to corruption. What did the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, do in Bani Qurayzah's battle when people disagreed on the time and place of the evening prayer? The prophet agreed with this and agreed with that because both could have been right in that situation. The prophet said: This man is in a hurry but

this doesn't mean that the prayer time should be missed, because every event requires a time and place. When the prophet said: We will only perform our afternoon prayers in Bani Qurayzah, one man looked at the place and said the prayer could be proper only in that land and another man looked at the time and said the sun would set by then. The prophet accepted both views because both were likely under the circumstances. That over which God wants no disagreement, He has revealed very precisely. I have cited as an example the Koran phrase on ablution. The phrase says: "When preparing to pray, wash your face." The phrase doesn't specify any further because no two people disagree over what the face is. But there is disagreement over the hands. Some consider it the palm, others consider it the elbow and yet others consider it the entire arm. The Koran defines specifically in this case and says "up to the elbows." Had the Koran said your hands without specifying "up to the elbows," some people would say this is the hand and others would say this is the hand. The Koran wanted to prevent ambiguity and thus said up to the elbows. If God doesn't want disagreement to develop over something He has revealed, He defines it precisely.

Has Read Nothing But Koran for 20 Years

[Question] Where did you get your special understanding of religion?

[Answer] That is if I really understand it.

[Question] Is this because you have understood life and, thus, have understood religion?

[Answer] God be thanked, there is no facet of knowledge on which something is written in Arabic that I have not read. I gathered a "yeast" and I don't know from where it has come. Ibn al-Muqaffa' expressed it for me when he said: "I have drunk of the Friday sermons but they have not quenched my thirst and are now neither the same speeches nor something else."

[Question] This means that the speeches sank into his soul until they overflowed it?

[Answer] And they are "neither the same nor something else."

Nobody creates something totally new. However, things are likely to be different. There are those who grab information hurriedly. When a piece of information is taken hurriedly, it does not interact with other information and appears on its own. When a piece of information is allowed to ferment for a while with other information, the outcome is something that is not self-contradictory because all the information is digested. For example, there is the person who eats the meal and then throws it up and there is the person who eats the meal and allows it to be digested and absorbed into the blood stream. I had my private sessions with my students but I did not allow myself to meet the masses until after I reached the age of 60.

[Question] This is why maturity is evident in your words and your understanding.

[Answer] Could be. Another thing is that I have tasted a sweetness that I would like to convey to others. This is a form of spiritual loyalty because the prophet said: "No man among you will become a believer until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself." When God finds that I want to convey something to my brother in God, will he not help me with acceptance? Yet another thing is that throughout my life I have never asked about something I know. All my questions have been on what I don't know. I have not asked to show off my knowledge, neither as a student nor as a teacher. When I don't know something, I ask about it unashamedly. My opinion is that if asking for knowledge is humiliating, then let me be humiliated for 2 minutes for a question I will be proud of for decades.

[Question] What surprises me is that I read the Koran but when I listen to you I find that you have become aware of issues that have never occurred to us.

[Answer] For 20 years now, I have been reading no books other than the Koran. If I find that a Koranic phrase is difficult for me to understand, I leave it, perform my ablutions, kneel a couple times in prayer and say: God, you and the prophet have said these words. God, open their meaning to me.

[Question] This is where your accurate understanding comes from?

[Answer] It could be, I don't know. If I knew, I would not have the accuracy.

[Question] A speaker does not speak to himself but co others.

[Answer] By God, sir, I don't know how this thing has come about.

[Question] The truth is that I listen to you with a kind of admiration with which I do not listen to others.

[Answer] I swear to you by God that the unhappiest moments to me are the moments in which I hear such words. My brothers know that when anybody starts praising me I turn the conversation to something else.

[Question] I have not said this to praise you. It is said in search of the truth.

[Answer] I do not interpret it. However, I am honest in conveying to the people something that has pleased me.

[Question] I have read many interpretations. Reading interpretations is a hobby with me. But I do say: Where does Shaykh al-Sha'rawi come up with beautiful opinions?

[Answer] Believe me, I don't know.

[Question] I am not trying to praise you. I am trying to find out some facts concerning you.

[Answer] In revelations, the reason is never asked. A revelation is an act of overflowing generosity and is not the result of exerted efforts.

[Question] Is it the mere desire to teach people?

[Answer] By God, it is so.

[Question] We would like to see many people like Shaykh al-Sha'rawi.

[Answer] I implore God, may He be praised, to send men better than me. O God, grant Islam better men than myself.

Let me tell you something. Taha Husayn was the intellectual epitome of his age, regardless of the disagreement over him. What did his life end up with? I heard him once being asked in a television interview: What do you hear—nobody asked Taha what do you read [because he was blind]. Taha Husayn said: I listen to the chanted Koran. This is all. All the genius and all the ambition ends with listening to the Koran. Once, while lecturing at the Jordanian University, a child came with his father to hear me. I saw in his eyes that he understood everything I said. I picked him up and kissed him. When I was asked, "Why are people pleased with what you say," I said: Because I speak with a Koran with which God addresses all the faculties. We only know one faculty but God addresses numerous faculties with His words. I was asked: Do you know what faculty was stirred in this child? I said: What does a nightingale say?

Koran Solves All of Life's Problems

[Question] Do you mean to say that the Koran contains everything and that if a man understands it and lives it he will solve all his problems?

[Answer] Listen, the Koran is "cure and compassion." We leave the cure until the sickness sets in. But with compassion, no sickness sets in. If we embrace the Koran from the outset, there will be no sickness. But if we disregard it a little and sickness sets in, then the Koran still has the cure.

[Question] I have read some Sufis who say that learning is not gained until the Koran is read.

[Answer] This is why I have been saying read the Koran. In this regard, I follow the school of Sidi Ja'far al-Sadiq who said: "I hear the Koran and God talks."

[Question] How do you read the Koran?

[Answer] We hear the Koran and our hearts are filled with it—"If the Koran is read, listen." This is because the speaker is God and not a reader. It seems to me that when a person expresses just the desire to hear the Koran, God, may He be praised, tells him: Stay where you are—"He who comes to me walking, I will go to him running." It is as if God is saying: You stay where you are and let those who do not tire come to me.

Politics and Religion

[Question] Is there a difference between politics and religion?

[Answer] This view has been taken from Christianity in Europe where politics are one thing and religion another. We don't have this because they are one. In a session in Oran, Algeria, I read the Koranic phrase "Muhammad is the messenger of God and his supporters are fierce to the enemy and compassionate among themselves," and I said: Praised be God, He has combined forcefulness with compassion and He is fierce one time and compassionate another because were He fierce where compassion is needed, He would be lost and were He compassionate where forcefulness is needed, He would be lost. This indicates that it is not a matter of personal disposition-be fierce and a man turns fierce or be compassionate and a man turns compassionate. It is not a matter of personal disposition. It is a commandment. Moreover, the Koran says: "You see them kneeling and prostrating themselves in worship, seeking God's favor and pleasure, with a mark on their foreheads from prostrating themselves." Kneeling, prostrating, marks from prostrating, all these are matters of worship. "There is their example in the Torah [part of passage unclear]. It is as if he says: I will bring a religion that combines both. What the Jews lack is values and what Christianity lacks is the material aspects. This religion will combine both. This is true. Therefore, there is no gap here or there. Those who want to create a gap imitate the Westerners who say that the church became dominant. We have no such thing.

[Question] The prophet's biography also contains comprehensive teachings.

 $[\mbox{\sc Answer}]$ I wish we would take up the biography and see what we can do to follow its example.

[Question] Consider the exhortation that the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, uttered when he left al-Ta'if. It is an appeal that moves one to tears when reading it.

[Answer] Moreover, the prophet's faith made him say: Whatever You order, God, will be done. But consider this: "But Your kindness for me is greater." How great! Didn't the prophet also say: "If You did not have wrath for me, I would not care." "But Your kindness for me is greater." How beautiful!

[Question] And imagine, your eminence, we have on top of all of this the prophet's midnight journey to the seven heavens!

[Answer] God told him: Come let me show you what people have done to you. Come let me show you and you will pray with all the prophets.

[Question] If a man reads the Koran and the prophet's biography he will never stray.

[Answer] He cannot. How could he?

[Question] Because the Koran and the biography turn into conscience in man's heart.

[Answer] That says it all.

[Question] And the conscience rules.

[Answer] Only the conscience.

[Question] The differences that we have in Islam among the sects are differences on the aspects of worship.

[Answer] Only.

[Question] People need somebody to educate them. Look at what has happened at the Fez summit, for example.

[Answer] Naturally, the advantage of piety is that it protects us from our whims because our whims are different. "If right followed their whims, the heavens and the earth would be corrupted." This is why God has said: (I will take care of matters of whim but you take care of matters in which whims are not involved) and we will meet. I, for example, am sad because the world contains material science and theoretical science. The hostile camps try to steal the material science from one another and spy on one another to know it. They also try to keep the theoretical science and the theoretical systems separated from each other and from their peoples and try to set up an iron curtain in their face.

[Question] When we think of God's words "do not forget kindness among yourselves" we find that God is not content with justice from us but wants what is above justice.

[Answer] He said: I will rule justly among you. They asked him: Is there anything better than justice? He said: Yes, kindness.

Religious Education in Schools

[Question] I want to know how to make those who teach religion express these concepts. They teach children superficial things even though we want them to turn the Koran into the student's character.

[Answer] This can be done only by religious people.

Fathers and Sons

[Question] We started our conversation with the statement that education begins before birth.

[Answer] With the father and the mother.

[Question] This is what I want to say to people. How can you educate the child when you yourself need to be educated?

[Answer] I once said in a symposium that the corruption of our homes, of our daughters, our sons and of our youth is that the father finds something on his son that he did not buy him and the mother finds her son carrying something that

neither she nor his father have bought for him and they don't question him as to where he got it. If the mother caught him the first time... [sentence incomplete]. Girls have been corrupted. We find an example of this in Mariam's chapter of the Koran: "Where have you gotten this," Zakariya asked Mariam. She said: "From God. God gives boundlessly to whomever He wishes." What did Zakariya do? It is true that God gives boundlessly to whomever He wishes. He did not doubt her words. But this being the case, he said: "God give me a son even though I am advanced in years." God told him: I will give you a son. The thing happens with Mariam but the situation is then immediately applied to Zakariya. Otherwise, Mariam would have been exposed to the gravest hardship. Had she not known that God gives whomever He wishes whatever He wishes, what could she have said? For her sake, Zakariya is given boundlessly so that she may not doubt herself when she gives birth without having touched a man... Never.... Exercises and drills on "He gives to whomever He wants." Also, he appeared to her human.

[Question] We are lost. How does this happen? Fifteen states meet to agree on something and they leave the meeting in a worse state than when they entered it.

[Answer] They cannot agree. How could they agree as long as each of us has his own desires and when God says: "If right followed their whims, the heavens and the earth would be corrupted?" What makes me and you agree is that we come from the same source. I have no whim and neither do you. In old times, we used to say in the countryside that a law that cuts with its finger sheds no blood. A beautiful proverb. God has said that faith is in the heart.

[Question] The problem is that faith is difficult.

[Answer] It is difficult for him who wants to make it difficult. The truth is missed only by someone seeking something other than the truth. The truth is more eager for you than you are for it. But when the truth finds that it is disregarded, it disappears. The truth is from right. He says: "He who comes to me walking I will go to him running." The truth will immediately come to whoever seeks it.

[Question] Man should always assume that he is dealing with God, may He be praised, and not with people.

[Answer] This is why I say that numerous poets and men of letters complain of man's ingratitude. The poet says: "I taught him how to write verses and the first verse he wrote satirized me." I tell such people: You deserve the ingratitude because you worked for men and not for God.

[Question] The early generations of Muslims worked for God, may He be praised, and He gave them victory.

[Answer] They worked for God and matters proceeded smoothly. Knowledgeable people say: The best efforts in God's eyes are good deeds met with ingratitude. Why? Because if the deed is acknowledged and is well known, then it would not have to be rewarded by God another time.

[Question] Khadijah [prophet's wife], may God be pleased with her, believed in God's prophet without demanding proof.

[Answer] Khadijah was logical before logic existed and a jurisprudent before jurisprudence existed. She tells him [prophet]: You are kind to your family, you carry the tired, you feed the guest and you help against the catastrophes of time and God will never disappoint you. Imagine her conclusion: God will not disappoint you.

[Question] When a man does a little thing that displeases God he feels uncertain.

[Answer] Some of the prophet's legacy, though not well documented, says that the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, once said: I and Abu Bakr al—Siddiq were like two race horses and I beat him to the prophethood. Had he beaten me, I would have followed him. This is a proof that faith was in Abu Bakr's heart even in the pre-Islamic era and that Abu Bakr was ready to accept the faith. This is why he was called al-Siddiq [the righteous one]. When the prophet said that he had flown in the middle of the night to Jerusalem, Abu Bakr said: If he has said it, then it is true. I have believed him on heaven, how could I not believe him on this?

[Question] This is why al-Siddiq told 'Umar in al-Hudaybiyah peace treaty: Cling to him, 'Umar, because he is God's messenger.

[Answer] This is why Abu Bakr said that the first real Islamic conquest was in al-Hudaybiyah. There is no conquest in Islam greater than al-Hudaybiyah conquest. But people are always ignorant and they forget what is between Muhammad, his God and the people. They are always in a hurry. God is not hasty like men and He lets matters reach where He wants them to.

[Question] What is your view of those who permit the Muslim not to struggle?

[Answer] The truth is that there is no difference between individual duty and collective duty. We are all required to take part in the struggle. When there is war, all must participate.

[Question] What is your opinion of the groups that resort to violence these days. Such groups did not exist before. Why have they emerged now?

[Answer] When you find radicalism in one aspect you should expect an equal and opposite reaction to this radicalism. This means that as long as there is terrible degeneration, then there has to be terrible radicalism. But people deceive themselves. The facts refuse to appear. Nothing that is far from the course that God, may He be praised, has wanted can be right.

Shaykh al-Sha'rawi--By Dr Husayn Mu'nis

His venerable eminence Shaykh Muhammad Mutawalli al-Sha'rawi is the undisputed imam of our age. His learning is matched by few of the shaykhs of Islam and God has blessed him with an alert nature, a heart abounding with faith and a fluent

tongue. When you sit and listen to him you feel that you are in the presence of an overabundance of learning because ideas flow from his mind and he expresses them ardently, eloquently and at length. Regardless of how strong your memory, you cannot remember all that he says. But you emerge from your conversation with him with a heart gladdened by faith and a mind broadened with knowledge because the man's knowledge is not confined to the theological sciences but extends to include profoundly the conditions and problems of his age. He views all issues from the angle of the faithful Muslim scholar who finds the solutions to all problems in the Koran and the Sunna. In this regard, he employs a unique logic unparalleled by the logic of any of the other jurisprudents of our age.

I sat and talked to him on religious and secular issues for 3 hours and then tried to recall and record all that I had heard from him to present it to the readers. I found that the only way I could follow was to convey the shaykh's words as he uttered them, at times in classical Arabic and at times in the vernacular, and at times even with signs and gestures. I have exerted utmost efforts to organize the conversation and this is the best I could come up with. I put the outcome before the reader so that he can read it as he is able and understand it as well as he can. As for me, I have learned a lot from this enjoyable conversation. This is not surprising because in our intellectual history, scholarly imams have been the men who have brightened the minds of people with faith in every age.

8494

CSO: 4504/141

IHSAN 'ABD AL-QADDUS DISCUSSES HIS WORK, CURRENT CONDITIONS

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 2983, 11 Dec 81 pp 29-33

[Interview with Novelist Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus by Yusuf al-Qa'id: "After 500 Stories, Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus Says: Intellectuals Must Not Wait for President Mubarak To Define Their Role for Them; Muhammad Najib: Made July Revolution More Serious; Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir: Destroyed Old Society and Built Revolutionary Society; Anwar al-Sadat: Transformed Egypt From One State to Another; Husni Mubarak: When Egypt Needed Personality Capable of Realizing Security and Safety and Building Future, God Chose Husni Mubarak"]

[Text] We will not say that it is the most complete and comprehensive press interview given by Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus. However, let us read the headlines only: Muhammad Najib, Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, Anwar al-Sadat, Husni Mubarak, Muhammad 'Abd al-Qaddus Sr., Fatimah al-Yusuf, Muhammad 'Abd al-Qaddus Jr., critics' position, isolation in which he currently lives, the movies of these hard times, going to the impossible theater, the latest novel and the circumstances under which it was written, the long battles throughout life, the remote childhood, women in the modern novel, the yearning for a regular bond with literary and journalistic life and the question of whether he will return to political writing in Egypt.

These headlines constitute only paragraphs in the longest interview he has given.

We must begin with a small and private confession. This is the first time that I sit with Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus, hear him speak and direct all the questions I have at him. He answers with rare patience. My generation started dealing with the written word when he was already a famous and well-known writer. We have met all of the teachers that preceded us. He is the only one with whom many of the sons of my generation have not met. Who would believe that the author whose novels ripple with all this throbbing warmth and whose literature reflects this vast society has imposed on himself from the outset a unique state of isolation. They said in the past that complete isolation is the real food of any genuine artist. It is rare to see Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus in a literary place and it is rare to see him address the masses. In the isolation of his tightly closed office room, however, he lives with his heroes and his novels in an utter freedom and courage that nobody can imagine.

There has to be special pride. This is the first time, as far as I know, that Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus has sat for 3 hours to speak about himself and his life with

rare patience. He has even answered the questions that pained him and the questions that left in his soul a feeling of bitterness, even though he rarely gives press interviews, has not spoken on the radio since 1954 and has not been to a television station in his life. Rare are the interviews that he has given before. Yet, he has been generous in the extreme in answering every question I asked him.

Interview: Time and Place

The interview was conducted at the residence of Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus: An apartment from former times, with spacious rooms and very long and semi-dark corridors, a home fragrant with a special smell. The first thing you see behind the door are the day's papers, placed in a special spot. We sat in his office—a room surrounded by glass on every side. Behind him, there is a portrait closely resembling him painted by Jamal Kamal. It shows him being crucified. He says to me: This is how I view the thinker's situation—crucified all his life. He is surrounded by a world of books. Behind him is hung his mother's special acting diploma, issued by the Ministry of Public Works of the Kingdom of Egypt for the encouragement of acting. The diploma, issued in 1925, belongs to his mother, Fatimah al-Yusuf. Also hanging behind him is a picture of his father, Muhammad 'Abd al-Qaddus, and his mother, Fatimah 'Abd al-Qaddus. On the lower part of the picture, Muhammad 'Abd al-Qaddus has written: I and Fatimah al-Yusuf. The lower part of the picture also bears the date: June 1917. Ihsan says:

I was born exactly 2 years after this photograph was taken. Directly facing him are the volumes of ROSE AL-YUSUF and SABAH AL-KHAYR. Below these volumes are his works: 34 books constituting all his literary production, containing 500 short stories and novels that he has offered throughout the years of his literary production. On his desk lie the last edition of the magazines AL-HILAL and SABAH AL-KHAYR, a book on the Camp David treaty containing the treaty's original text and a number of editions of AL-TAQADDUM, published by the Progressive National Unionist Grouping. Above his complete works is the only sign--a sign consisting of the venerable Koran phrase: "If God supports you, nobody can defeat you." Also facing him are family photographs: his son Ahmad who now lives in the United States, his wife and their sons Karim and Sharif. The room contains more than one picture of his son Muhammad who is now in custody [detention]. Commenting on this, he says: Since Muhammad was placed in custody last September 3d, we have been gathering, enlarging and hanging his photograph in this manner. The latest photograph of Muhammad is surrounded by roses and flowers. Next to it hangs a photograph of Muhammad with Ihsan's mother. There is also a photograph of Muhammad and his bride cutting the cake on their wedding day. Ihsan says: Muhammad's mother is the one who has been gathering all these photographs and hanging them everywhere in the house.

Others Have Written and So Has Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus

Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus once said that he does not read books given to him as gifts and that he only reads the books he purchases. Why?

The man wearing black trousers and a youthful black shirt and wearing dark glasses —this color has a special presence in a glass-walled room where the winter sun rarely enters—smiles and says:

"These words have a story behind them. I used to present my books as gifts to others. One day, Dr Taha Husayn told me that his wife was complaining about the number of books in the house and so he put some of the books in the bathtub. From that day on, I have never given him or others any books as gifts for fear of this strange fate. However, I read all the books I receive and I am really proud of the books presented to me as gifts."

These days, a novel written by 'Abd al-Qaddus is being published in serialized form in Cairo and London, simultaneously. Ihsan told me with great happiness that after publication of the first part of the novel, he asked the two chief editors concerned whether their circulation increased or not. As usual, the answer was that publication of the novel did actually increase their circulation. But the question raised by the publication of this novel at the present time is whether it has any connection with what has happened in Egypt recently, beginning with 6 October. The novel is entitled: "My Dear, We Are All Thieves." The thing in the novel that gives one pause is: Who does the "we" in this novel refer to.

Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus says: "In my novels, the protagonist is not a specific personality. In all my stories, I rely on depicting the various aspects of society. This story is based on a certain aspect of society, particularly the economic and commercial aspect and how people make profit and how they lose. It is the so-called economic negligence."

[Question] Did you write the novel after 6 October [1981, the day al-Sadat was assassinated]?

[Answer] This is what is being said, but it is untrue. I did not write this novel after the death of the late Anwar al-Sadat. I finished writing it a year ago. But some circumstances made publishing it this past year difficult. This is my personal opinion. I figured I would publish it in the last days of President Anwar al-Sadat's rule. The recent period did not permit the publication of this novel because it is based on a severe criticism of the general climate in which the story revolves—a climate that conflicted with its publication and did not permit its publication. It was not at all my intention to publish the novel in London. I write novels for publication at home. But when it was decided to publish this novel in Egypt, I also decided [to go ahead and publish it in London].

It is my habit to write a novel and put it aside for a spell. For your information, I now have three novels actually awaiting publication.

[Question] This leads us to the way you use vocabulary in your writing. How do you write and from what point do you usually begin a novel?

[Answer] I always begin by defining the topic of the story. I often rely in this respect on thoughts that occur to me and on the general factors influencing the thoughts of any person. After I decide on the topic, I start defining the events and the personalities that reflect my opinion on the topic. This takes 3-5 months, sometimes even a full year, in which I let my imagination roam insofar as the topic of the story is concerned until I settle on a complete picture. I then start writing, having defined the points that outline the story. It is not easy

for me to write stories but I enjoy writing them more than writing political articles. When I write a story, I feel totally emotional. In political articles, I rely on reflection and thinking. A story includes the writer's feelings and always reflects his feelings while he is writing. At times I say that a story writer is like an actor. The actor acts the personalities on stage and the writer acts them on paper, with his ink.

Return to Political Writing in Egypt

[Question] Under the relaxation that has developed in Egypt recently, the question is raised: Will Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus return to political writing in Egypt once more?

[Answer] Nobody has offered me anything yet. I previously agreed with AL-AHRAM that my work will be confined to writing stories only. This agreement is still valid and there has been no agreement with any other press establishment or publishing house so far. I am very happy with the success of Mukarram Muhammad Ahmad in al-Hilal [Publishing] House and with the developments that he has introduced into AL-MUSAWWAR. When Mukarram talked to me, he asked me for a novel and not for a political article.

[Question] What about the three novels sitting in your desk drawer?

[Answer] I would rather, and I hope you will agree with me, keep the titles and topics of these stories a surprise for the reader because they are all long novels and the publication of each of them requires a full year, approximately.

[Question] When the political man-in-the-street sits in a coffee shop, he discusses the leaders of his time. No man can get to ether in a session with Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus, the man who represents an important part of the last half century of Egypt's life, without asking him about his contemporaneous leaders. What is your evaluation of the period of President Anwar al-Sadat's rule?

[Amswer] My friendship with the late Anwar al-Sadat was not affected by our general estrangement and our political differences. I maintained his friendship and I believe that he also maintained my friendship, even though my son Muhammad was among those put under custody last September. It is a friendship that dates back some time, to 1948. This friendship was exposed to all the events encountered in this period, and yet it wasn't affected because it was not a friendship of work but a friendship of personal closeness and of agreement on the national goal, despite differences on the means of attaining this goal. Insofar as Anwar al-Sadat is concerned, I place him within the framework in which I place Egypt's entire history since the beginning of the revolution. Since the start of the revolution, four presidents have ruled Egypt and I believe that each of them has performed his role and ended when this role came to an end. Muhammad Najib performed his role in projecting the revolution as something more serious than just a revolution of youth. Then Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir performed his role in realizing what a revolution actually dictates, i.e. destroying that which existed before the revolution and building a new society dictated by the revolution. Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's role came to end and the situation in the wake of the 1967 defeat required an adventurous and daring personality and not an ordinary personality. God chose Anwar al-Sadat and he was able to transform Egypt from one state to another. Then his role ended and Egypt needed a personality with other qualities capable of insuring security and safety and of building the future. God has chosen Husni Mubarak to perform this role.

[Question] Are you a fatalist?

[Answer] It is my nature to submit to fate. I believe in God and believe that God loves Egypt. He thus makes fate move Egypt from one phase to another and He chooses for each phase the right men to shoulder responsibility.

[Question] What about the future?

[Answer] The future requires an extensive building process and requires new planning and new details. For example, we need economic freedom but no controls have been established for this freedom to turn it into a firm reality insuring harmony between the conflicting interests of the classes. We also speak of democracy but we have not yet crystallized the details of this democracy in order to stabilize the relationship between the ruler and the ruled and between the state and the parties. So, all that we hope for insofar as the future of Egypt is concerned is that a firm foundation will be laid and complete details crystalized so that we can achieve a stable situation that lasts for hundreds of years, as is the case, for example, in the United States and the advanced European countries.

[Question] President Husni Mubarak often talks of the role of the intellectuals in the coming phase. What is your concept of this role?

[Answer] The intellectuals' role is not built on a statement by the president. The intellectuals' role lies in their responsibility toward themselves and in opening the path for them to shoulder this responsibility. It must not be the duty of the president or of any other individual to determine the role of the intellectuals. An intellectual is an innovative, creative and developing person who innovates by himself, creates by himself and develops by himself. For example, when the president appoints an intellectual as the chairman of a committee or as the prime minister, the outcome of this appointment is up to the intellectual himself. He is responsible to himself. Moreover, the intellectuals' sphere of responsibility is broader than any official instructions or appointments. It is a responsibility that reaches the man-in-the-street himself.

Ihsan and His Son Muhammad

[Question] Muhammad 'Abd al-Qaddus, the young journalist and the son of Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus, is in custody now. We wonder, how does the father view the position of his son in jail at present?

[Answer] Since they became aware of things, I have deliberately dealt with my two sons, Muhammad and Ahmad, by letting them take responsibility for themselves. I am not entitled to and I do not give myself any right over them, except for expressing my opinion if they consult me. Muhammad has worked for the media and he

has been determined to express his political opinion. There is no doubt that I disagree with him, not on the national goals but on the means of achieving these goals. But this disagreement has never affected the paternal relationship binding me to him, nor has it affected my respect for him. I always stand with him and allow him the freedom that I allow myself. I always wonder: Perhaps his opinion is sounder than mine, especially since I was young once. As one of the members of the new generation, I always disagreed politically with the people closest to me. I b lieved that I was closer to the truth. Because many of my opinions have been realized, perhaps Muhammad's opinions are also the sounder opinions and are the ones that can be realized.

[Question] How can you say that there is a difference between you when the means are the same, namely, writing?

[Answer] The difference is in the opinions. We speak of democracy but the position of each of us is different from that of the other.

[Question] What are the roots from which Muhammad has grown?

[Answer] People may not know that I am from a family that is altogether religious. Muhammad's inclination is not alien to the family. My grandfather, Shaykh Ahmad Radwan, was a graduate of al-Azhar and a member of the religious judiciary. He was a conservative by virtue of his religiousness. He took part in the political life and admired art within the limits of this religiousness. All the singers of his time, such as 'Abduh al-Hamuli and his contemporaries, used to come to my grandfather's home. He called his son Muhammad 'Abd al-Qaddus Radwan. 'Abd al-Qaddus was the name of a flute player whom my grandfather admired. With time, the name of Radwan was lost and my father came to be known by the name of 'Abd al-Qaddus. He is the only member of the family known by this name. The rest of the family carries the name of Radwan. Many may not know that we came from the countryside originally. We come from the village of Shubra al-Yaman, which is within the jurisdiction of the village of Kafr Ma'munah in al-Gharbiyah Governorate. We owned 5 feddans of land there and I continued to visit the village and spend some time there until the age of 10. I lost touch with the village after my grandfather's death. The rest of the family still lives in the village and carries the name of Radwan.

Father, Mother and Impossible Absence

During the interview, Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus got emotional only once. His voice trembled and a note of deep grief penetrated it and the beginnings of a big tear gathered in his eyes when he spoke of his mother, Fatimah al-Yusuf, and his father, Muhammad 'Abd al-Qaddus. The man began to soar with his memories with them. Despite the age, the heart is still green and the eye still sheds generous tears in times of grief.

[Question] Why haven't you written about your mother?

[Answer] I cannot write about my mother because whenever I remember her my emotions dominate my thoughts and I am unable to hold the pen and make it control

this thought in order to write about her. I am constantly afraid that if I write about her, my emotions will take charge and influence what I write and that what I write will not befit my mother's memory. My emotions are sensitive and they overwhelm me to the extent that I also cannot write about my father, Muhammad 'Abd al-Qaddus, whom I consider one of the peaks of art, whether in terms of acting or of theatrical writing.

[Question] Was your father a writer?

[Answer] Yes, he wrote three plays that were considered in his day a milestone in the Arab theater. The plays were produced on the al-Azbakiyah stage. Actress 'Azizah Amir starred in one of them. Of those plays, I remember "Nahid Shah," which was a musical, "Ma'ruf, the Cobbler" and a play that my father called "Ihsan Bey," which he made sure would be acted on stage on my birthday. I remember that on the day the play was shown, my father took me and we rode the tram together and he pointed out to me the posters carrying the name "Ihsan Bey." That day was one of the most beautiful days of my life. The play was also produced as the second movie in the history of the Egyptian cinema under the name "Daughter of the Nile." I used to go with my father when he went to 'Azizah Amir to write the scenario for the movie. I owe my literary and artistic interest to my father. I started writing in an attempt to imitate him. The first thing I wrote at the age of 10 was a play with which I tried to imitate my father. He also wrote poetry and popular poems. I also tried to imitate him by writing poetry and popular poems. The first of my works to be published by the press was a prose poem that I sent unsigned to ROSE AL-YUSUF, published daily at the time. Yusuf Hilmi was the literary editor. After the poem had been published, my mother found out that I was the one who had written it. She was so upset with me that she denied me my pocket money because she feared that I would become an artist, like my father. My father was an artist 100 percent. This happened in 1934 when I was 15 years old. My mother only wanted me to become a journalist. As for literature and art, she feared them no end. My mother wanted me to become a journalist so as to run the newspaper as she wished.

Critics Disregard Writer of 500 Stories

[Question] I have now reached the sensitive part in the entire matter, namely: Why have the critics, researchers and students ignored the works of this author, despite his profuse production? Is it a position or what?

[Answer] (He says magnanimously:) The fact is that I see my special circumstances as a main reason for the critics' attitude toward me. I grew up as a newspaper owner and publisher. This has influenced the critics' attitude toward me. I am not just a novelist or a man of letters. If anybody praised me, he was said to flatter the newspaper owner and chief editor. This is why the writers at ROSE AL-YUSUF criticized me. This is the reason. I remember that Fathi Ghanim, who was influential in ROSE AL-YUSUF, wrote an article violently criticizing one of my stories. I allowed the article to be published. My mother became incensed by my behavior and shouted at me: "How can you allow anybody to attack you in your magazine?" But I told her: "I believe in the freedom of criticism." However, there are those who have written favorably about me. Tawfiq al-Hakim, Dr Louis 'Awad and Yahya Haqqi have written favorably about me.

At other times, the critics attacked me or ignored my works because of some political circumstances. For example, the accusation that I am a sex writer is not based on a study of my literary production but emanates from a political position against me. I have never intended to write of sex and the sex scenes in my novels are not premeditated and are less provocative than the sex scenes in the novels of numerous other writers. Whey my novel "A Nose and Three Eyes" was debated in the Egyptian National Assembly, the motive behind the debate was political and not literary. I believe that my nature pushes me toward full liberation when I write. This nature has given me a coloration different from the ordinary coloration of writers. This is why a long time will be needed before somebody presents a fair critical study of my work.

[Question] Is your popularity what has made the critics hostile to you?

[Answer] This is basically due to the writer's status and seriousness. I now rely more on the reader's opinion than on the writer's opinion. I believe that the writer is more sincere in his expression than the critic. In studying literature, I have personally relied on reading the world's literary production and not on what the critics and the researchers say. This is why I am proud that I am still keeping my readers and that I enhance the circulation of any magazine or newspaper that publishes my stories, regardless of my political writings.

Writer's Isolation; Why?

[Question] Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus lives in isolation. Few men of letters have come to know him personally and you rarely see him in a public place even though his literary work teems with life. Why this isolation?

[Answer] This isolation is the result of the policical circumstances I have encountered. It used to be that if I sat in a coffee shop, some people would gather around me, viewing the session not as they view a session of Majib Mahfuz's but interpreting it politically. This started when I was young and continued until just before the revolution to the extent that I became used to isolation. Moreover, the development of my practical life has pushed me toward further isolation. I was in charge of ROSE AL-YUSUF, which played a major role in preparing the revolution. A friendship of work or of revolution, not just a personal friendship, bound me to those around me. This is why, when I lost my position at ROSE AL-YUSUF, all those who had been around me scattered. You may or may not know that I always avoid press interviews and avoid appearing on television and talking on the radio because this isolation has become a part of my nature. All that ties me to people now is my writing and their reading what I write. All this is the result of the political circumstances that I have encountered, even though I nowadays try to blame and deceive myself to appear in society, especially in literary and journalistic meetings, and to appear on radio and television to advertise myself and to win the reader's favor. But I cannot, and I still prefer that people read my work rather than read about me and still prefer that they read me rather than hear from me.

[Question] Your story "Don't Leave Me Here Alone" has provoked extensive argument. Did you write it on the spur of the moment, as it was published?

[Answer] The truth is that the story revolves around the Jews in Egypt or the Egyptian Jews. It is not the first story about the Egyptian Jews. I have written many stories on the Jews in Egypt, but this story has aroused special interest because it was published at the time of [al-Sadat's] initiative. What is surprising is that the Arab world has rejected it whereas in Israel this story is [words unintelligible] because of the picture it gives of the Jews in Egypt to the extent that I have published, and answered, in AL-AHRAM a message that I received from Israel attacking the story.

[Question] Arab resentment over publication of the message and the reply to the message was greater than the resentment over the story.

[Answer] The story takes place before the treaty. They have misinterpreted it. The story takes place even before 1948. I personally would like to tell you that I am proud of this story and wish that it would be presented on television and on the movie screen. But the political circumstances, or the interpretation of the political circumstances, precludes this.

On this occasion, let me tell you an anecdote that reminds me of the political influence on all the stories I write. I have always been the victim of this influence. I recall that I wrote a story that was interpreted as being a serious charge against Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir in the days of 'Abd al-Nasir's rule. In the story, I said that what had been taking place before the revolution was still taking place after the revolution. So 'Abd al-Nasir read the story and instructed, as a result, that it be presented on television and ordered the television officials not to change a single thing in the story. Anwar al-Sadat has told me that 'Abd al-Nasir was meeting with him once and asked to be excused, saying that he was going upstairs to watch television and see a story by 'Abd al-Qaddus that he had requested and expressing the fear that they might have to modify it. This is an indication of the difference of interpretations—a difference reaching the point whereby I am charged by some of opposing the ruler whereas the ruler himself finds that what I have written is a lesson that must be presented to the people.

[Question] 'Abd al-Nasir also supported you in your battle with the shaykhs of al-Azhar. Do you remember the story?

[Answer] In 1954, the people in charge of the radio were able to persuade me to present a program, as Fikri Abazah, may his soul rest in peace, used to do. I used to give a weekly talk, ending it with the words: Good night and may you wake up with love. Some shaykhs became incensed because the word "love" meant only sexual intercourse to them, as if I was asking every man and woman to engage in sex. The uproar reached 'Abd al-Nasir. Even though he laughed at the incident and was not convinced by the uproar the shaykhs provoked against me, he suggested that I replace the word "love" [hubb] by the word mahabbah [which also means love or affection]. I refused to change the word, telling 'Abd al-Nasir that I wanted the people to get used to the sublime and pure meaning of the word "hubb." 'Abd al-Nasir permitted me to continue, and subsequently, he himself in his speeches used the word "hubb" and not "mahabbah," which Anwar al-Sadat frequently reiterated. But that year I quit the radio as a result of the censor's intervention. I found that I could not withstand that intervention in what I wrote in ROSE

AL-YUSUF and what I said on the radio. Since then, that is, from 1954 until now, I have not spoken on the radio.

Ihsan, Movies, Stage, Songs, Television and Masses

It was impossible not to talk with him about a number of arts in which he has a special interest.

[Question] Do you write your stories for the cinema in particular?

[Answer] I have not written any stories for the cinema. I write for reading only and then what I write is turned into movie scenarios. I personally have written few movie scenarios, not exceeding five. In the United States and Europe, movie scenarios are published as books and distributed for reading, like plays. Even though plays are seen on stage, they are printed for reading. So why shouldn't scenarios also be printed? This is what I meant in the campaign that I launched concerning cinema literature. Why shouldn't there be a cinema literature as there is a stage literature?

[Question] In the face of movies, the stage, television and video, isn't the written word in danger?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the general reading rate in the world has declined. This affects book sales. The new generations have found that it is easier to sit in front of the television than to open a book and read. Even the sciences taught at schools are broadcast on television and recorded on video, as if we are on our way to abolishing the role of the word.

[Question] The cassette tape is on its way to replace the book.

[Answer] I myself have recorded some of my stories on cassette tapes, even though I don't believe that hearing is as effective as reading.

The ear is not as strong as the eye in stirring the imagination and in the ability to comprehend, meaning that listening is weaker than reading. Therefore, whatever you say about the ability of the television and the radio, they will never replace reading.

[Question] Do you go to today's theaters?

[Answer] Unfortunately, I don't know why I don't go or what has happened to me. However, it is a general phenomenon. I do not often go to movie houses and theaters unless there is a special urge to go and see. In this respect, I rely on the television and the video. The most important thing to me is reading. Currently, I read until 9 pm. From 9 pm until I go to bed, I sit in front of the television. Before, I used to read until I went to bed. Now, I content myself with reading until 9 pm.

[Question] So how do you regulate your relations with the social reality in Egypt?

[Answer] I am not fully cut off from society. I get visitors and I visit people, though within narrow limits. Through these visits, I get much of my social information. I also depend on reading the domestic and foreign press to keep in touch with the world. All that I lack is close contact. I have no connection with the critics, the new generation or society generally.

[Question] Your readers are the youth of the 1950's. Are they still with you or have you replaced them with the youth of the 1970's?

[Answer] God be thanked, the dearest blessing I thank God for is that the generations have passed me in succession while I continue to hold my place generation after generation. My stories have been republished more than eight times. Certain generations were not born when these stories were published for the first time. Yet, these generations read them when they reached the age of awareness. In the past, the accusation made against me was that all my readers were young people. But I have discovered that even grownups and old people follow my work.

[Question] Don't you think about writing your memoirs?

[Answer] The same impediment that prevents me from writing about my mother and my father prevents me from writing about myself. This is why I don't think of writing my memoirs, even though these memoirs are reflected in my stories and my political articles. Others urge me strongly, but when I think of the memories, I fear that I will leave the future and live in the past. So far, I have kept stronger ties with the future than with the past. I keep up hopes and think of the future. The future is building and the past is a form of spectatorship.

I think of being in a building movement and not in a spectatorship movement.

[Question] Women have retreated in your latest stories, why?

[Answer] This is untrue. Discussing my story "Days in the Permissible," a woman critic has said that I "have grown old" because I was not frank in presenting the heroine's views. She has said that this is a sign of weakness. The critic has forgotten that the entire story is based on [this] issue. For example, the story being published now, "My Dear, We Are All Thieves," is completely void of any love scene. The story dictates this. Different stories dictate different details. I am boundlessly honest to the topic with which I deal and I do not intentionally squeeze any scenes into a story.

[Question] Why do you write?

[Answer] I write for personal pleasure. I cannot live without writing. It is the issue of my life and my only hobby. Without writing, I would not know how to live and how to spend my time. Without writing, this world would have no meaning.

[Question] How many times do you rewrite your works?

[Answer] Just one time and then I immediately leave it alone. I am afraid to review the work. If I do so, I will end up writing something different. I read the

work a week later, in the galleys. This means that I content myself with this one review. This is due to the fact that I always feel that I am not perfect. I am never content with myself and I always have doubts about myself. The reader is my only refuge. The readers' communication with me is my only solace. There are dozens of readers who contact me and who come to me. Some of them consider me a psychiatrist. Many members of the new generation of writers come to show me their new work. It is true that I do not hold sessions like that of Najib Mahfuz or Tawfiq al-Hakim, but the young writers come to my home.

[Question] Do you like today's cinema?

[Answer] The cinema has changed and this change is due to production. The movies are an art that depends on capital and capital controls any work you see. If I see a movie, I can tell if there is a good producer behind it. In the past, there were specialized movie production companies that understood the art of cinema. Presently, production is done by individuals who have no connection with art. This has led to the deterioration of this great industry. Moreover, the general conditions have helped this deterioration.

For example, the transportation crisis has caused further deterioration of the movies. Most of the major movie houses are located in the center of Cairo and most families refuse to come to central Cairo because of the heavy traffic—traffic to which we gave no thought in the past. Despite the deterioration of the movies, there is still in Egypt a great art that has continued to shine despite the worst circumstances. This is the art of acting. It is the only Egyptian art that seems to be greater than any crisis and stronger than any problem. We still have the greatest artists [actors] in the Arab world and in the entire world.

[Question] What is your political affiliation?

[Answer] Politically, I am affiliated with freedom of opinion. I started this affiliation when I was a university student and I have kept it until now. Freedom of opinion is my life's basic issue. For the sake of my freedom of opinion, and to preserve this freedom, I have always refused to join any political party or group. I have even refused to be tied by personal friendships taking on a political color. Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir was my friend before the revolution. I disagreed with him despite our friendship but the friendship continued despite the difference in opinion.

Freedom of opinion is the mainstay on which my basic personality is built. In my view, freedom of opinion is above opposition and above support. I consider myself free to the degree I can support, then oppose and then support again because opinion emanates from a certain condition and a certain position. I may support the ruler in one aspect and oppose him in another.

Instead of Conclusions

Throughout the hours of this interview, Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus drank two cups of coffee, smoked two long cigars and answered two telephone calls, the first from a woman complaining of the silence of her telephone and the second from a woman

caller asking him about his grandson Muhammad, the son of his son Muhammad, whom Ihsan calls Mudi. During the interview, Ihsan left his place twice, the first time to ask his wife about the name of the family's native village in al-Gharbiyah Governorate because his memory is very weak and he can remember nothing and the second time to show us some of his private belongings, namely 200 private photographs, a statue of him in jail, with his wrists handcuffed, and the water glass he used in jail. His office contains a jungle of simple gifts that he has brought with him from every part of the world—a gift from every country reflecting the personality of that country. Muhammad, his son, was the one who was present and absent throughout the interview. Mudi, Muhammad's son, was present throughout the interview, playing with his grandfather. Whoever said that nobody is dearer than a child except a grandchild is true.

At the end of the interview, the man was tired and said he had a headache from talking so much. Thankfully, he spoke in correct classical Arabic and spoke slowly. His office room contained a television and a small video set.

8494

CSO: 4504/141

CONFERENCE DISCUSSES DEVICES FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 8 Mar 82 p 9

[Article by Husayn Shahbun: "Five Hundred Experts Discuss Consumer Protection; Conference Discusses Means to Deal With Poor Distribution of Goods and Services and False Advertising"]

[Text] The proceedings of the consumer protection conference opened yesterday. The conference includes more than 500 experts in various fields and has a specific task facing it, namely, to study the ideal means of protecting people from greed and exploitation and to formulate proposals capable of curtailing laxity and the lack of firm control over the markets.

The actual situation confirms that the domination of a small number of merchants and middlemen, the lack of consumer protection laws and the failure of the citizens themselves to stick to their rights vis-a-vis the merchants and the producers are behind the intensifying hardships of the broader sectors of citizens. Moreover, these manifestations, along with the absence of ethical deterrence and conscience among, some producers, are consuming most of the efforts exerted by the state to lighten the burden on the citizens.

According to Dr Siddiq 'Afifi, the dean of al-Minufiyah School of business and the conference rapporteur, the problem's intensity and danger will escalate unless all state agencies intervene and unless the citizens themselves act in solidarity with these agencies by organizing their efforts to create effective control over the markets, whether in terms of food supplies and processed or unprocessed goods or in terms of services, considering that this is the only way to restore discipline to the Egyptian market and to regain the citizens' rights.

Dr Siddiq 'Afifi added that the conference will discuss in its sessions 26 studies, of which the most important are:

The study presented by Dr Na'im 'Atiyah of al-Azhar School of Business on protecting the consumer against false advertising. The study proposes a specific definition for false advertising and a detailed discussion of the various elements and aspects of this concept. It also includes a number of criteria that can be employed to judge the falsehood of an advertisement. The study asserts that the consumer's awareness of their rights vis-a-vis the

marketing and advertising agencies is low and that Egyptian law has failed to give the consumer adequate protection against false advertising and to inflict deterrent punishment on those who engage in false advertising. The study proposes that the role of consumers and of popular control and information in ascertaining the truthfulness of advertisements be stressed to prevent deception, cheating and methods of false advertising.

The field study prepared by Dr Rashid 'Abd al-Jalil, from al-Zaqaziq School of Commerce, on protecting al-Zaqaziq consumers. This study points out that the consumers are actually aware of the importance of consumer protection and that the most important reason for the lack of this protection is the negligence of the consumers themselves and their acceptance of any commodity or service standard offered them and the businesses' and merchants' awareness of this negligence and acceptance, all of which lead to the formulation of commensurate marketing policies. The study also points out the need to deal with slowness and favoritism in the housing sector and in the distribution of food supplies and with the poor services generally. Through the people surveyed, the study offers a number of proposals to protect the consumers. These proposals do no more than reflect the injustice and the lack of protection the consumer feels. The most important of these proposals are the proposals to set specifications and prices and to strengthen the role of the local government agencies in setting prices, profits and quality-control specifications, in controlling advertisements and installment transactions and occasional sales and in enlightening consumers and responding to their complaints.

The study presented by Fathi Mabruk, general director at the Central Management and Organization Agency, on the judiciary authority's role in protecting consumers. The study calls for the formation of special courts or circuit courts to settle disputes concerning the various aspects of consumer protection and for providing a number of judges specialized in this field. To settle cases quickly, the study calls for appointing a central judge, with his office located at the police center. The study also specifies the cases to be presented to this judge and the limits of his jurisdiction insofar as these cases are concerned. The study further contains a number of proposals on developing the judiciary agency as a whole.

The study presented by the General Federation of Egyptian Workers on the role of the ministries and agencies concerned with consumer protection. This study calls for strict adherence to commodity weight and to sound packaging, especially for food supplies which, when poorly packaged, are exposed to weight loss and damage. The study also discusses the problem of the failure of both the public and private sectors to abide by the standards set by the agencies concerned and the problem of the lack of control capable of preventing such negligence. The study underlines the importance of the role of the Ministry of Supply in this particular sphere, especially the ministry's role in supplying the people's commodity needs, in insuring the delivery of subsidized commodities, especially food supplies, to those who deserve them, in dealing with laxity in the consumer cooperatives and in putting an end to tampering with ration cards.

The study presented by Engr Firyal 'Azmi on the role of the Industrial Control Agency in protecting the consumer of engineering and electrical goods. The study contains a proposal for the creation of a new consumer protection office in the agency to check the goods marketed and to confiscate products violating standards. The study also calls for a strict ban on the sale of goods produced by unlicensed public and private sector workshops, for bolstering the agency and solving the problems of its workers and for giving them incentives.

8494

CSO: 4504/231

COMMENTS ON CHEESE SCANDAL, CORRUPTION

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 257, 16 Feb pp 8-9

[Article by Ahmad Baha' al-Din: "The Humiliation!"]

[Text] One of the stories talked about in Egypt these days is the "cheese" story.

The issue here is simply the fact that there were dozens of cases of food poisoning among the pupils of one of the schools. Later on there were hundreds of such cases, and they occurred in dozens of schools.

It turned out that the cause of the food poisoning was the triangular pieces of cheese that are wrarped and which had been imported from abroad and served to pupils as part of their school lunches.

Millions of citizens were deeply disconcerted by this.

When this scandall could no longer be kept out of the newspapers, it turned out that the spoiled cheese was far more widespread than people could imagine. The discovery of the spoiled cheese led to the discovery of huge quantities of such cheese which had accumulated in our ports and not yet been sent out. It was also discovered that there were millions of pieces of such cheese in the warehouses, in the hands of the importers, in the possession of those who had contracted to distribute the cheese to the schools, in the school storerooms, and on the school lunch plates of the pupils. That is, there was such spoiled cheese at every stage of the cheese's delivery and distribution from the country of origin to the mouths of the school pupils. This cheese had gotten by all of the barriers set up by customs, health inspectors, and inspection committees!

It was only natural that this affair would cause widespread and profound shock among the public. After all, this was something which concerned the dearest of people's possessions—their millions of sons and daughters who attend school. Furthermore, food poisoning in the food used in the school lunches is something which especially affects poor people—the overwhelming majority [of the population]—since the school lunches constitute a type of food aid program for the majority of the middle—income and low—income Egyptian families.

This scandal had already been preceded by another scandal which had taken place in the sensitive realm of food. This scandal was what the newspapers had published concerning the seizure of large quantities of tin cans of spoiled sauce. The newspapers had also written about the seizure of cat and dog food which came in elegant tin cans which were well-known to the inhabitants of Europe and the U.S., but not to the inhabitants of Egypt. Egypt's people were still worrying about feeding their families, and could not yet afford to worry about feeding cats and dogs. Egypt is a country where the rate of illiteracy is high both in the rural areas and the in poor areas [of the cities]. Furthermore, this importing of cat and dog food happened at a time when all of Egypt's informational, advertising, and marketing media, as well as other media of persuasion, were devoting all of their energies to brainwashing Egypt's citizens and convincing them that anything in cans, as long as there was foreign writing on them and as long as they were imported, had to be better than anything produced locally!

Naturally, it was inevitable that talk concerning spoiled cheese would give rise to talk concerning the corruption of people's consciences and morals. During the last few months the talk in Cairo—whether justified or not—has been only about cases of bribery and corruption. People have been talking about cases which have already been made public, and about cases which are in the process of being brought up. The accumulated grievances which are swamping the offices of the public prosecutor and the attorney general cover nearly every aspect and phase of Egyptian life.

The scandal concerning the spoiled food, which the newspapers have written about and which people have been talking about—in exaggerated fashion, as usual—merely adds to the average citizen's feeling that he is a victim of injustice. This is a feeling which has accumulated during the last few years and become a profound feeling of injurious humiliation.

Not only have people stolen from him, they have also served him cat and dog food!

Not only have these people inflated their wealth which they stole by means of sucking his blood and running the economy of the country for their own benefit of their interests, and at the expense of his interests. They have also cheated him out of the main thing which a poor person anywhere in the world must fight for—his food and the food of his children. This is a particularly sensitive issue as far as the Egyptians are concerned because they are proud of the fact that they, throughout the course of their history, have produced their own food and beverages in their fields and farmyards. This is something that they have been proud of for thousands of years!

The people who have imported dog food for their citizens are, in the eyes of these citizens, dogs themselves and are the real dogs. Unfortunately there is no nicer word to describe them.

In any case, this is the way Egypt's citizens view them. I am merely faithfully reporting their feelings.

The subject of conversation now in Egypt is bribery, corruption, and negligence. Nothing is being talked about more than this. Egyptian newspapers, generally speaking, are still trying their best not to talk about the corruption which took place during the previous administration, thereby expressing the attitude of many of the groups which are part of the "centers of power" which have arisen again during the last few years. Nevertheless, the new items and reports in the press are, in spite of everything, full of information, news, reports, and statistics which are enough to shake the foundations of any state's existence:

- 1. Incidents involving imported food, costing hundreds of millions [of Egyptian pounds], which affected school pupils and stores in rural and poor [urban] areas.
- 2. Incidents involving the collapse, tottering, or "inclining" of new skyscrapers which in some cases had not even been occupied yet and for which people had already paid the contractors and owners.
- 3. Hundreds of millions of Egyptian pounds' worth of delayed tax payments because the government does not dare to demand that big-time financiers and "those with connections" in the government pay on time.
- 4. Extensive land areas worth hundreds of millions [of Egyptian pounds] which are located inside and outside the cities and which have been set aside for future use—and which some people have usurped over the years.
- 5. Local Egyptian products, from all branches of the Egyptian national industry, which have been accumulating in warehouses due to the sweeping invasion of the Egyptian market by foreign products by virtue of their advertising and overpowering marketing capability. This has threatened to cause the plants and factories [of the national Egyptian industry] to close and to cause this local production to remain idle. Many accusations are being published in some newspapers concerning money which is being paid in order to ensure that this local production remain idle and be ruined.
- 6. The multinational corporations which, because of their crushing power, are—with no prior warning—destroying and putting out of business all types of handicraft enterprises which provide employment for hundreds of thousands of people. These corporations also pay huge commissions [to their Egyptian agents].

Where did all this horror come from?

Those who have known Egypt during the last few decades feel that what they are hearing, reading, and seeing is an unreal world. Last week the editor in chief of the British magazine THE ECONOMIST was in Egypt. One evening he went up to the rooftop of the hotel on the bank of the Nile which he was staying in. What he saw was something out of the book "The Arabian Nights"—which perhaps was the fruit of popular imagination and maybe nothing like it ever took place! On the hotel rooftop he saw food which had been flown in fresh from all parts of the world, and wealth, furs, and jewelry, the likes

of which people do not see even in London. Champagne was flowing like water. This man was no stranger to the world of wealth. But here he saw wealth being displayed in a vulgar and shameless fashion which reminded him of the wealth of the "war profiteers" and more.

The man then came down from the hotel rooftop dazed, saying: "This is something which I have never seen before in the developing countries!"

Let me say again what I believe to be true and what I have said many times: Egyptians by nature do not resent wealth. But they do resent the source of such wealth if they feel that it is not a natural source.

Egyptians by nature are not affected by riches or poverty. But they do have their ideas about what is allowed and what is taboo!

Civilized people generally accept wealth, but they detest vulgarity in the display of wealth.

Some people who are in contact with President Hosni Mubarak say that he is surprised by the scope [of this wealth] and this corruption. Fighting corruption is the first battle which is being imposed upon him. This is in spite of the fact there is an unlimited number of large problems which are being imposed upon him such as Israel, maintenance of security, terrorism, maintenance of stability, ensuring continuation of change which remains controlled change, and the economic situation.

To observers he appears as if he is confronting this battle alone and is grappling with corruption all by himself.

The only backing which he has is the people's support for him, their confidence in him, their optimism concerning him, and their desire to give him a chance to succeed. Then they have to show their feelings and push him in the right direction. People do not know the complications of exercising power. They think that the head of state can change everything however he wants to merely by signing decisions which are issued from his office.

This, of course, is a simple-minded notion.

There is no doubt that President Mubarek desires to eliminate corruption, but this will be an extremely difficult task to carry out.

Furthermore, there are those who are utilizing all means to resist these efforts of his in this direction. They believe that they will be able to deflect the resentment [of the people] and enable things to stay the way they are. And, of course, there are also those who are trying to outbid him [by being more verbose about the problem of corruption].

He is in the best possible situation, as far as popularity is concerned, which a president can expect to be in in his first few months in office.

But he is also in the most difficult position a leader can be in who is exercising his responsibilities in his first few months in office.

This is the essence of the situation in Egypt! The rest, in the opinion of the Egyptian man in the street, is now simply foolish talk and [unnecessary] details. And [the Egyptian man in the street] is able to wait and see what happens!

9468

CSO: 4504/197

STUDY CONCERNING RURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 2, 3 Feb 82

[Articles by 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Uthman]

[2 Feb 82]

[Text] We Have Reclaimed 200,000 Feddans, But Lost 533,000 Feddans Due to Urban Expansion. Holdings of Less Than One Feddan Account for 17 Percent of the Total Cultivated Area.

When we are searching for the best methods of economic development in Egypt by means of an established plan which is based on realistic foundations, it is necessary for us to review the situation in the Egyptian villages as the basic center of production. We have carefully studied, seen, and had experience with lengthy plans which the government has submitted and which discussed providing support for and renovating industry as well as bringing in and establishing new industries. But [concerning villages] almost the only thing we have heard about has been a few small projects dealing with village development, electrification of the rural areas, and the construction of a covered drainage system. However, none of our previous plans dealt with the villages as integral production units. They regarded the village as places which would provide so-and-so many tons of crops. In times past the cities of Egypt lived by taking and not giving anything in return, whereas the villages gave what they had but did not receive anything in return. When the cities did begin to give something to the villages, they were very stingy about it. The natural result was that the cities, which were on the receiving end, began to make slow progress, whereas the villages, which were on the giving end, stayed where they were. Consequently the gap between the cities and the villages widened. In fact, the gap between them became so large that the villages' capability to continue giving to the cities nearly died out, and the villages began being transformed into a shackle which restricted the progress of the cities themselves.

According to a study which was undertaken by the National Planning Institute, one can become acquainted with and gauge the gap between the cities and villages by means of taking into consideration a number of various indicators. These include the fact that the average wage in the cities is nearly twice as much as the average wage in the villages, and the fact that average individual

income in the cities is almost three times as much as average individual income in the villages. Since an individual's spending power depends on the income he receives, the spending power and average consumption of individuals in villages are remaining on a very low level. This comparison not only reflects the size of the current gap between the villages and cities. It also reflects whether [the rural areas] are likely to develop or whether the gap between the urban and rural areas is likely to increase in the future.

Since the Egyptian villages are part of the Egyptian nation and account for approximately 60 percent of Egypt's total population, then it is obvious that the whole nation cannot slowly advance or make progress unless all parts of the nation are making progress. Thus the growth and progress of Egypt depend on development of the villages. The villages do not live in isolation from the rest of Egypt. They are bound to the rest of Egypt by a series of mutual relations. This is why development of the villages depends on the scope and nature of these relations.

For this reason, the plan for development of the villages should be a basic cornerstone of the overall national development plan. However, the question which should be asked of the authorities who engage in overall national planning on the district level is: Are they capable of carrying out or establishing alternative plans for the processes of development, on the local level, of all parts of the Egyptian nation—including the Egyptian villages?

The study made by the National Planning Institute answers this important question in the negative, and gives several reasons for this answer. They boil down to the fact that the national indicators which rely on overall total statistics such as total [national] income, total savings, total investment and investment distribution, total production, and total labor force are measured in accordance with what is called the "overall [national] level." These overall statistics are fundamentally based on the creation of income, regardless of where the income comes from. In other words, they deal with the creation of income during a given period. There are other statistics which deal with the creation of income according to location and its distribution. But they involve a different type of planning which is not carried out by the [agencies engaged in] overall national planning.

The study selected a sample of Egyptian villages which included 13,000 families. The total population included in this sample of villages was 74,000 persons, living in 74 villages in 8 different governorates in the year 1978. A group from the National Planning Institute, headed by Dr Kamal al-Janzuri, the minister of planning, who at that time was director of the institute, participated in the preparation of this study. Other members of the group were Dr Ahmad al-Murshidi, first deputy minister of planning, Dr Imam Salim, deputy minister of planning, Dr Sa'd Nassar, professor in the Faculty of Agriculture at the University of al-Minya, Dr Ibrahim al-'Isawi, Dr Ahmad Hasan, Dr Sayyid 'Abd al-Maqsud, Dr Sayyid Kaylani, and Dr Khudr Abu Qurah-all of whom were experts employed by the institute. Other people participating in the preparation of the study were Mr Labib Zamzam, governor of al-Buhayrah, and Dr Sulayman Hazin.

The sample chosen showed that the inhabitants of the rural areas were predominantly very young or elderly, and the fact that there was a low percentage of people of a productive age--in comparison with the age structure of the population of the urban areas. What this means is increasing dependence by the rural areas on the urban areas. The rural areas account for a higher percentage of the nation's illiterates than do the urban areas. According to the 1976 census figures, the rural areas accounted for 68.5 percent of all of the illiterates, and 31.5 percent of the illiterates were from urban areas. The percentage of Egypt's illiterates living in the rural areas was higher than the rural areas' percentage of the total population of Egypt (56.3 percent). Also, rural areas accounted for only 27.4 percent of all of those holding school diplomas, whereas 72.6 percent of them were from urban areas. The study showed that the most important reasons for illiteracy in the rural areas are the families' lack of [financial] resources and the families' need to have the children help in agricultural work or help acquire additional income from some other source in order to bolster the family income. This reason alone explains the lack of schooling of about two-thirds of the uneducated people in the villages which were used in the study's sample. As the study points out, there is no doubt about the fact that the [inappropriateness of the school program in the schools of the rural areas and their lack of orientation toward production are considered to be one of the reasons why individuals are not encouraged to continue with their schooling.

Since agriculture is the predominant activity of the inhabitants of the rural areas in Egypt, and in view of the fact that the land is the principal means of production, then it is quite important to find out how much land is available and how fertile it is. Statistics which deal with the total cultivated land area during the period from 1950 to 1978 indicate that the total area of cultivated land in 1975 was approximately 5.9 million feddans. This represents a decrease of 330,000 feddans from the year 1961, and this was in spite of the fact that the area counted in 1975 included 200,000 feddans of reclaimed land. What this means is that the total area of cultivated land decreased 533,000 feddans from 1961 to 1975, that is, a decrease of about 40,000 feddans per year. This is attributable to the fact that cultivated land is eaten up by urban expansion. If we assume that such land continued to be swallowed up at the same annual rate, then we can estimate that the total area of cultivated land in 1980 was about 5.7 million feddans.

If only the decrease in cultivated land area were the only problem of the rural areas which are the basic—in fact, the only—means of [agricultural] production. The agricultural problem also includes the fact that agricultural areas are breaking up into a huge number of small holdings. From 1950 to 1975 the number of holdings increased from 1 million to 2.8 million. The natural result of the fact that the number of holdings increased at such rapid rates was a decrease in the area of the average holding. The area of the average holding decreased from 6.13 feddans in 1950 to 2.06 feddans in 1975, that is, by two-thirds.

Even more serious than this is the fact that the number of very small holdings, the total area of which amount to less than 1 feddan, increased five-fold from 1950 to 1975 (that is, from 214,000 such holdings to 1,124,000 such holdings).

Holdings of this size account for approximately 17 percent of the total cultivated area.

Soil samples indicate that half of the cultivated area is land which can be considered either excellent land or land of great fertility. The other half of the cultivated land is considered average land or land of little fertility. This test was made in 1973. More than likely the percentage of excellent land or land of great fertility decreased somewhat after that year, for several reasons. The most important reason is the rising of the level of the ground water and the increase in the degree of the water's salt content. This has led to an increase in the degree of the salt content of the soil itself, and thus a decrease in its productivity. Also there has been land stripping to provide raw material for the brick-making industry.

In view of the statistics, it is necessary to remark that there has been a decrease in the number of tenant farmers occupying agricultural lands which are part of medium-size or large holdings. This is because these tenant farmers have begun to work in other areas which are more profitable than agricultural work. On the national level there has been a decrease in the percentage of holders of medium-size and large-size plots of land from about 15.9 percent in 1961 to 6.8 percent in 1978. This has resulted in an increase, on the national level, in the percentage of those holding plots of land totalling less than 1 feddan--an increase from approximately 26.4 percent in 1961 to about 50 percent of the total in 1978. Likewise, there was an increase in the percentage of holders of less than 5 feddans of land, during the same time period, from 84 percent to 93 percent of all of those holding land. The study indicates that Egyptian agriculture basically depends on draft animals to provide the pulling power needed in the carrying out of the various agricultural tasks. This is primarily attributable to the predominance of small holdings. The holder of a small plot of land, because of his lack of financial resources, is not able to acquire agricultural machinery. Furthermore, it is not economical to utilize such machinery on small plots of land. This explains the importance of animals in Egyptian agriculture. They are above all a means of labor which is indispensable to the farmers. The smallness of the land holdings also is reflected in the type of animal which the holder of the land plot acquires to use in his agricultural work. A small plot of land needs to be worked only for very short and irregular periods of time during the course of the year. Thus for holders of small plots of land it makes no sense to acquire particular animals which are used for specialized agricultural work. This is particularly true if their economic resources are not sufficient to do this. This is why the most common thing in Egyptian agriculture is the acquisition of animals which can be used for a variety of purposes.

One result of the predominance of such multipurpose animals in Egyptian rural areas has been a noticeable decrease in the productivity of animals which give milk. For example, the average milk production of Egyptian cows per year is about 675 kilograms as opposed to 3,000 kilograms of milk production by special milk-giving cows in other countries.

Perhaps the decrease in average milk production by Egyptian cows is not only attributable to the fact that they are used as draft animals. It may also be due to the fact that they are of inferior stock and are poorly fed. Nevertheless, their utilization as draft animals is considered to be the main reason for their low milk production. The nature of agricultural production in Egypt prevents the raising of cows which would specialize in the production of milk or which would be able to achieve a high production of milk. The study, which was prepared by the National Planning Institute, interprets the fact that some holders of agricultural lands to not acquire agricultural animals as being attributable to the small size of their holdings and to the fact that these small plots of land are unable to provide both food for the farmers and the members of their families and fodder for animals at the same time. In addition to this, mention is made of the lack of fodder and the difficulty of obtaining it due to considerations which have to do with the prevailing composition of crops in the area and the agricultural cycle decided upon for the area.

These growing problems which are confronting Egypt's villages have led to a decrease in income in the rural areas. In 1970 the income of the rural areas represented two-thirds of the total [national] income, but by the year 1979, that is, 10 years later, it totalled only 23 percent. This is explained by the fact that the rate of increase in income in the rural areas was less than the rate of increase of the income in urban areas. The rate of increase in income in the rural areas was about 2.8 percent during the above-mentioned period, whereas the income in the urban areas increased at an annual rate of about 8.6 percent.

Consequently, during this period, average individual income in the rural areas increased from 46.5 Egyptian pounds to 52.4 Egyptian pounds, whereas average individual income in the urban areas increased from 128 Egyptian pounds to 209 Egyptian pounds—in terms of fixed prices. Inis means that the gap which originally existed between average income in the rural areas and average income in the urban areas greatly increased during the seventies.

But what is life like for rural Egyptians, and how are their living conditions? This is what will be dealt with in tommorrow's article.

[3 Feb 82]

[Text] Only 40 Percent of the Housing in Rural Areas Is Fit to Be Lived In After Being Repaired and Remodeled. What Is Needed Is Planning for Villages As Production Units and the Providing of Basic Services for the Peasants.

The study conducted by the National Planning Institute concerning the rural areas of Egypt, using a sample of 74,000 persons from 8 governorates, showed that the housing of Egyptian peasants, in most cases, does not even meet the minimum standards of health requirements. In most of the rural dwellings there is a great degree of danger to the occupants' health because they are overcrowded with people, there is bad lighting and ventilation, they lack a source of clean water, they have no sanitary facilities and latrines, the

enclosure for the animals is inside the dwellings, and agricultural crops and fuels are stored on the rooftops and thereby constitute a danger. The study shows that about 60 percent of the rural dwellings need to be torn down because they are unfit [for human habitation], about 27 percent of the dwellings need to be remodeled and repaired, and about 13 percent of them require partial repairs. All of this is according to the statistics collected by the institute in 1980.

These statistics indicate that the average number of rooms in a rural dwelling is slightly more than that of urban dwellings. In spite of the fact that the number of individuals per family in the rural areas is higher than that of families in the urban areas, the fact that rural dwellings have more rooms than do urban dwellings means that there is less crowding in rural dwellings than there is in urban dwellings. Nevertheless, these average figures conceal the fact that the dwellings of the rural poor are far more crowded than are the dwellings of wealthy people in the rural areas.

By means of the data taken from the sample, the study shows that about 87 percent of the families live in dwellings which they own, 7 percent of the families live in rented dwellings, and the remaining 9 percent occupy their housing on the basis of the partnership system. In general, the phenomenon of owning one's dwelling is more widespread in the rural areas than it is in the urban areas. According to the study, in spite of the deterioration of the housing situation in the rural areas, there is little interest in the rural housing problem. Generally the housing problem in Egypt is considered to be a problem which concerns the urban areas.

The study shows that there are social and economic phenomena which determine the development of the villages. The villages, in addition to being administrative and production units, are also human settlements where people live side by side with what they produce, and this is due to the circumstances of agricultural production. If we assume that industrial production projects are economic units which perform a particular production role by means of buildings, machinery, and equipment, if we assume that these projects constantly require that research and studies be conducted concerning the utilization of both local savings and savings from outside, and if we assume that the projects are seeking to obtain the best possible returns, then we may, by direct analogy, view villages, from the abstract point of view, as industrial plants. Villages product agricultural products which are utilized directly in production or are utilized as raw materials in processing Because of this, villages play a prominent role in increasing industries. production within a society, increasing income, and intensifying the production interrelationship which exists between agriculture and industry. This, in turn, helps to develop the process of production and strengthen the national economy. If this is so, then controlling and guiding the processes engaged in by these villages, as economic units, will help to increase production within society. This production will consequently be on the same level as that of the industrial operations in various factories and plants. Furthermore, if laws, legislation, and labor codes grant rights to factory workers and attempt to ensure a definite living standard and provide a good level of certain services and health care--and some factories and plants even provide housing

services for their workers—then it is only fair that the workers in the various production sectors of the nation be treated equally.

This reason for this is that, according to the logic of social justice within a society, there should at least be no discrimination or gap between the workers in the various economic activities. Thus it is important to develop and improve the villages for the benefit of those who work there. Of course, the principle of equality does not mean absolute equality—at least not during the first stages of development.

In view of all of the problems of backwardness faced by Egyptian villages, there has arisen the problem which is affecting the economies of both the rural and urban areas. Numerous studies dealing with this area have shown that the rural areas are always areas which induce their inhabitants to leave [and migrate to other areas]. They show that this trend of migration from the rural areas is greater in Upper Egypt than it is in Lower Egypt. They also show that whenever there are few people in a certain area working in industry, there is a great tendency to migrate to other places. What this means is that it is possible for local development to stop this migration trend.

The study of the economic gap between rural society and urban society in Egypt clearly shows that the standard of living in rural society is lower than it is in urban society. This is in spite of the fact that rural society accounts for 56 percent of the total population. This study also shows that average individual income in the villages is no more than 36 percent of average individual income in the cities. It also shows us that the rates of increase in income in the villages during the seventies was no more than 1 percent [annually] as compared with 4.5 percent in the cities.

The study by the National Planning Institute has proposed that what is needed to be done is to reconstruct the villages economically and socially and develop them and build them up. As the field study says, and as we all know, the villages, in many of their aspects, do not meet even the minimum requirement for human life. The time has come to bring about development in the villages. In this regard attention should be focused not only on the purely engineering process of rebuilding the villages. There should also be a developmental program for the Egyptian villages and for their local resources in order to improve the living standard of the villagers and in order to hasten the process of [overall] development.

The study demanded that some of the aspects of the policies of rural development have the objective of creating several factors and conditions relating to the situation of people in the villages. They involve changing the traditional pattern of agricultural production to a modern pattern which takes into consideration the resources and possibilities of the peasants, and studying the effect of this modernization on unemployment inside the villages. The changes are as follows:

1. Creation of rural leadership groups which will lead the work process. They should have an understanding of the circumstances surrounding [work in the rural areas] and of the requirements for change. These leaders should live

together [with the village people] and not look down on them and behave arrogantly toward them--which is the attitude right now of the people in the bureaucratic agencies which are administering the development process in the villages.

- 2. The peasants must feel that they will receive the benefits of their production and of this development, and not that these benefits will go to the cities. If this were to happen, this would make the peasants defend their interests and shoulder their responsibilities.
- 3. More democracy in the process of making decisions which concern the welfare of the villages. This would impel the peasants to bravely, and without fear, express their opinions. This would bring out all the aptitudes and natural dispositions which they have inherited and acquired through the course of the ages.
- 4. Transforming agricultural work into a type of collective work with its relationships of production similar to those found in plants and factories. This would make individuals members of a group and they would be working to achieve their interests by means of such a group.
- 5. The peasants would learn from the modern agricultural production process, their social education would improve, and they would be linked closer to other outside civilizations.

The study demanded that local meetings be held in the villages which would serve local needs and would help to hasten the process of implementing existing projects—without having to turn to the cities, governorates, and capital city concerning every matter, large and small. Such industries include, for example, the repair of modern agricultural equipment, vehicles, and tractors, industries which serve hospitals, health units, and schools such as carpentry, some of the work done by blacksmiths, glass—making, printing, bookbinding, the making of notebooks, ironing and pressing, the industries which produce oils, particularly in the areas where there is cultivation of sesame plants, cotton, olive trees, soybeans, and castor—oil plants, and textile—production industries which utilize electricity in industrial operations rather than utilizing it exclusively for household purposes.

9468

CSO: 4504/197

KHOMEYNI'S PROBLEMS, ARMY'S 'FUTURE ROLE' ANALYZED

Athens OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek No 11 (1454), 18 Mar 82 pp 15-16

[Article by Giorgos Mitralias: "The Shaky Stabilization of the Khomeyni Regime"]

[Text] Beyond certain generalities that facilitate the two existing and diametrically opposed appraisals of the Khomeyni regime, it is a fact that the Iran of the Islamic revolution remains a mystery. Once the scanty information available on the unending Iran-Iraq conflict is passed out, there is nothing else.... After the first period of press enthusias 1, Iran has proceeded into oblivion in international affairs!

However, the fact that the press has ceased to concern itself with Iran does not necessarily mean that especially "significant" events are not taking place in Iran. How could this be possible in an area like the Middle East and in a country where a revolution has just taken place—without having yet ended—whether it is theocratic, social, progressive or reactionary? Present-day Iran can be anything but...indifferent!

Is Khomeyni dead or alive? One could almost say that in the view of "experts," everything in Iran is dependent on the death of the leader of the Islamic revolution. Naturally, no one doubts the special significance of such an occurrence is in a country where the leader has turned into...God's representative on earth! However, the subordination of developments in post-revolutionary Iran exclusively to the death of the Ayatollah Khomeyni ignores a lively reality which cannot be expunged. We shall try to analyze this lively reality of the war with Iraq, of internal terrorism and of the social, economic and political crisis in this article.

This first thing that a seasoned observer will note in present-day Iran is the deepening crisis in its government apparatus. In spite of the fact that the Islamic regime attempted, from the very first day, to exercise its hold on the old state apparatus—and especially on its military one—it has never been able to rely on it. This is due to at least three reasons, the first and most important one being its loss of control over the entire country.

Beginning with Iraqi Kurdistan and ending with Baluchistan while also touching Azerbayjan, we find that the regime has not only been unable to bring "peace" to its national minorities (which, however, amount to a majority of the Iranian population when taken all together), but has worsened its already tense relations with them. Today in Iran, centrifugal forces are more developed than ever.

Especially in Kurdistan, the many activities of the army and the Pasdaran have failed lamentably. As if these military losses were not enough, the Khomeyni regime has been unable to avert the creation of the "free regions" it fears most at this time. Indeed, no one hides the fact that the "provisional government" of Bani-Sadr and the Mojahedin-e Khalq is planning to establish itself in Kurdistan in the spring with the agreement of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan. As is easily seen, Bani-Sadr's transfer from Paris to the Iranian territory is one of the great headaches of the Tehran leadership.

The second reason for the worsening crisis is none other than the deepening disagreements both within the regime's leadership and among the new and the old government institutions and mechanisms. First of all, a large number of centers of power were created within the Islamic leadership, that has already suffered so much from the Mojahedin's terrorist activities; in these centers, various candidate successors to Khomeyni have gone as far as organizing their own personal armies, as, for instance, Ayatollah Montazeri and Ayatollah Khalkhali! Today, in Iran, all the leaders speak of unity, but almost all have carefully surrounded themselves with their own Pretorian guard. Characteristic of this situation was the recent confrontation between Prime Minister Khamene'i and the parastatal power of the ayatollahs which controls the Pasdaran as well as the continuing dismissals and replacements of many of the regime's leaders, among whom was also the well-known Khalkhali.

However, the most important cause for the present-day crisis, as well as for the prob ble confrontation that will take place soon, remains the continuing loss of control over the army's officer corps. The fact is—and it is almost daily confirmed by the regime itself—that the majority of the officers remain withful to the monarchy, only biding their time to act! For the time being, and the attempts by Khomeyni or of the (exiled) Bani-Sadr to co-opt the Iranian army have only produced meager results....

indeed, the general disintegration noted in Islamic Iran, which-paradoxicallyco-exists with the relative stabilization of the regime--can be explained from the absence of credible alternative solutions vis-a-vis the present "status quo." The embryonic condition of both the "right" and the "left" dissidence carries the social and political clashes which do persist within the governing party .: self, dividing it and simultaneously turning it into a unique framework for air confrontation. The above observation acquires monumental importance for the inalysis of the internal Iranian balances, as well as for a fitting explamition for the (at first glance) "curious" diplomatic moves of the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, exactly because of mutual fears, both President Reagan and Leonid Brezhnev at this time support the Khomeyni regime, limiting their action to an improvement of their respective positions while waiting for better days to come. The Soviets, for instance, have recently unleashed an especially subtle "charm offensive," which, while denouncing the existence "reactionary forces" within the Islamic leadership, awards it a progressive label. As for the United States, despite the fact that it supports and finances : number of rightist politico-military organizations opposed to the regime, it has made clear to them that at least for the present, it opposes any military action against the Tehran regime!

In reality, the Western world's opposition to the Khomeyni regime is not as unbending as a certain sector of the Western press with tendencies toward oversimplification would wish it to be. Uncertainty over future developments, the lack of clear and direct alternative political solutions and...the eternal search for profits have laid the foundation for quite a few "incomprehensible" economic enterprises which are in full bloom. Thus, it is a well-known fact that the regime's main supplier of weapons is...Israel, a country which, of course, does not miss any opportunity to play the part of the especially lucrative arms merchant while at the same time indirectly weakening Iraq. However, side by side with Israel (which does not act completely independently from the United States) one can find also North Korea, Libya, Syria and the Soviet Union, which together cover the other half of the Iranian needs in war materiel....

Economic Crisis and Social Clashes

The decapitation of the Islamic leadership last June by the bomb attack against the Majlis, and especially the assassination of Ayatollah Beheshti caused a serious vacuum which has not yet been filled. As a result, the underlying oppositions within the regime became even deeper and have reached the point of paralysis. However, the price of such a euphoric inaction which limits itself strictly to the management of the war against Iraq and against national and political minorities is very high. An example: the most important change promised by the regime, which concerns the peasant --its wider social base--that is, land reform, continues to be blocked in the Ma, lis' drawers. According to a recent edition of the U.S. news-magazine NEWSWEEK on Iran, "until now the deputies representing the religious conservative establishment of the city of Qom have successfully blocked two basic reforms proposed by the radicals and indirectly adopted by Khomeyni." We are referring to the nationalization of foreign trade opposed by the powerful bazaar merchants who traditionally have associated themselves with the right wing of the clergy and to the creation of committees that will undertake the distribution of land holdings most of which belong to the...clergy itself! "We do not want to impose equality," Ayatollah 'Ali Meshkini of Qom was recently stating, indirectly answering Khomeyni himself, who had just fulminated against "pseudo-clerics." "In Islam, no one is equal with any one else," he had continued, so as to clear up any doubts. As becomes obvious, in this instance--which has, however, more general repercussions--the lingering doubt that Khomeyni only holds the power allowed to him by the variously clashing leadership tendencies is confirmed, his role being ceremonial to a certain extent!

In the midst of this paralysis of the state apparatus, the deepening economic crisis certainly does not contribute toward normalizing social relations. Inflation has reached 60 percent, industrial production has fallen to one-third of the 1979 level, foreign exchange reserves have shrunk to 1 billion dollars compared to the 14 billion that existed in 1980, and, finally, one-third of the work force is unemployed. If to the above frightening statistics is added the hemorrhage caused by the unending conflict with Iraq (1.5 million refugees, 60 billion dollars' worth of damage and 400 million dollars the monthly cost of the war), we can understand the increasing impoverishment that is beginning to show in Iranian cities and rural areas.

In the face of this tragic situation, the political movements are called upon to shape their perspectives. For Ayatollah Khomeyni and the Islamic leadership, their first concern is to neutralize any weakening of the disparate alliance supporting them. The spectrum of the specific measures they are adopting to achieve this goal is especially wide, going from mass state terrorism to the kind of propaganda that considers "asses those who worry about economic problems" (a recent Khomeyni phrase). However, in the view of the other segments of the Iranian opposition, the economic crisis and the disintegration of the state must tend toward the overthrow of post-revolutionary bal-Thus, according to the shah's former ambassador in London, "for the great majority of educated and moderate Iranians who would like to see their country develop honorable relations with the non-communist world, hope is concentrated almost exclusively on the armed forces. The Girondins of the Iranian revolution (Mehdi Bazargan and Company) have been elbowed aside with the expected speed. The terrorism of the Jacobins (Ayatollah Khalkhali and Company) is, at least for the time being, enthroned in power. It is certain that a Bonaparte, or, in this instance, a Reza Khan will follow to put an end to the folly of the clergy in order to ensure territorial power in the country and to restore the wounded national pride...."

The only thing certain in present-day Iran is that the situation is so fluid that it permits all kinds of prognostications. It may be that Iran has withdrawn today from that international scene which it had entered so vehemently barely 3 years ago, but it is very far from having stabilized under the Islamic regime. By following carefully the not negligible present less spectacular internal developments, the task of understanding tomorrow's even more impressive congrontations will doubtlessly become easier....

050: 4621/279

EGYPTIAN, FRENCH PRESIDENTS 'WARNED' BY PREMIER MUSAVI

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 8 Mar 82 p 11

[Text] Our country's prime minister spoke yesterday about the Egyptian courts' predetermined sentencing of those accused of Sadat's revolutionary execution, and said: Those whose signatures sanction the death sentence on Muslims must realize that dire consequences await them, and that Muslims will get revenge on them.

Engineer Mir Hosseyn Musavi, the prime minister, took part yesterday evening in an exclusive interview with IRNA's corresponden, and answered questions concerning various issues, including the arrival in Iran of commissions to mediate and investigate the war imposed on Iran, economic relations with Japan, the control of inflation, the predetermined verdicts of Egypt's and Bahrain's courts, and the present status of relations between the Islamic Republic and France.

Musavi was asked: In light of the fact that once again the commission chosen by the Islamic Conference and the nonaligned body investigating Iraq's imposed war on Iran are about to travel to Iran once again, has any change taken place in Iran's position on the war, or not? Musavi said: Because we have followed a clear and definite goal since the beginning of the Iraqi regime's aggression, we consider these trips useful. It seems that the conditions we have repeatedly announced for the end of the war have gradually gained the world's attention. Our conditions are the same as those we stated before: Unconditional withdrawal by the aggressor to that side of the border which was attacked at the end of September 1980, the payment of compensation, and finally condemnation of the aggressor by the committee investigating the aggression. There are no vague points or irrational desizes among these principles.

The prime minister, regarding the state of economic relations between Iran and Japan, said to IRNA's correspondent: We have tired very hard to have a sound economic bond with Japan. Unfortunately Japan wishes to give a political aspect to its economic relations. This approach naturally affects bilateral relations. He added: We cannot permit Japanese businessmen to sell us goods and to buy petroleum from us with currency they have gotten from countries hostile to us. The prime minister was asked: What program do you have for controlling inflation? He stated: Inflation in the prices

of essential goods has been curbed. It is due to this that our country's oppressed people obtain thees goods at fair prices.

Of course inflation has deep roots, one of which is the imposed war. He added: Another one of our difficulties is the existence of a group of impious speculators. They continue their economic crimes at the expense of pressure on the people. These persons should know that the government's policy is to eliminate these crimes. I have heard of a factory owner whose factory is making a considerable profit from the shortage of glasses and saucers. Instead of planning to expand the factory and raise production, he has purchased ten passenger cars, and continues to profit from the price increases. If we do not call this action treachery to the revolution, what should we call it? We will deal severely with these persons.

Engineer Musavi was asked: Although the Reconstruction Crusade's charter has been brought to the Majlis floor, during a seminar the Reconstruction Crusade asked the government to withdraw the bill relating to the Rural What is your view of the matter? He said: Of course you Services Centers. are aware that this bill was one of those presented by the governments of the martyred brothers Raja'i and Bahonar. In my view, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Reconstruction Crusade should cooperate in the operation of these centers. I have told these brothers that the government's sovereignty over all the country is indivisible. They accepted this. However, the difficulty is the nature of the connection between the government and the Reconstruction Crusade. I hope that this matter will be resolved quickly with the help of the brother and sister representatives and the Crusade brothers. The cabinet as a revolutionary institution itself is aware of He added: the roles of institutions which have sprung from the hearts of the people. In light of the constitution's spirit, the government considers it in the national interest that relations with these institutions should be directed towards concentrating affairs in the government's hands. This is so that, on the one hand, country-wide planning can be done, and on the other hand the government can be answerable to the people's respected representatives. Engineer Musavi was asked: What is your view of the kangeroo courts in Egypt and Bahrain that have given the death sentence to a group of Muslims accused of being connected with the Iranian Islamic revolution? Musavi said: The government has repeatedly announced that attributing Islamic movements which are spontaneously arising in other nations, particularly those in the region, to the Iranian Islamic republican government is a pure lie and a plot. At the same time, we cannot remain indifferent to the fate of Muslims throughout the world. What Muslim, what human being can see the lives of a group of innocent Muslims endangered and remain silent? Any kind of harshness to Muslims definitely produces a commitment on our part. We cannot remain silent in these instances.

He added: Those whose signatures sanction the execution of Muslims should realize that harsh consequences await them, and that Muslims will get revenge on them.

Musavi was asked: What is your view of the visit to the occupied Palestinian lands several days ago by Mitterand, the French president and general secretary

of the Socialist Party? He said: The previous behavior of the French president shows that he was a solid supporter of Zionism, and in this light his trip is not unnatural. What is surprising is that Arab countries have hopes in the French government. It is as if they did not know that the solution to the Palestinian problem is in the powerful hands of all the world's Muslims, and not in the hands of arrogant regimes.

Mir Hosseyn Musavi, our country's prime minister, spoke at the end of the interview with IRNA's correspondent concerning Iranian-French relations and the current status of these relations. Musavi said: On the one hand France tries heroic persons committed to the Islamic revolution for the crime of attempted assassination of a fugitive criminal with a long record. On the other hand it supports with all its strength terrorists and murderers like Rajavi and Bani-Sadr. This government, a so-called supporter of human rights, does not even remain true to its simple economic obligations. They have kept approximately 1.2 billion dollars of ours for nearly three years without any justification. This is money which the French government itself even guaranteed. Or they have compelled contractors who had agreements with us to leave Iran on the excuse of a lack of security. If we do not call this thievery, what should we call it? France should know that one day it will pay compensation for all this oppression and bullying of Muslims.

9597

CSO: 4640/206

UNIVERSITIES REORGANIZING ON ISLAMIC, NON-WESTERN LINES

London ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW No 7 Mar 82 p 77

[Text]

In a message to the nation two years ago. Ayatollah Khomeini emphasised the need for a "cultural revolution" in Iran, particularly with respect to the institutions of higher education. It was his view that Iranian universities had been turned into superficial, western institutions where students, divorced from the needs of their own culture and society, learned only western values.

The time had come for change, the Ayatollah explained: "We want our universities to serve our nation, not some foreign interest."

Following this speech, the Cultural Revolutionary Council (CRC) was formed in April 1980, headed by a committee of seven eminent scholars. This committee now supervises the work of more than 140 sub-committees dealing with the restructuring of the university system and, to a lesser extent, of secondary and primary schools, radio, television and any other aspects of the mass media which affect the education system.

Several hundred university professors, members of the CRC and others, have been working with students and officials to amend the teaching programme and materials used. The work is handled by three major units under CRC control. The first, the Education Planning. Unit, is in charge of reshaping courses and curricula to fit the needs of the country at present. To date, the medical, agricultural and engineering sub-committees have presented their reports.

The second unit, the University Jihad, is working towards introducing the work of the universities into the community in a real sense. Attention is being drawn to the social and economic problems confronting the country and on how the universities can help. So fair, activities have been concentrated in the fields of industrial reconstruction and urban and agricultural development.

This work is being carried out in close cooperation with the Jihad e Sazingdigi revolutionary committee, a largely student body. Early achievements include the involvement of students in the production of industrial spare parts and machinery, and of a variety of other goods including vacuum pumps, compressors, electric driers, manual harvesters and anti-tank mines. These are valued at between one-tenth and one-fifth of import values.

The two groups have also been involved in the preparation and distribution of educational material such as textbooks and dictionaries, and in building and running educational facilities in rural areas

Similar work in the production of educational materials has been carried out by the Iran University Press, the third of the CRC units. Run by a committee of professors engaged in writing, translating and adapting textbooks, the Press has published about 2,000 works.

Besides preparing universities for a more constructive role in society, the CRC handles a number of practical problems, not least of which is the fight for university places, with an estimated 700,000 students competing for only 30,000 vacancies

As a first step towards meeting these demands, the CRC has drawn up two new schemes the first, designed to absorb some of the surplus admissions, is to set up a number of technical and training colleges offering courses of a largely practical nature. The second, whose aim is to ensure fairer admission procedures throughout Iran, will divide the country into about 100 districts from which students can apply for admission. Until now most admissions were processed largely in Teheran.

The theological schools in Qum, Mashad, Isfahan and Teheran will remain independent

and will not be covered by the new rules and regulations. These schools cater for about 100,000 students pursuing various disciplines and continue to attract some of the ablest young scholars in the country.

In addition to tackling the vast administrative problems of reshaping the higher education system, the CRC is faced with the challenge of having to change the attitude of some of those involved. Many professors are found to be unsympathetic to anything they think "smacks of religion." As Dr Abdul Karim Sorush, a member of the CRC explains, "They are not against the Revolution, but they do not know what it is. They are still living in their own world. They think that they know everything and they are sure of their 'superior' role in thinking that they are separate from the people... We have to convince them that they cannot remain separate"

Dr Sorush goes on. "The main target area will be in teaching human sciences. Islam will no longer be studied as part of oriental studies." The theories of human behaviour, endeavour and relationships which have been

put forward as facts by western disciplines have done untold damage to Islamic societies and they are no longer wanted by Iranians. We want a social science that reflects our value system, is relevant to our goals and can solve our problems.*

The question of political activity in the universities is, of course, another sensitive area for the CRC. Before the shutdown of the universities, teachers and students did as they pleased, without any sense of responsibility, according to Sorush. New criteria for oncampus political activities are to be laid down Outlawed political parties will not be allowed under any pretext. Political associations, both Muslim and non-Muslim, will be tolerated on campus, provided these are restricted purely to the students and not attached to any political party outside the university. Once the universities reopen, students will be free to do what they think best, as long as their activities do not distort the main function of the university - to teach and to learn.

Source Muslim No ...

CSO: 4600/390

GRAND MUFTI OF JERUSALEM COMMENTS ON ISRAELI OCCUPATION

London ARABIA in English No 5, Jan 82 p 16

[Interview with Sa'd al-Din al-'Alami, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and Hasan Tahbub, Director-General of Waqf]

[Text]

How has the status of the Muslim community in Jerusalem been affected by the Israeli occupation?

Alami: There are one billion Muslims in the world. Our places here in Jerusalem are holy to all of them. The most important of these is the Al Aqsa Mosque, because the Holy Quran says that God sent the Prophet Muhammad to Jerusalem and God blessed Al Aqsa. For any Muslim, praying at Al Aqsa is equal to 500 prayers anywhere else.

Israel has taken by force the keys of the Moghrabi Gate. Having the key means it is open to everyone, against Muslim tradition Also, they are digging around the walls from the western side. This endangers all the buildings of the western sector of Al Aqsa.

Then we have the Ibrahami Mosque in al Khalil (Hebron). After the 1967 occupation, the Minister of Defence, Moshe Dayan, asked the Mayor of Hebron Sheikh Jaabari, to permit Jews to enter and visit the Mosque. What happened after that? The Jews brought tables and chairs and prayed as if in a synagogue surely this is wrong.

Have you protested against these measures?

Alami Hundreds of times — but we get no answer. There is another mosque in Beth-leh. ar Local Muslims call it the Dome of Rachael. The Jews made it into a syntgogue and they do not let any Muslims in. Two others were in the Moghrabi Quarter — west of Al Aqsa (the site of the rebuilt Jewish Quarter of the Old City)

Tahboub Several times Israeli soldiers have surrounded the gates of the Al Aqsa Mosque, terrorising the Muslims. Of course they say they are there for security reasons.

How has the Israeli occupation affected the Shariah courts?

Alami: The Jerusalem court is the oldest in Palestine, perhaps even in the world. When the Caliph Omar came to Jerusalem in 638 he created it. But Israel does not want to know that there is an Islamic court in Jerusalem and does not recognise it.

How does this attitude affect administration?

Alami: I still give decisions in my court and the people respect them. If, however, a woman wants a divorce and I permit it, the Israelis do not accept it. If anyone wants to marry they are obliged to marry twice or have two certificates: one from this court — we believe that this is the right one, the one used in Amman — and another one from Jafta (the location of the Israeli "official" Shariah courts), for when anyone wants anything from the government here.

What are your relations with the Jaffa court? Alam We have no such relations. We do not recognise the authority of the Jaffa court, which is obliged to follow the rules of the

Israeli government

Who funds the institutions in Jerusalem?

Alami: All of our funds come from Amman In 1967, Israel's Minister of Religion asked us to work with the Israeli government and said that he was ready to give us all necessary resources. We told him that we would continue our work.

What is the future of Jerusalem's Muslims in the light of Israel's declared intention never to give up the territories occupied in 1967?

Alami There are about one billion Muslims in the world and about the same number of Christians. There are a total of 13 million Jews. It is not right to leave the holy places of the world's Christians and Muslims under Israeli occupation.

I believe that I am in a great prison. I am a religious man. I do not want war, I want peace. You cannot gain peace by force. Only when there is justice is there peace. The best solution is to divide Jerusalem into two parts one for the Arabs and one for the Jews Jerusalem was divided from 1948-67 and other cities have been divided — Berlin, for example. It is not necessary to put walls up, but to return Israel to its 1967 status — to leave the West Bank for the Arabs. We should be good neighbours — the Arabs free in their land and the Jews free in theirs.

CSO: 4400/210

BACKGROUND OF GOLAN DRUZE DISCUSSED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE in English 26 Feb 82 pp 8-9

[Article by Ya acov Friedler: "Views From the Heights"]

[Text]

AS 1HE prime minister of a Jewish state and no stranger to Jewish folklore. Menachem Begin should have known better than to have expected the Golan Law he rushed through the Knesset to change the Golan situation for the better.

He should have recalled the story of the sole Jew in a small Polish village who, for economic reasons, succumbed to the entreaties of the local priest to convert. After sprinkling some holy water over him the priest pronounced him a true son of the church and told him that he must never again eat meat on a Friday. Calling on the new member of his flock one Friday evening, the priest found him enjoying a traditional shabbes meal complete with half a chicken. The ex-Jew was unperturbed. "You see, Father, just as you turned me into a Christian with a little water, I sprinkled some on a chicken, and it's now a fish."

Mr. Begin sprinkled an Israeli law over the Golan, but the 12,000 or so residents of the four Druse villages aren't dancing the hora. In fact, they started a general strike a fortnight ago which is to last "until the law is rescinded or until we die." The schools were closed, the shops were shuttered, hundreds of workers who daily travel to work in Jewish enterprises stayed home. Only the spokesmen for the two extremes, those standing four-square for Israel and those demonstrating loyalty to Syria, were working overtime for the newsmen who flocked to the Heights.

In between the articulate prosand conners, all speaking fluent Hebrew, are the vast majority of the inhabitants, who seem anxious to get back to work that has, in only 15 years of Israeli occupation, transformed the Golan from one of the more backward areas of the Middle East to one of enviable prosperity.

THE IMPRESSION one gets is that the Druse want to hedge their bets. If Israel should return the Golan or part of it to Syria in the future ("If you're returning Jewish settlements to the Egyptians, you surely won't forgo peace with Syria for the sake of four Druse villages"), they will have demonstrated their loyalty to Syria. If the Golan stays "an integral part of Israel forever," they'll be back at work with no harm done.

Now for the facts. Before June 1967, there were 14 motor vehicles, including four tractors, in the Golan. Today, the Druse own 1,700, including 700 tractors. Last year's apple crop, their principal produce, brought them an income of IS100m., far more than they ever dreamed of before Israeli knowhow helped them to develop orchards. In addition, millions more are earned by the men working in Israel or acting as contractors. To match these incomes, many village homes have been turned into veritable mansions.

Nor are they unaware of the change in their fortunes. They had a chance to visit Khader village, which Israel captured in 1973,

before it was returned to Syria. Ihere they found the Druse population "living as primitively as we had ved before 1967. We had advanced into the 20th century; they were still in the 18th," one resident conceded

From the point of view of prosperity, Israel is not faulted, as one "extremist" explained. "But, we aren't arguing economics; we're fighting over politics."

LAST SUNDAY morning broke bright and crisp on the Golan, with the sun mopping up the night's frost, as the general strike went into its second week. The snow had retreated to the Hermon and the streets of Majdal Shams, the largest the Golan villages, were practically empty when we arrived. But ater on a crowd of men collected in the village square, and I was soon surrounded by a circle of younger ones, many dressed in khaki "dubon" parkas. With their lightish hair they could have passed for a group of disgruntled Jewish moshavniks complaining about the government. The impression was dispelled neither by their Hebrew for by their Israeli style: "We want our rights and we'll strike till we get them

The Bank Happalim was the single business open in the square, "manned only by two Jewish clerks and we've broken off contact with them." They had not considered that while this was fine for people and wed money, creditors might not take the same view, but "plenty is have large accounts, and take care of those who need gir wages to pay their bills."

As for water and electricity, these are paid for through the local council which was on strike, and they hoped the strike would be settled before these accounts became due.

Salman Abu-Salah, who lives near the square, apologized for being in his pyjamas but soon dressed in front of an iron, wood-burning stove. His 11 children preferred, despite the cold, to remain harefoot

Abu-Salah, a member of one of the two major Golan Druse clans, is chairman of the "Druse Zionist Club." He was the second man to take out Israeli I.D. cards for himself and his wife, and since the religious leaders imposed a ban on all card-holders he has seen his flourishing insurance business "ruined," but he still seems to do quite well with his apple orchard. He expressed the firm conviction that the present trouble was not being caused by the population in general.

"The pot's being stirred by a number of local leaders who cooperated with Israel in the past and did well out of it, but recently changed course under the direction of a hand across the border, and by a small number of communists and leftists prodded by Israel's Rakah Communists," he declared.

He would not identify the hand across the border, but mentioned that the retired Syrian general, Nur Ed-Din Abu-Salah, a Ba'ath leader and member of the Syrian parliament, a native of Majdal Shams, had been put in charge of the Kuneitra district, which on Damascus maps includes the Golan.

UNTIL the Yom Kippur War, said Salman Abu-Salah, the Golan Druse had in general thrown in their lot with Israel, a minority clinging instinctively to the stronger side. But since then they had seen the feared Syrians recovering Kuneitra and taking over the Lebanon, and now they were watching Israel abandoning Jewish settlements in Sinai. Their faith in Israel was shaken and the way the government had bungled the I.D. card issue did nothing to prop it up. The people who were directing the Druse agitation "managed to gain control over our clergy and through them forge our religion into a tool for achieving their aims. They even mixed politics with religion, which is contrary to our faith."

The government's incompetent handling of the I.D. issue had resulted in humiliation when it had to take back all but 46 of the 700 cards when the clerics imposed their ban. Now it had passed the Golan Law, which the Druse considered "annexation of the population but not the land" and which had aroused fears of "what will happen to us if Israel negotiates peace with Syria in return for Golan ter-

ritory." They had no illusions about their fate if the Syrians returned, Abu-Salah stressed. The Syrians were a cruel people, and had kept them down by imprisonment, exile, rape, and even hangings in the central square of Damascus.

"We remember how we feared the Syrians, but nobody is afraid of the Israelis. We can climb on the roof and denounce Begin without fear," he smiled. "But now in the Golan freedom of speech and democracy have been imprisoned by the extremists," he added wrily.

AFTER THE Golan Law was passed, Interior Minister Burg had announced that the military government I.D.s would remain valid. Faced with a choice between incompetent benevolence and the threat of brutality, the Druse made a show of opposition to Israel for the benefit of the watchful eye of Damascus.

This, said Abu-Salah, should not have come as a surprise. "But believe me, 90 per cent of the people fee! good with Israel. We make good livings, we enjoy liberty, and they only want the situation to continue as it is."

He estimated that if Israel were to return the Golan or that part of it with the Druse villages to Syria, "30 per cent of the population would choose to move to Israel." He would be among them and, indeed, had no intention of returning his I.D. card as he was not convinced that the religious ban was justified "It's political, but if it really was religious, I'd be the first to hand my I.D. card back."

He cautioned against taking the general strike too seriously. "We Druse don't have flex ble characters. We tend to extremism, and among us here you'll find everything from zealous pro-Israeli positions to men who claim that the Druse are Moslems."

As an example of this extremism he cited Mahmoud Safadi, who is one of the four leaders now under arrest for anti-Israel agitation but who was imprisoned by the Syrians for cooperating with Israel in the '40s and '50s. The Safadis are the second major Golan clan, "and their cooperation with Israel cost them

dear under the Syrians. Now what does Israel offer us? The government has declared that the Golan Law is not annexation and that if Syria will negotiate everything is open, and that despite the Law, the military government I.D.s remain good.

But Abu-Salah believed that, if entrusted with the task by the government, he was capable of pacifying the Golan Druse.

IT WAS NOT very difficult to find the spokesman for the pro-Syrian camp, Aref Safadi, in nearby Massadhe village. Following general directions we stopped the car to ask for his home and he himself came up, "You're looking for me, aren't you? Every newspaperman does." He welcomed us eagerly and smiled with satisfaction when we noticed the ruins of a demolished building opposite his front door. It would have been hard not to notice it - or the big Arabic and Hebrew inscription on it in red: "This is Israeli-Druse Brotherhood."

"You see what Israel did to me because I speak my mind," he said excitedly. He conceded rather grudgingly that he had constructed the building illegally, but added, "All the neighbours did too, but they only demolished mine."

Aref Safadi, who bears a remarkable likeness to Syria's President Assad, describes himself as an apple farmer with a grudge against the government because the Lands Administration had claimed part of his orchards as state land for which he must pay rent. The two eldest of his 10 children, a son and a daughter, are students at Haifa University, though the former has missed more than a year because of a restriction order.

Before the hot sweet tea -appeared ("Sorry there's no coffee. we've run out because of the strike"), we were joined by half a dozen young men who must have been waiting for a journalist to turn up. One of them, a tall blondish man, was introduced as a former soldier in the Syrian army. He happily admitted to having shelled the Golan. He was one of the 500 Golan Druse allowed back into Israel in order to reunite families

AREF SAFADI did the talking, or rather shouting - but the young men frequently disagreed with him vociferously and argued loudly in Arabic before they agreed on the

replies to questions.

"We don't recognize the Golan Law, because it was passed by the Knesset and not our legislature," Aref declared, "We won't accept Israeli I.D. cards or, under any circumstances, Israeli citizenship, because we belong to Syria, and it is universally acknowledged that the

Golan is Syrian."

Asked whether Israeli administration had not at least improved their economic conditions. Aref at first denied this, then attended his denial, but added, "We bought everything we have with the fruits of our own labour. Since 1967 the whole world has progressed and Syria too." He affected not to know that this did not apply to Khader village just across the border, but argued that "economics is not the problem.' He added that 80 young Golanis were studying in Damascus, free of charge and getting an allowance too.

There have been rumours that the organizers of the strike have assured the population that all their losses will be made up, to the last agora, with money from Svria. Aref would not comment on this, but said they would accept money from Syria or from anybody else who would offer to help tnem. Indeed, they had already asked the International Red Cross to open a dispensary instead of the Kupat Holim clinics they intended to boycott, and would appeal to the whole world to help them.

He claimed that the government was trying to force them into accepting the Golan Law by refusing to register births or renew licences for those who didn't hold I.D. cards.

It would achieve nothing, he insisted. "I am an Arab before I am a Moslem and I am a Moslem before I am a Druse," he declared, and they would strike for as long as was necessary.

But they had not yet decided exactly what they would do in case of medical need before the Red Cross stepped in; and when the apple trees need pruning in about a week's time, "we may decide to work in the orchards one day a week."

AREF FEARED that the government intended to take away some of their lands for Jewish settlements. He agreed that this had not been done so far, "but there are signs they want to take land near the Birkat Ram lake. I believe they'll take lands and we'll have problems. Land is politics."

He dismissed the estimate of 30 per cent of the Druse moving to Israel if the Golan were returned to Syria. "Not more than 10 per cent, those who cooperated with the

authorities."

He and his supporters had nothing to fear from the Syrians, "because we are Syrians." True, they had helped build the I.D.F. defences against the Syrians on the Golan "but we only did it for the money. President Assad lost the Golan to the Israelis, it wasn't our fault. We didn't cooperate with the Israelis, only did a job of work," he explained. He was convinced the Syrians would accept his explanation too. But they were ready to live peacefully under Israeli military government, as they had done in the past, provided the Golan Law was revoked.

"If you don't hurt the honour of a Druse he won't hurt you," he said, inviting us to come again and have the coffee we had missed this time.

THE STRIKE, which has been joined by two of the four village local councils, has caused considerable embarrassment to the Druse of Israel. One well-informed man who asked not to be named said he considered the situation "very complicated." On the one hand the Golan Law had been

enacted, on the other, high officials had admitted that the I.D. issue had been mishandled. The "Druse Zionist" circle had received a lot of publicity in the Israeli media, and this had upset others.

"Don't forget, almost everybody has a close relative in Syria for whose safety they fear. And when they make fiery anti-Israeli declarations for the TV and the press, they are talking not to Jerusalem but to

Damascus," he said.

He also stressed that leftists and communists in Israel were stirring up feelings in the Golan unobstructed by the authorities and often finding fertile soil for their nationalistic and extremist propaganda among the youngermen, who like young men everywhere, tend to lend a receptive ear to radical arguments. He advocated toning down publicity on the strike. Once the Druse were satisfied that they had made their demonstration, it would be ended.

He noted, too, that not all the Golan clerics had been unanimous in their religious ban. The Kadi of Bukata, Mohammed Ali Farhat, for example, had not supported it, because he considered it politically

inchired

Others expected the strike to fizzle out when apple-pruning time comes, if it is not over by then. But one must remember that strikes of this type have a dynamic of their own, and people who preach extremism have nowhere to go but to greater extremes. The various government pronouncements on the enforcement of the Golan Law can hardly be called constructive. Indeed, far from giving evidence of a clear policy, they have served to add to the confusion of an already confused section of the population.

4400/210

JORDAN VALLEY AREA SAID FREE OF STRIFE

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 26 Mar 82 p 5

[Article by Abraham Rabinovich: "Beyond the Canebrakes"]

[Text]

SOMEWHERE ON THE JORDAN RIVER — While the socalled West Bank smoked and shuddered this week under burning tyres and gunfire, the real West Bank was a picture of End-of-Days bliss.

A red-headed Israeli soldier sat on the bank of the Jordan River within sight of a hilltop Jordanian army observation post, fixing a piece of army-issue meat loaf to a fishing line attached to a bamboo pole.

Just opposite him, beyond the canebrakes on the east bank of the river, Jordanian farmers were working in a field. Just behind the redhead, a moshavnik in blue work clothes was plucking a still green ear of wheat from the edge of a field covering 1,800 dunams. Last year, the wheat field had been a minefield

"We've been watching the Jordanians come closer and closer to the river on their side the past few years," said an Israeli settlement official. "For us it was a signal that they wanted to co-exist here. We decided we'll go down to the river, too."

The signal was clearly visible during a visit this week to the river bank in the lower Jordan Valley—the sun glinting on greenhouses on the opposite side like a message in Morse code.

This was the eastern front in the post-Six Day War years. Armed Palestinian bands, crossing from the cover of the canebrakes at night, would attempt to pierce the Israeli defences — minefields, electronic

fences and bunkers. Some got through and would be pursued at dawn up into the foothills of Judea and Samaria. Most died near the river bank.

Following Black September in 1970, wher King Hussein threw his army against the Palestinians challenging him for control of the country, peace descended on the Jordan Valley. Jordanian farmers began slowly to return to fields abandoned under fire in 1967.

"We've been seeing them expanding in the last seven, eight years." says Yehuda, a moustachioed young farmer with a kippa from the Orthodox moshav of Mehola. "But in the last three years, the pace has picked up considerably, particularly their use of plastic covering and hothouses."

The modern agricultural technologies being used by the Jordanian farmers in the valley have been taken across the Jordan bridges from Israel by West Bank Arabs who learned to use them from Israeli instructors. The equipment is imported from Israel, too. including the drip irrigation piping carried across by West Bank middlemen. The piping feeds water and fertilizer directly to the roots of the plants, increasing yields and saving scarce water. Much of the crops grown with this Israeli know-how is shipped to the Arab Gulf states.

ON THE Israeli side, however, the land along the river had lain sterile all these years, sown with mines and lying under the guns of the fortress-

bunkers on the high ground to the west. A survey carried out by the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization determined that there were at least 30,000 dunams of good farm land lying unused along the river bank.

Known as the Zor, this arable lowland between the river and the first foothills ranged from a width of only some 20 meters to more than a kilometre. The arable land here was more than is available to the 19 settlements in the lower Jordan Valley in the Ghor, the wide upper strip of valley straddling the north-south road between Jericho and Beit Shean.

Last year, clearing work began, on an experimental basis, on an 1,800-dunam tract midway up the Zor. First, the mines were removed by the army engineers. Then farm machinery was sent in to clear the land of roots and prepare it for farming. In January, Nahal soldiers sowed a sturdy strain of wheat, which is already more than waist high.

Ra'anan Weitz, co-head of the Settlement Department, has proposed rapid development of the Zor in order to provide land for 10 new settlements in the valley and to expand the land available to existing settlements. Because of Likud leadership's insistance on priority to settlement in Samaria and Judea, Weitz was given permission only to begin detailed planning. His overall proposal, however, has been accepted in principle by the Interministerial Committee on Settlement.

Weitz also wants to extend the National Water Carrier southwards from Beit She'an for some 90 km. through the valley to augment the limited amount of water now available from the river itself and local wells.

"When I saw the land along the river, I knew it would be very fertile," says Weitz. "It reminded me of the landscape in the Beit She'an

Valley before the kibbutzim were developed there."

Weitz' political objective in urging a strong settlement belt in the lower Jordan Valley is precisely opposite to that of the Likud government, which must endorse it. "My thinking is based on the assumption that Israel in the long-run won't be able to evade the basic issue of selfdetermination for the Palestinians." The only way this can be faced without endangering Israel's basic security needs, he says, is by developing a security belt of settlements. These are not intended as a military defence line, but as a physical sieve that would ensure the West Bank remains demilitarized.

The Likud has no objection to development of the valley but it has different priorities.

Weitz envisions some 6,000 families living in 30 rural settlements in the valley and the Samarian foothills and 10,000 in the urban centre of Ma'alot Ephraim. Outside of Jericho, there are only several hundred Arab families living in the torrid valley, made habitable for the Israelis by air-conditioning.

The land along the river bank is more fertile than on the Ghor. In addition to wheat, the settlement authorities are planning date tree plantations and cotton, alfalfa and corn crops. The river defences are not being abandoned, but they are being adjusted to meet the new situation.

A military escort is required to enter the Zor, but once there, a visitor finds an atmosphere along the Jordan as pastoral as any Sunday school vision of Bibleland. Ecologists have solemnly announced on numerous occasions that the Jordan River is little more than an open sewer trench between the Kinneret and the Dead Sea, but the red-headed reservist with the bamboo pole had fortunately not heard about it. "Plenty of fish," he said. "Up to half a kilo."

The river is about 20 metres wide at this point and two to three metres

deep. An old pump on the Israeli bank has just been replaced by a sturdy new one to draw river water for irrigation. "In winter, the water is of good quality," said an Israeli farmer. "In summer, there's less of it and it has a high saline content, so we mix it with water from wells."

THE MEN and women in the fields on the Jordanian side hardly look up as an Israeli army vehicle drives along a track between the river and the fields about 100 metres from where they are working. Behind them is a covered shed, where they can take shelter from the sun.

"We talk to them from time to time," said the Israeli farmer. "About crops and weather. I asked them about growing vegetables here, and they said it's not good because there's frost at night in the lowland."

The river meanders wildly at points, and because of its narrow width and the tall cane along its banks, it is sometimes difficult for someone near the river bank to know whether someone upstream or downstream is on the Israeli side or Jordanian.

The foreman of the workcrew preparing the site for the new Israeli river pump was waiting impatiently for his promised tractor to arrive a few weeks ago when he spotted one moving uncertainly nearby. Thinking the driver might be lost, the foreman ran towards it and shouted. The driver halted and looked at him with a puzzled expression. Drawing close, the foreman saw that the tractor was on the other side of the river

A suggestion was made in Israel several years ago to seed the river bank with alligators as a way of discouraging infiltrators from crossing the Jordan. The authorities, however, have chosen to seed with wheat and corn instead, to keep their powder dry and to trust in King Hussein's shared interest in ensuring that the Jordan keeps rolling peacefully along.

CSO: 4400/210

WEST BANK TOWN IMPROVES IRRIGATION SYSTEM

London ARABIA in English No 5, Jan 82 p 13

[Article by Cal McCrystal]

[Text]

The village was squeezed dry in the way a strong man might squeeze an orange. Zbeidat, a Palestinian community, lay clamped between the Israeli security fence along the Jordan river and the barren eastern slopes of the Jordan Rift, helpless as the pressure was applied and disintegration began. More than half the village lands had been seized, its orange groves defoliated, its wells destroyed, its school, clinic, post office and many dwellings demolished — all in the name of "Israeh security."

For those who continued to live in Zbeidat, there was little to live for. The men had to make a living of sorts labouring in the nearby Jewish settlement of Argaman. Each evening they would return to mud hovels and an atmosphere of hopelessness.

But it's an ill wind Two of the villages' farmers who worked as labourers on the Argaman settlement were able to exploit their lowly positions to create a miraculous turnabout in Zbeidat's fortunes. As a result, today the village has been rebuilt. The mud hovels have been replaced with newly-painted cement houses. Rather than going to work for the Jewish settlement at peak times of the agricultural year, the Zbeidatis bring in outsiders to help with the planting and harvesting.

What happened? Drip irrigation happened — a network of black polythene pipes which, ironically, was developed by the Israelis in response to the need to utilise every precious drop of water. In 1976, Zbeidat managed to get a grant and advice from a Christian Mennonite charitable organisation and within a couple of years the village had started on the road to recovery.

Open furrow irrigation with its crude earth channels and imprecise control systems delivers only 40 per cent of the water to the plant. Sprinkler irrigation loses much through evaporation and delivers about 60 per cent of the original supply to the plant. Drip irrigation, however, delivers 90 per cent.

The thin pipes are laid along the rows of plants with a sheet of plastic, which prevents evaporation and inhibits weed growth. A hole in the sheet allows the plant to grow. Careful filtering is needed to prevent clogging, but once the system is installed, it requires very little maintenance. Soluble fertilisers can also be fed directly into the pipes with precise control.

The system is ideal for squash, melon, cucumber and tomatoes. The Zbeidatis are getting yields of four to eight times those given by open furrow irrigation. The crops can also be brought on earlier, ensuring higher

market prices and increasing income to the farmers tenfold. Today, drip irrigation has been adopted by most Arab farmers in the Jordan valley, with or without financial assistance. The rebirth of many a community is therefore assured.

How do they spend their money? Is it channelled into community projects, such as hard-topped roads, a school, better drainage? The villagers of Zbeidat were originally Bedouin from the Beersheba region. Families may cooperate, but rivalries between families often quickly emerge. So far, however, the technical cooperation required for successful drip irrigation — sharing water resources and filter equipment — has drawn the community together in an unprecedented way, and the indications are that spare income will indeed

be funnelled into communal facilities.

The system has brought changes in labour patterns. Under open furrow irrigation, men did the bulk of the work, clearing canals. That is no longer necessary, so women and children readily undertake intensive and precise planting and unrolling of lightweight pipes and sheeting. Because crops must be picked at their peak and shipped to market without delay, school absenteeism has been serious, especially since the nearest school to Zbeidat is 10 miles away. A school in the village is the future solution.

Despite its political difficulties. Zbeidat stands as an excellent example of modern agricultural development on a small scale on the ruins of an impoverished community.

cso: 4400/210

NATURE OF PRESS COVERAGE OF RECENT EVENTS DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 13 Mar 82 pp 66, 67

/Article: "The Kuwaiti Press -- Is It the Alternative?"/

/Text/ Two weeks ago, journalists in Kuwait proceeded to elect their new society with a degree of receptivity that no other election campaign had experienced since the society was established in the early sixties. That is because this campaign, this time, as usual, was a union campaign, but it was also characterized by a sort of professional solidarity, proceeding from a latent sense that the Kuwaiti press might be losing some freedom of movement.

There now is a government draft in the National Assembly drawers which has the objective of reorganizing journalistic activity in a manner that will reduce Kuwait's vexations and concerns, during the delicate situation the region in general and the Gulf in particular are going through. Although the government is serious about presenting the draft, it is acting as if that was the most loathesome of the legitimate choices open to it. Therefore, it has not pressed for a review of the draft, leaving it to the democratic game to take its course, on the one hand, and, on the other, avoiding giving the press an excuse to enable it to turn the draft into a confrontation.

This is how the government has acted and how the press also has acted--as if the law does not exist. However, as soon as the nominations for the Journalists' Society elections were announced, the campaign assumed a different dimension, Mr 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Masa'id, the dean of the AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM Publishing House and the first chairman of the society, entered it at the last moment; similarly, Mr Nabil al-Marzuq, the editor in chief of AL-ANBA', a young man known for his aversion to positions and general authorities, entered it for the first time. The two of course won membership in the new society, along with Mr Jasim Muhammad al-Mutawwa', the editor in chief of AL-WATAN. The three have given the society important political weight in addition to the professional weight its former and present chairman, Mr Yusuf al-'Ulayyan, has given it.

The three, naturally, are opposed to the draft publications law that has been submitted for discussion, but, along with the other editors in chief of Kuwaiti papers, the three also are not opposed to having the press regulate itself and conceal Kuwait's situation. Mr Faysal al-Marzuq says that the Kuwaiti press must resemble Kuwait, that is, must be free without infringing on the freedom of others and be

nationalist without entering into the game of Arab debates. Nonetheless, he is opposed to the existence of a "law" regulating the positions of the press and limiting its freedom.

On top of that, the Kuwaiti press is implicitly and without exception in agreement that allegiance goes to Kuwait first of all. However, the Kuwaiti government, and the great majority of the people along with it, are burdened down with dread of the "freedom" of the Lebanese press and it says, most plainly, that it would prefer a press that was a little disciplined to a nation without discipline.

The reason of course is that in the absence of the Lebanese press, Arab attention has been focussed on the press in Kuwait. Kuwait, after Lebanon, is the sole Arab country that has allowed its press not to be guided or subjected, directly or indirectly, to the power of the state. The Kuwaiti government "supplies" the press to the degree that the press "pays heed" to it, not to the degree that it "submits."

The government has established relations with the press that are almost unprecedented; whenever an important event occurs in the region or the political balance is shaken, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, who is the foreign minister and minister of information both, summons the editors in chief of the newspapers to a meeting in which he presents them with political issues as if he was raising them in the Council of Ministers, that is, without reservations or secrecy (though it has been the custom that the journalists do not publish anything about what goes on at the meeting). Sometimes the government requests the editors in chief to help it with some local issue, and the editors in chief agree to apportion editorials among themselves, lest they repeat themselves. Such matters are generally of a type which requires enlightenment or guidance, such as increases in salaries, reduction in oil production, or other issues whose reasons the public is not aware of.

In other words, the relationship between the authorities and the press is not without balance, but the government is afraid that some people, because of some commitments, might gravitate into one Arab camp or another. In Kuwait there are now 40 political and non-plitical publications, while, in the first days of independence in 1961, there was only one daily newspaper, AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM; Mr 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-lasa'id printed its first issues in Beirut, because at that time there was only one old press in Kuwait, which had been set up in 1947.

Just as the government wants to distance itself from Arab and even international struggles, it at the same time wants to preserve a free press that will be in keeping with the revival of parliament after an enforced suspension that has lasted about 4 years--also out of the fear that freedom will lead to more "Lebanons."

The fact is that over the past 2 decades the Kuwaiti press has passed through a stage of great technical and professional progress both. While al-Masa'id started the daily press with a single paper, today there are five daily papers in Arabic and two in English. The circulation of Kuwaiti papers registered a steep rise in this period not just because of the high rate of population increase but also because the press of Kuwait has opened other foreign markets for itself in the Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and even in Europe--and Beirut!

Along with this development, the newspapers entered into intense competition among themselves, but this was always professional in nature. Some, if not all, of these papers sought recourse to the use of modern machines which were almost unknown in Europe itself. The newspaper AL-QABAS, for instance, uses printing equipment that still is prohibited in THE TIMES. The newspaper AL-SIYASAH, which was the third to appear in Kuwait, is now preparing to buy similar equipment. There are people who also say that Mr Ahmad al-Jarallah, the owner and editor in chief of AL-SIYASAH, is intending to come out with a European edition of the paper.

Like Kuwait, which has 120 different nationalities, the Kuwaiti press contains a mixture of Kuwaiti and Arab colleagues, not to speak of foreigners working in the papers issued in English--and Urdu, in view of the large number of Indians and Pakistanis.

The quantity in this mixture can be seen from the great colleague Ahmad Baha'al-Din, who has been the editor in chief of AL-'ARABI for years and is now about to resign, to Mr Raj and Mr Larmashina, who work on the KUWAIT TIMES.

The Kuwaiti press attracted a large number of Arab colleagues before the Lebanese press migrated to Europe. Some of it has also managed to raise a new generation of journalists. However, it is still also compelled to rely on a large number of "moonlighters" in the profession, that is, people wio have their main jobs outside the press but are employed in the press as a second job that provides extra income. This is in reality the basic obstacle to an absolute leap forward in the profession.

In any event, the Kuwaiti press does not intend to offer itself as an alternative to the press of Egypt or the press of Lebanon. This is partly because Kuwait's situation does not allow it to do so. However, the Kuwaiti press wants at least to become the "press of the Gulf," in terms of circulation, writing and advertising. Kuwait is the biggest country in the Gulf. The means of communication and transportation in the region are perhaps more developed than those in Europe. Consequently, it is in the ability of Kuwaiti papers to circulate in Bahrain, Qatar and the emirates the day hey are issued. Indeed, some of those papers are sold on the same day in the Saudi markets.

On top of that, there is a local advertising market in Kuwait which is perhaps without precedent except in the United States. This advertising revenue encourages the press to invest further in the areas of printing and distribution--and competition.

There now is an undeclared "war of pages." The number of pages in the past was generally 20, or as a rule more in accordance with in the extra volume of advertisements, but were no less than that. Now, however, it seems that the newspapers will settle on 24 pages a day. Since the sister publication AL-ANBA' was issued in its new format last 25 January, declaring that it would continue with the 24 pages a day, the other papers decided to hold to the same number. In fact, some of these papers came out with more than 40 pages on national independence day, a day of advertisements.

Because of the competition, some newspapers sometimes incur major financial losses, but they treat these with disdain. Coming out on the seventh day of the week, Friday, for instance, is a total loss; the circulation rate drops tremendously because it is a day off. Advertisements are almost totally absent. Nonetheless, the five papers insist on coming out, for fear that one paper might get a monopoly on the day. There is a draft recommendation before the new Journalists' Society that calls for newspapers to take turns coming out on Friday or come out on the basis of seniority.

Competition in Kuwait also assumes forms that are not familiar to other Arab countries; because of the large number of Arab groups there, some papers indirectly orient themselves to acquiring a sales "market" in a given group. Of course this does not mean that the paper itself does not get other readers; sometimes however they are stamped by the character of a given majority of readers.

The reason for to a large extent is that the reader in Kuwait is himself "politicized," or "steeped in party politics," if one may use the expression. Therefore studies carried out by the Kuwait Center of Studies show that a Palestinian majority reads AL-WATAN, and Egyptian majority reads AL-SIYASAH, and a Kuwaiti majority reads AL-NABA' and AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM. AL-QABAS, which has had the greatest circulation so far, has found its "majority" by attempting to satisfy or at least not enrage all Arab families.

However, this spontaneous "system" or "arrangement" that has existed up to now has been troubled by disruptions. There are now obvious changes in the circulation rates of the Kuwaiti newspapers, and a real effort either at a new "leap forward" or at the preservation of former positions. Consequently, there is a tendency to be lavish in editing, printing, distributing and advertising.

The circulation department of AL-ANBA', for example, claims that the sales rate rose by a full 30 percent in Kuwait (the rate was higher abroad) after its editor in chief, Mr Faysal al-Marzuq, declared that it would come out in its new "format." AL-ANBA' is distinguished in having a group of Arab writers, among them Kamil Zuhavri, Shafiq al-Hut and Ahmad Hamrush, as well as Dr Fu'ad 'Ajami, chairman of the Middle East Department of Johns Hopkins University, and a group of guest writers, not to speak of its permanent writers.

Each Kuwaiti newspaper has a specific "flavor" or "distinctive character." However, there is no doubt that most of them are characterized by a serious tone and true professionalism. In terms of content, these papers have managed to become greater than the papers in Beirut, which, because of the circumstances in Lebanon, are still being published in just 16 pages.

Nonetheless, of course, the Kuwaiti papers are not "the alternative," and do not want to be such, for the daily or the weekly press. All they want, and this they have perhaps achieved, is to remain a balanced press, like Kuwait itself, able to attract friendships without stirring up anyone's enmity.

11887 CSO: 4404/384

BASHIR AL-JUMAYYIL'S POLITICAL STRATEGY ASSAILED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 256, 28 Mar-4 Apr 82 pp 16-17

[Article by Amil Khuri: "Bashir al-Jumayyil Initiative Follows Failure of Arab, American Initiatives. No Change in Situation if Israel Does Not Attack. New President to be President of Reconciliation and Solution"]

[Text] Why did Bashir al-Jumayyil, commander of the "Lebanese Forces," announce his intention to make a unilateral Lebanese decision if the other side does not cooperate in making a joint decision? Why did he choose this time in particular to announce what he announced? Is the decision a decision of war or a decision of politics and partition?

An informed source states that Bashir, since issuing his statement concerning dealing with Israel, is betting on an American and Arab stance to achieve the withdrawal of the Deterrent Force from Lebanon before the presidential elections begin so that an atmosphere of freedom will prevail at "hat time resulting in the restoration of power and authority throughout Lebanon to the central government.

When the commander of the "Lebanese Forces" visited Washington last summer, he returned with the impression and semi-assurances that the Deterrent Force would withdraw gradually from Lebanon starting early in 1982 and completing the withdrawal at the beginning of the new era, and that the means for achieving this was a topic currently being studied by the pertinent American authorities.

Wager on Follow-up Committee

The Arab Follow-up Committee began its important mission and official American and European circles attached great importance to the role of this committee. Bashir al-Jumayyil placed his bet on the committee, specifically on the role of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in achieving complete national reconciliation and providing an atmosphere conducive to a calm withdrawal of the Deterrent Force from Lebanon and deployment of the army in its place.

He wanted to eliminate all the obstacles on the road to reconciliation, so he issued a statement on dealing with Israel in the hope that it would prompt a political dialog. However, he was later surprised when it was said that the statement was insufficient to prove that relations with Israel had been severed and that a

committee must be formed to watch over the ports and coasts, preventing weapons deliveries to any of the factions in Lebanon with the exception of the legal authorities. However, the formation of this committee ran up against the problem of determining its powers and the parties to which it would apply, since the Palestine Liberation Organization, in a memorandum directed to the secretary general of the Arab League, said that it considers that a committee to oversee the ports and coasts would not pertain to it [the PLO], but only to the Lebanese factions and that relations between the PLO and the Lebanese government are governed by official agreements made between them. The foreign ministry responded with an objection to the contents of the memorandum saying that it considers the powers of such a committee to apply to all parties in the Lebanese arena. One of the results of this difference of opinion was the postponement of the meetings of the Follow-up Committee.

At a time when the date for the presidential elections is drawing near and concern is increasing that there be a free atmosphere in which to conduct them, the wager placed on the Follow-up Committee to bring about national reconciliation and the withdrawal of the Deterrent Force under the umbrella of this reconciliation was a losing one.

In another attempt to achieve reconciliation, Bashir al-Jumayyil proposed his political initiative which included Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, a controlled Palestinian presence and an immediate Lebanese-Lebanese dialog to draw up a formula for coexistence. This initiative was met with various reactions, some positive and others negative or reserved. It was followed by direct and indirect contacts and meetings between the leadership of the Phalange and the leadership of the other Lebane a side with the hope of establishing the principles of a political dialog which would achieve reconciliation on the basis of complete national sovereignty. However, these contacts came to a sudden halt after they had made considerable headway in achieving their goals.

After this, Bashir al-Jumayyil was surprised with a concentrated campaign launched against him. In a television interview, Walid Jumblat refused a dialog with Bashir as the sole representative of the Christians. In a speech Abu-Iyad called for encouragement of the Amin al-Jumayyil faction of the Phalange. Brigadier General Sami al-Khatib, commander of the Deterrent Force, returned from Damascus with a position on the political dialog, should a decision be made to start it with the continuation of the Follow-up Committee meetings. The position stipulates that such a dialog be conducted with the Lebanese Front and not with Bashir in his capacity as commander of the "Lebanese Forces" and that the Lebanese Front accept the National Movement into the dialog.

Wager on America

Bashir heard disconcerting talk from the American envoy Philip Habib during his trip to Beirut concerning an early solution to the Lebanese crisis and concerning the lack of any clear American idea for a solution or a timeframe for a solution. He was told that the Deterrent Force would not begin its withdrawal from Lebanon soon, but perhaps during the latter half of this year, i.e. the presidential elections would probably be held under the shadow of a Syrian presence.

So it is evident that the wager placed on the American administration to accomplish national sovereignty, a Lebanese reconciliation and an extension of state authority was a losing one, as was the wager placed on the Follow-up Committee. After this, all that remained was one last effort which consisted of calling on all Lebanese parties to make a joint resolution which would achieve this sovereignty and reconciliation. If no such joint resolution were made then a unilateral one would be made for the sake of Lebanon's interests and the interests of all Lebanese Christians and Muslims.

Joint Resolution

This position stirred the apprehensions of many people because it coincided with numerous press reports on the expectation of a large-scale decisive Israeli strike. Some tried to link Bashir's announced intention of a unilateral decision with the approaching Israeli strike. However, doubts and apprehensions quickly subsided when the commander of the "Lebanese Forces" reannounced, in a speech delivered during Mother's Day celebrations, that the decision was a joint decision in the interest of all Lebanese, Christian and Muslim, and in the interest of a single united Lebanon and against partition and naturalization [of the Palestinians]. He said that what is needed is a unified Lebanese position to confront the dangers threatening Lebanon's unity and existence, and an effort to extricate Lebanon from its tribulations, for it cannot remain on the cross another 7 years or perhaps longer waiting for the Middle East crisis to be solved, for an agreement to be concluded establishing a Palestinian state and for international reconciliation to be achieved between the two superpowers.

Although the beginning of a change may appear with the beginning of the new era, there are some observers who do not expect a substantial change, either militarily or politically, in the current situation, barring mebanon's exposure to a large-scale Israeli aggression which would upset the balance and make Israel an important player on the Lebanese stage, if not a large constituent in these elections.

The new president of the republic may be a president of reconciliation and solution, if only in the sense that an agreement by all or most of the sides to select him would indicate the beginning of reconciliation and a move toward change, or in the sense that a presidential program would be the one which draws up the formula for a future Lebanon which would achieve permanent coexistence among its citizens, the extension of the government's authority and sovereignty to all regions according to a program of gradual withdrawal of borrowed forces, whether Arab or international.

CSO: 4404/403

CLASHES IN SOUTH MAY LEAD TO WIDER CONFLICT

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1318, 5 Feb 82 p 19

[Article by Ibrahim al-Burjawi: "A 'Shadow fovernment' Headed by Gabi Lahud As a Precaution in Case of a Constitutional Vacuum: Clashes in the South Are Causing the Authorities Once Again to Fear a Big Blow-Up!"]

[Text] When responsible police authorities, during the middle of last week, informed a high official that the clashes in the South resulted in more than 20 dead, the high official answered: "This number does not mean much when compared with the number already killed so far in Lebanon. However, the important and dangerous thing about these clashes is their future repercussions, the true nature of the aims of those engaging in the clashes, and the reasons why the clashes took place."

Based on what this high official himself said, it is said that he is afraid that if these clashes develop into something more serious, they might lead to a broad conflict between the [Palestinian] resistance and the Amal movement. He has special reason to feel this way in view of the abundant information which he has which confirms the fact that the Palestanian resistance, from the strategic point of view, cannot permit the villages and positions in the South, which are basically located on its military path toward the occupied lands, to fall under the absolute domination of the Amal movement. This is not because [the Palestinian resistance] has misgivings about the intentions of the leaders of the Amal movement, but rather because it fears that this will be to the detriment of the general strategy of the PLO as a whole and that this might be the prelude to moving Palestinian guns and Palestinians north of the Litani River and thus weakening important trump cards which the Palastinian resistance has to play. This would mean implementation of the U.S. plan recently suggested by (Muris Draybr), which stipulates a Palestinian withdrawal in return for an Israel withdrawal to the international boundary and the deployment of international forces [in the area]. This was the reason for the enormity of the military mobilization brought about by the Palestinian resistance in order to guarantee that the joint forces regain control in the town of Jousiya and some of the villages in district of Tyre, thereby preventing them from being totally controlled by the Amal forces. The fact is that the clashes in the South began due to an ordinary individual incident between a member of the Arab Socialist Union and [a member of] Amal in al-Nabatiyah. The incident developed, there were repercussions, and finally the clash extended to Tyre and environs and nearly enveloped the Biqa' Valley and Beirut as well.

The supporters of Amal maintain that the issue is not "Rummanah," but rather "hearts filled [with rancor]." They say that any common incident in the South today is likely to be the straw that breaks the camel's back. They say that the excesses of some members of the Palestinian resistance and its allies in the National Movement may someday make it equal to either endure the pressure and submit to it or become a traitor and side with Sa'd Haddad, or even Israel!

The high official himself also expressed his apprehension that the cease-fire decision which was made by the Higher Coordination Committees, composed of Amal, the Palestinian resistance, and the National Movement, would be transformed into a decision resembling the 250 decisions which came out during the first part of the Lebanese war and which dealt with bringing about cease-fires between the Palestinian resistance forces, the Phalangists, and their allies.

In spite of the apprehensions of this higher official, the main concern of the Lebanese government so far still revolves around one particular issue. This issue is securing the transfer of authority 'y constitutional means by the deadline specified. On the basis of this fact, the Lebanese government is still conducting official discussions primarily with Damascus but also with the U.S. and various other parties which are active in the Lebanese arena, concerning providing a political atmosphere and security climate which would create a situation which would allow agreement to be reached concerning a consensus candidate for the president of the republic.

Among other things mentioned in this regard, it is said that the higher authorities are still suffering from a "guilt complex" concerning Col Gabi Lahud. He was the first person to nominate President Ilyas Sarkis for the post of president of the republic. Nevertheless, all of his peers among the Shihabist officers have received their due in terms of promotions, positions, and high rank, but Lahud himself did not receive his due. For this reason he has frequently been mentioned as a candidate to be commander of the army. The last time his name was mentioned in this connection was last month when he came to Beirut, where he was expected to demand the implementation of the Advisory Council's ruling that he be reinstated in the army and consequently appointed commander of the army. But many obstacles prevented this from happening, and one of the obstacles was the fact that reorganizations were expected in the army leadership.

One of the most important of these obstacles boils down to two factors, which are: 1. the fear on the part of those on the right and the left, who would suffer from the establishment of a strong Lebanese army which would regain the legitimacy which was taken away from it, and 2. the fact that the future president of the republic would have to work with a newly-appointed commander of the army with whom he might have disagreements concerning his military policy.

In any case, because of all of these obstacles, the responsibility of command of the army will remain in the hands of Maj Gen Victor Khuri until the end of President Sarkis's administration. At that time it would be the normal thing for the new president to either choose a new commander or to retain Maj Gen Khuri in the event that his views concerning military matters agree with those of the new president.

As for Col Lahud, we should mention that informed circles are saying that he is refusing to return to the army as a high-ranking officer. They are saying that he would prefer to be commander of the army rather than president of the republic, especially at this stage. However, according to these same sources, this does not mean that Col Lahud, who is [at the present time] residing in Spain, would refuse the presidency of the republic if it were offered to him. Sources whose influence is not to be discounted are working hard to achieve this goal. Perhaps they are the reason for the fact that the decree reinstating him in the army was not implemented, since this would enable him to enter the presidential elections which must be held during the last 2 months before the end of the current president's administration and would mean that he would not be affected by the legal requirement which stipulates that it is necessary to resign from an official position at least 6 months before being chosen by the Chamber of Deputies as president elect. All of this is in spite of the persistent rumors going around among political circles that a foreign power will "veto" Lahud as a candidate for president of the republic. But there is still great hope that the supporters of Col Lahud will not be afflicted by such a "veto."

In both political and military circles they are incessantly talking about Lanud these days. The latest thing that is being said is the following: There is a desire on the part of the higher-ups to appoint him as president of a transitional government in case it is felt that there will be a constitutional vaccum in the country. President Sarkis would issue a decree providing for the formation of such a government without consluting anyone, and would have everyone in such a government face up to his own responsibilities. The government would have to include traditional politicians and politically-active groups, as well as ten higher officials from one institution, distributed in accordance with the Lebanese religious sects—the Maronites, Sunnis, Shiites, Orthodox, Druzec, and Catholics. Those nominated for this de facto government would be Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, Ibrahim Qulaylat, Walid Jumblat, Nabih Barri, Robert Franjiyah, former presidents and prime ministers such as Sham'un, Salam, 'Usayran, Taqi al-Din al-Sulh, and others.

In case any of the traditional politicians or members of the politicallyactive groups resign, the ten higher officials will assume the reins of government and will thereby constitute a "shadow government" within the de facto government.

All of this reflects the real fear felt by the higher authorities that conspiracies are being hatched against Lebanon on the eve of its presidential elections. The most dangerous of these conspiracies is the one aiming to plunge Lebanon into the stumbling block of a constitutional vacuum in order to prepare the way to have Lebanon "blow up," be partitioned, and thus implement the plan to permanently settle [the Palestinians in Lebanon]!

9468

CSO: 4404/244

AL-QADHDHAFI CRITICIZES U.S. POLICY IN SPEECH

Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 4 Mar 82 pp 4, 5

[Article: "The American National Council Meets Only Over Libya, Reagan Makes Statement Only on Libya, and He Has No Files at Hand on Anyplace in the World Except Libya"--Conclusion of speech by Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi to emergency session of the General People's Congress; for beginning of speech see FBIS Middle East and Africa DAILY REPORT, Vol V, No 044, 5 March 1982, pp Q 1-Q 10]

/Excerpt/ Wastefulness in the Administrative Budget

Our brother the commander talked about the wastefulness that exists in the administrative budget, which rose this year to 1.2 billion dinars, while it was in the vicinity of 1 billion dinars last year. He pointed to the extravagance that exists in the disbursement of salaries spent on trivia.

Our brother and commander said, "For some time I have been hoping that an oil crisis would take place, so that we would become aware of the current of extravagance and wasteage of money that dominates us - money that goes into the garbage every day." He stated that that is unallowable and brings on the wrath of God.

The brother and commander talked about clothing imports from abroad, saying "The people's conferences will determine what country the clothing is to be imported from and they will then be responsible for their decisions."

We Will Resist America to the End

Our brother and commander went on to state, "You must review your oil policy and face your enemy, because there are reasons which prompt you not to sell your oil; the reasons for this have become sufficiently clear through the American and Saudi positions." He asserted, "We will resist America to the end and it must be crushed, because its existence is a threat to freedom everywhere. It is the true enemy of the Arab nation since it was the one who created Israel and armed it, and it was the one that commanded the Saudi princes to deprive you of oil sales."

The president and commander emphasized "Our position is clear. Come let us specify our position on this basis. We are supposed to lead a revolution such as Polisario's, and we have nothing to fear. We can strike with bombs and missiles and even burn out all the rot that exists in the Arab nation, we can unify it, and after that we can forge the atom and arrogate to ourselves the right of the veto, against the will of everyone in the Security Council, giving the Arabs great might."

Our brother and commander said "We have been prohibited from selling oil, which is a vital matter. Thus, any act we commit against Saudi Arabia is legitimate."

He went on to say, "I have broken relations with the reactionary regimes." He pointed out, "The King of Morocco gave America bases in his country in exchange for our suspension of arms for Polisario, in expectation of the referendum, but then Fahd presented his plan of capitulation and the King of Jordan abandoned Palestine and went to fight Iran." He stressed that any truce with these regimes would lengthen their lives and said, "The revolutionary way is the one that will bring these regimes down, is spite of America. America will know that there is a will that is stronger than its schemes, as it realized in Libya when it saw that there is something unknown, whose name is 'revolution.'"

He stressed that the will of the people of the country was stronger than America's schemes and that it was necessary that America be defeated publicly and in broad day-light in spite of itself, in the Arab nation, that it was necessary that the revolution triumph in Somalia lest Somalia become an American base, that it was necessary that the revolution triumph in the Sudan lest that become an American military base, and that it was necessary that the revolution triumph in Morocco, in Saudi Arabia, in Oman and in all these areas.

Our brother and commander said, "I personally am allied with the Arab revolutionary forces. Let America do what it wants against us; we will compel it either to use the atom or to be defeated."

He stressed, "There must be at least a million Libyans under arms in order to defend our homes, not to invade other people or occupy the territory of others."

He said, "They want us to make this land subject to them, recognize Israel, not arm the Palestinian resistance, and not do anything for the sake of development in our country."

dur brother and commander asserted, "I consider it necessary that we orient ourselves toward agriculture, as of this year, and that we resume reclaiming and redeveloping the land on a broad scale so that we can provide food and avoid importing the main portion of the food."

The Need to Expand Agriculture

The commander stressed the need to expand agriculture and livestock and fish recources, pointing out that that would require the orientation of the bulk of the budget and that even people on pensions would have to invest in production and anything that would provide food. He said, "That means that everyone working in public service must work in agriculture as well, in addition to his job; that is, he will be able to perform a job for the people and his public job, and at the same time will be working on his farm with his family. That means shifting a quarter of a million citizens into production alongside their public service." He observed that a large number of people working in public service were working in jobs that were not now of any use.

The commander also referred to the need to benefit from young people who are able to work and produce and who receive social insurance pensions, by shifting them into production in order to take part in increasing productive capacity.

The commander stated that the Ministry of Light Industries had been incorporated into the Ministry of the Economy, which is now known as the Ministry of Economy

and Light Industry. He said that light industries must enter a new stage and stressed the need to process everything locally, in order to bring about the establishment of heavy industry.

Development of Domestic Industry

The brother and commander laid stress on the need to protect the domestic economy and develop domestic industry, instead of relying on imports of manufactured goods, European products and so forth.

The brother commander called upon the basic people's conferences to study this issue and set out the fundamental points that would guarantee that the development of domestic industry was attained, on grounds that the basic people's conferences held the power and the decisionmaking ability. The commander and brother observed that it was necessary, in selecting the secretaries of the General People's Committee, to devote attention to a number of factors, including sincerity on the job, execution of the people's committee decrees, and specialization and educational qualifications, each within the sphere of specialization.

Our brother the commander pointed out that the land reform and redevelopment sector needed an active group to carry out agricultural development and land redevelopment projects and provide food for the people, to whom it is their duty to show respect.

The commander laid stress on the need to exert the utmost effort to increase production and warned of any shortcomings in service to the people.

The commander referred to the transformations that had been realized in various fields, among them the health field and the field of education, and called for heightened efforts to realize high returns on production in various spheres.

He pointed out that the health field had developed greatly and that the efficiency of its activity had increased in a form that had achieved results. Health awareness had become widespread, health services had developed, and the rate of diseases and incidence of disease declined. In this regard, our brother the commander stated that when the revolution took place there were 35,000 people afflicted with tuberculosis, and this number had shrunk and become very small due to advanced services and health awareness and because of the efforts exerted in the health field. In addition, many endemic and contagious diseases had been eliminated. Smallpox had been eliminated for once and for all, and the rate of infant mortality had declined.

He said, "It is in our power to help other people and extend them the hand of help in this field." He referred in particular to the great medical aid the jamahiriyah had been offering the people of Chad.

The commander referred to the approach of reducing military conscription and exercising commitment to the general military training program in the context of increasing production and doing without foreigners in all fields as far as possible.

Al-Sadat Had Been Preparing To Launch a War Against Us

Our brother the commander said that al-Sadat had been preparing to launch a war against Libya and had turned the 6 October parade into a parade of force in preparation for this agression. He stressed, "We do not have the intention to go to war against anyone in Egypt and the opportunity is now open to Husni Mubarak to rid the Egyptian people of the degrading agreements."

No Problems with Our Neighbors

The commander expressed his belief that war would not break out between Libya and Egypt and said "There is no room for such a war, unless America decrees it, since we do not have problems with our neighbors. We have left Chad to its people and our relations with Tunisia are good. Tunisia is a country which does not think of war at all. Hedi Nouira, who was vindictive and almost went to war with us over the continental shelf, is finished and has been crushed."

The commander referred to the International Court of Justice ruling on the continental shelf and said, "The International Court of Justice issued its ruling, and it appears that everything we said was correct, that our demands were legitimate, and that the line the court set out was in keeping with the statement we had made.

"The lies and allegations of Nouira, who maintained to the Tunisians that the Libyans were taking over Tunisian oil, brought in France and America, and started preparing for war have now become apparent and here the Court of Justice has ruled in our favor and the problem with our brother Tunisia has been ended for once and for all."

The commander pointed to the case of the continental shelf with Malta and said "We are continuing with arbitration on this matter in the International Court of Justice. The court will again rule in our favor because we are aware of our rights and are asking only for what are our rights and are not dealing unjustly with anyone."

A New Leaf with the Fraternal Tunisian People

Our brother the commander stated, "The Tunisian people are a fraternal people; we have turned a new leaf with them, and have started new cooperation. They will need help from the Libyan people and cooperation with them to create common activities which the two countries will benefit from." In this regard, he referred to the economic integration projects that have been signed by the two countries and the opening of the borders to facilitate movement between Libyans and Tunisians.

Our brother the commander expressed his certainty that the economic integration project with Tunisia would succeed and said "This integration will ultimately lead to the creation of common interests. Political unity will also result." He said, "Our brothers in Tunisia realize the importance of these steps we have attained and they are fully aware that Tunisia's interests lie in economic integration and that anyone who is devoted to Tunisia must be devoted to cooperation between it and Libya."

He pointed out that the government of Niger had declared the resumption of relations with Libya, having severed them on its part. He said "Al-Numayri is drowning and we have left him to the Sudanese people. Yesterday these people tried to kill him twice, setting off booby-trapped cars against him on the road and blowing up ammunition depots and radio station electric generating plants. He himself admitted that he has failed to cope with the people's uprisings, and he also admitted his blatant failure to achieve anything. He is now testering and facing his inevitable end."

In his statement, the brother and commander of the revolution declared "The steps toward union with Syria and Algeria are continuing and, with regard to Tunisia, we have reached agreement on periodic meetings between the Tunisian Council of Ministers and the General People's Committee in Libya, which will be held every 6 months." He said, "These things, on the basis of possibilities, will lead to union."

The commander of the revolution warned of imperialist conspiracies which Libya was exposed to and the Libyan Arab people's position on confrontation with them. He pointed out, in particular, The American Sixth Fleet is carrying out maneuvers on our Western borders in the Mediterranean and the American Sixth Fleet is determined to hold maneuvers in the Gulf of Sirte. If it comes into the Gulf of Sirte, that will mean war, because it will be entering our territory, and this is what the whole world must know and the Security Council, the United Nations, Russia, America, Europe and Africa must know, since, if America enters the Gulf of Sirte, war in its complete sense will start between us and them, on air, sea, with missiles and with everything. The Gulf of Sirte is part of Libyan soil and Libyan sovereignty."

Our brother the commander addressed himself to numerous diverse areas on increasing production, especially production in the agricultural sector. He stressed the need to reclaim and redevelop all watercourses, hills and plains, use every square inch of the al-Jabal al-Akhdar area and turn it into productive orchards and farms, turn the watercourses of the Western mountains into fruit and vegetable farms, and breathe life into neglected cases in various areas of the jamahiriyah.

The commander concluded his statement by stressing the alliance with the revolutionary youth in the Arabian Peninsula. He said, "We are declaring our alliance in full with the revolutionary force and will never abandon it, and we declare the severance of our relations with the reactionary force."

11887 CSO: 4504/235

STEPS TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY OF MILITARY SERVICE DISCUSSED

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 21 Jan 82 p 2

[Article: "On Implementing the Military Service Law"]

[Text] Along with the positive development of political and ideological actions in our heroic armed forces, the strengthening of its role in defending the gains of our country's workers and its effective participation in the economic and social life, the importance of the national military service law has increased. It has become a fundamental mission of the party and military committees in the various headquarters, brigades, armed forces camps and the other military organizations, since effective participation is giving this law the kind of flexibility that in fact embodies the military and party leadership's ability to deal positively with the youth, through a knowledge of their mental attitudes as a basis for making national military service a firmly desireable duty for the youth. This will provide them with a great possibility to embark upon the adventure of life with intelligent confidence and a sure determination.

Undoubtedly, the issuance of the national military law, and its great success through its acceptance in youth circles, in fact confirms the correctness of our Yemeni Socialist Party's program with regard to its leadership of the youth and correct guidance for effective participation in various aspects of the ongoing revolutionary process in our country, since that obviously is manifested by the youth's widespread joining into national military service, because it is a sacred national duty imposed by many necessities, in light of the imperialist, reactionary attacks against our progressive regime and its revolutionary gains. It has been, and will be, incombent on the masses of our people to be in a state of armed readiness to oppose and thwart the conspiracies of our lurking enemies.

In this framework, the third general conference was set up to consider the question of national military service, and within its resolutions, stressed the need for members to be commended and to constantly be in the vanguard of youth to heed the nation's call to fullfill military service. Since we are exposed to everything reported about the youth's acceptance of joining national military service voluntarily and not compulsorily, we should be excused for mentioning some negative aspects and shortcomings which, in some cases, accompany the implementation of the law, in order to understand how to deal with it. Accordingly, we have some observations that we have made as follows:

- 1. Ensure that recruiting offices in the provinces, in coordination with the schools, play a role in explaining the different aspects of the law, before the end of each school year, which would basically result in youth awareness of the importance of national military service and its positive influences on their future life.
- 2. The commendable party councils and military command committees, wherever located, should play a role in meeting with the recruited youth, watching over their mental attitudes, being aware of their social conditions and consequently, not looking down on those who do not carry out their tasks and duties, so that military service will be a welcome field for educating youth in political and ideological matters, based on the idead of our party and regime.
- 3. The Ministry of Defense and recruiting offices in the provinces must play an effective role in evaluating the youth who fulfill national military service, and regard the best and most active recruits by honoring them and encouraging them to develop their abilities during and after service. This should be done in coordination with the Ministry of Education and the study committees, in order to give an opportunity for higher education to the best examples of recruits, especially those who have fulfilled their service in difficult locales, so that this action will be an effective factor in distinguishing between those who weaken when carrying out their national obligations and those who fulfill their duties with honor and manliness.

All this is considered to be a firm foundation for more effective implementation of the recruited youth's military and political service in national military service, and to make the law a prominent symbol in the course of quantitative and qualitative development of our armed forces and other military organizations, through carrying out all the resolutions of the emergency general conference of our Yemeni Socialist Party.

7005

CSO: 4404/283

ECONOMIC MEASURES EMPHASIZE HOLDING DEFICIT DOWN

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 4 Feb 82 p 6

[Article: "Adjusting the South Yemeni Economy to Reduce the Deficit; People's Tastes To Be Considered in the Program to Import Consumer Goods"]

[Text] The Supreme National Council has concluded its 10th session, which began this week, chaired by President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Central Committee, chairman of the presidium of the Supreme People's Council and chairman of the Council of Ministers.

The People's Supreme Council began its session by listening to a report submitted by the chairman of the council, which reviewed the government's activities between the two sessions. He expressed his satisfaction with the state's activities in various fields. The council considered the report assessing the activities of the council, the presidium and the standing committees for the past year, and which reviewed all the various activities for 1981. The council expressed its appreciation for the efforts made by the presidium, for the precision which marked the preparation for the council's sessions and the progress that has been made in the work of its secretariat, which has strengthened the methods of planning and programing its activities and has enabled it to make the appropriate decisions regarding the issues brought before it. The people's representatives also adopted the two plans of the council and the presidium for 1982.

Assessment of Economic Dealings for the Past Year

During its debate of the second year (1982) of the second 5-year plan, the council considered the indicators of economic developments for the past year, the level of economic achievement, and the continual growth achieved in the various economic branches and activities, as well as the increase in social production and national income produced. The council believed that the dealings that were accomplished last year produced tangible results in methods of implementing the annual growth plans and in raising the level of production branches' participation in social productivity.

When the council adopted the second year plan (1982) of the second 5-year plan, it stressed the necessity to utilize all capabilities through superior methods, and to adopt various measures to improve labor productivity, raise the level of competency and performance, rely on programming methods and to regulate labor.

It also praised the role assumed by the citizens both at home and abroad. It called for their increased efforts and sacrifices in order to make implementation of the growth projects successful.

Work to Reduce Non-essential Expenditures and to Hold Down the Budget Deficit

During the council's debate on the general budget for 1982, the council considered the country's financial situation, reviewing the various circumstances and business methods which could increase the public revenues and reduce non-essential expenditures. It adopted the government's general budget. The council emphasized the importance of adopting more measures to improve the financial situation and reduce the deficit, to strive to develop administrative methods, and to raise the efficiency of the organizations' production, in order to increase domestic revenue.

Adjusting the Import Program, to Take into Account People's Tastes in Consumer Goods

Regarding the import program for 1982, the council felt that covering the increased need for growth and national requirements ought to be given total importance, along with considering the tastes of the people when importing consumer goods. Apart from that, the council stressed providing construction materials and spare parts for equipment and vehicles, so that they will be available to the citizenry. This requires careful regulating of imports and distribution by the authorities concerned.

Regarding draft laws submitted to the council, and after a thorough debate, the council adopted the law of control and accounting, amended the local government law, amended the penal code, the exemption for domestic land transportation organizations from taxes and custom fees, amended the law of national military service and the law regulating the legal profession, amended the law to erradicate illiteracy and educate the elderly, as well as amended the cooperative law. The council ratified the presidium's decrees issued between the council's sessions, especially the treaties and agreements.

Assessment of the unionist efforts between the two yemens with regard to the Yemeni national issue, the council reviewed the unionist steps that have been made during the past few months. It highly praised the results of the Ta'iz and Aden meetings between the presidents of the two halves of the nation, and considered the avhievements made to be a qualitative leap forward in the course of the struggle for union and the mutual efforts of the two sides' leadership.

The council stressed that the Aden agreement represents an important step in the course of unionist efforts, will make more unionist coordination available, is a new achievement for our people in their struggle on behalf of building one nation, and considers the accomplishment of a draft constitution for a united state to be one of the fruits of continual, unionist action. The People's Supreme Council praised the unionist steps and considered them to be at the heart of its principal tasks. It reiterated that Yemen's stability, through its two halves, means stability for the peoples of the region.

The council expressed full solidarity with the Palestinian people's struggle, under the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and with the steadfasteness of the Syrian people who stood in the front line against the Zionist foe.

7005

CSO; 4404/283

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

ANNUAL POPULATION FIGURES REPORTED

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 2 Feb 82 p 1

[Article: "This Year's Population Figures Are Two Million Four Thousand (2.004 million)"]

[Text] Estimates indicate that the country's population figures for 1982 will reach 2.004 million, which would mean an increase of 51 thousand people over the previous year's figure. That would put the labor force figure at 920,000 with individuals in that category ranging in age from 16 to 59.

That was indicated by a source who had access to statistical information and who added that the number of workers in all sectors of the national economy will go up to 467,700 workers, which would mean an increase of 15,100 individuals over last year's figure. The increase represents 2.3 percent. The largest portion of those workers will work in the production sectors, which will absorb 72 percent of the total number of new workers in the labor force. The rest will work in other sectors. Steps adopted and designed to increase production are expected to account for approximately 80 percent of the total increase in the gross national product. Productivity is expected to increase by 16 percent for this year compared to last year.

The source indicated that the plan for the increase in the number of workers was prepared according to forecasts of projected available jobs in 1982. The source also mentioned that the training and qualifying of employees during their service will continue in all areas of government service where the number of trainees for this year is expected to reach 3,166 which would indicate an increase of 538 trainees over the past year.

CSO: 4404/390

OIL MINISTER PROMISES PRICE RESURGENCE, END TO GLUT

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 258, 30 Jan 82 pp 49-52

[Interview with Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Shaykh Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani by 'Abd-al-Karim al-Khalil in Riyadh: "Oil Will Regain Its Political Power and We Will Try To Accelerate That!"; date not specified]

/Text/ In the course of an information-gathering trip to Riyadh, the capital of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, our colleage 'Abd-al-Karim al-Khalil, managing editor of AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-IQTISADI, held a number of conversations with a number of ministers responsible for various sectors of the Saudi Economy. One should note that these conversations took place with the aim of learning about Saudi views in detail on subjects and issues of a general nature from the direct sources of these views. Following a review of all the conversations, it may be possible to conclude with some observations and general deductions.

Herswith is the first conversation, with Shaykh Ahmad Zaki al-Wamani, minister of petroleum and natural resources.

Question/ Proceeding from the distinctive role that Saudi Arabia has continued to enjoy in the OPEC organization, and on the basis of its ability, which has been affirmed, to direct the organization's oil policy, how do you conceive of international oil conditions and relations in general in the forseable future?

Answer/ In this regard, great obscurity surrounds the future and the views of many economists on the short and medium range differ. As regards the long range, the picture might be somewhat clearer.

1. As far as the near term goes, the oil situation depends on variable factors, among them:

The state of the conomy in America and the other member countries of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

The movement of international public opinion as regards the dangers inherent in the use of coal as an energy source.

The pricing policy which the OPEC organization will pursue at the end of 1982 and after.

If economic conditions remain stagnant, especially in the United States of America, during most or all of the months of the current year, that will have an effect on the rate of consumption.

It was expected, in the past, that the economic revival in America would start at the beginning of 1982, but these expectations have not been realized, and the fear is now becoming widespread that the recession will last for some time. There is no doubt that the other industrial countries will be influenced by the state of the American economy.

As regards coal, the International Energy Agency has set forth plans to increase coal consumption by rate equivalent to 1 million barrels of oil a day per year up to 1985. At the present time coal is a strong competitor to fuel oil derived from petroleum and therefore it is commercially and economically possible to carry this plan out, especially since coal investments do not exceed \$152 billion, which is not considered a large amount.

However, coal causes serious air pollution end results in serious changes in climate, in addition to the health problems it causes when it emits carbon oxide gases and other pollutants.

Although Germany has large amounts of coal and an advanced technology in the use of coal, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt delivered a serious warning on the use of coal at the summit of the seven industrial countries in Ottawa the middle of last year. Some sutdies have been issued and some voices have begun to be raised against the use of coal in large volumes. We do not now know to what extent the International Energy Agency's plans will succeed, in spite of these dangers.

The third point bears on pricing policy and the cause of the sharp decline in the rates of oil consumption, which is fundamentally the sharp oil price rises of 1979 and 1980. If the OPEC countries can act in a reasonable, wise manner to stop the price increases for a period of time, the severity of coal's competition with fuel oil will disappear and consequently consumption of oil will gradually increase.

All these three points are variable, and in the light of them it is possible to set forth some conceptions regarding the near future.

2. As regards the medium term, there is no doubt that oil consumption will increase by the end of this decade, that is, the end of the eighties, in a manner that may be satisfactory to the OPEC countries.

Nonetheless, we do not know what will be the results of the oil exploration activities that have taken place the last 2 years and are still going on, especially in the United States of America and some other oil areas.

If these activities meet with much success, people will be producing this material outside the OPEC organization and that will have an effect on this organization and its ability to exert control in setting the price of crude oil.

3. In the long range, all studies indicate that oil, gas and coal will continue to meet no less than 90 percent of total energy demand by 2000. All other sources will meet just the remaining 10 percent only. The most important other source is atomic power, which will meet about 7 percent; therefore it is expected that petroleum will continue to play an important role, if not a major one, at the end of this century and the start of the next one.

The oil role of course will be determined by two basic factors:

The role of coal.

The pricing of petroleum.

To these two one should add new oil discoveries and the economic condition of countries in the world in general.

Question As part of this general picture, going back a little, some of your colleagues in OPEC who have differed with you on pricing policy go so far as totally to oppose some of your hypotheses, indeed as to accuse you of having been a direct cause of the sharp drop in oil prices. If Saudi Arabia, they say, had not exceeded the official production ceiling (8.5 million barrels a day), or if it had brought its production down below this ceiling (and it is financially able to bear the consequences of such a drop), this drop in prices would not have occurred, and the rift in policies, which had a great effect on OPEC's image, would not have occurred.

Answer One might make such a statement to an illiterate person who cannot read or write, or an uneducated person who does not know the simplest rules of arithmetic, and then it might be believed, but a trivial grasp of the rules of arithmetic and a simplified understanding of the simplest economic rules will inspire laughter at least over this sort of talk.

In 1979, the OPEC countries were producing and exporting 31 million barrels a day, perhaps a little more than that.

In 1981 the OPEC countries' output dropped to less than 22 million barrels a day. Is the difference between 31 million and 22 million the result of an increase in Saudi production, or is it the result of a drop in world consumption? Any novice in economics who knows that the reason for the drop in consumption in the world may for the most part be attributed to the increase in prices can answer this question. That is, anyone, even if he is responsible, can lie to the public, but it is hard to sustain such talk.

In the OPEC meetings we stated and underlined many economic facts which had been rejected by some colleagues. Recently, at the Abu Dhabi conference, we heard the same statements that we had been making repeated by the persons who had been rejecting them.

We speak in the language of figures and the language of reason. We want to protect the interests of this country and those of the Arab nation in general, which relies on the political power of oil.

In any event, all these matters are in the hands of history and we in OPEC are now a single front and are working together to protect our mutual interests.

Question/ Let us pause briefly before the "illiterates" and the "simpleminded." Naturally a very big discrepancy has occured in consumption rates, but the drop in the rate of consumption has been accompanied by an increase in the Saudi rate of production. That has had an effect on production in countries that had been selling at high prices; they were compelled to lower their prices at a time when they be-

lieved it was in Saudi Arabia's power to reduce its output, or that it should have done so, and refrained some inundating the market and adding to the glut. Was it in Saudi Arabia's power to do that?

Answer Absolutely not.

[Nuestion] Why not?

Answer/ Because there is a discrepancy in prices. OPEC's internal pricing system relies on what is known as the pricing of the market crude and linking all other oils produced to this price in an equation known as the price differential equation. The more unified a pricing system we have, the more the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's output will drop, as a result of that system.

This is what happened after the unification of prices, when production dropped from 10.5 million to 8.5 million barrels a day.

It is not reasonable for us to continue with an unauthorized pricing system. The Saudi price was the official OPEC price; the organization approved it at the Bali conference. Other prices in other countries have been individual ones, since each country raised its own price and must bear the responsibility for doing so. We want to fight stagnation in the oil markets and we want to protect our interests in the medium and long range. I also made that statement at the outset of this conversation.

Therefore it was our duty to leave matters as they were, under the influence of economic factors, so that the price unification process could be realized, and when it was, OPEC would regain its strength. If we had not increased Saudi output, maintaining our price, which is lower than that of others oil, prices would not have been unified, and OPEC would not have regained its power. This process is one of the things we want, but it was necessary in order to unify the price within OPEC, and it succeeded. Everyone now knows what good results resulted from this process.

Answer One can say that OPEC has rid itself of the ailment that afflicted it, which was pricing chaos. It is now in a half-way house, has a substantial degree of power and will regain its power in a very brief period.

Answer Let me distinguish among these three interests, the interests of OPEC, those of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

As regards the interests of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, I can assert that our conduct is based on these interests. These interests are not haphazard or confined to this year or the preceding one; rather, they are long-range ones and we look at all their dimensions and must act in accordance with them.

As regards the interests of the Arab economy and the Arab world, two points are of absolute concern to it:

The first is that oil remain a political power.

The second is that it obtain oil at appropriate prices, that is, that it not be debilitated by very high oil prices.

As regards the first point, oil will not remain a political force if we are reckless in raising the price. This is what happened recently. Everyone, including the man in the street, now knows that oil is not a political force at the present time.

As regards the second point, the Arab world is satisfied when it is sold oil at \$34 a barrel instead of \$40 or \$50 a barrel, as some others want.

As regards OPEC's interests, no one inside the organization can say that our interests are congruent and correspond. There are countries which will perhaps stop exporting in this decade, or at the end of it; these are therefore not concerned with the life of oil or its durability as a source of energy -- what concerns them is that they get the greatest amount of money from every barrel at the present time. Therefore they act in accordance with their own interests. In the face of these countries, there are others in OPEC which have tremendous reservas and want their oil to continue to be a source of energy for a long period of time. Therefore, when we talk about OPEC's interests, we must talk about its interests as an organization. Its interests as an organization are that the life of the oil be prolonged. These interests are the same as those of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, if I talk about the interests of a few OPEC member countries, these interests are different and conflict with those of OPEC, and they must not be imposed upon us. However these countries may try to talk to the man in the street in a language different from that of economics, we are too strong and too able to look after our interests to be affected by these campaigns.

<u>/Question</u>/ If oil's political power has been eliminated or greatly diminished, when will we be able to regain this power? And how?

Answer/ I believe that oil's political power will undeniably be restored in the future. We are trying to shorten the time required for that. This will all depend on the economic factors we explained above.

Nonetheless, one can say that we do not have political power in oil. The other party knows that this political power will be restricted at a point that is not far in the distance, and, when the other party knows that you will have that power at a time that is not far away, that means that he knows that you will be able to use that political power when you talk about politics, which is what is happening at the present time.

However, what we cannot do at the present time, and perhaps for another year or two, is use the oil weapon as we used it in the past, because it is not possible in cases where there is a glut of oil on the market, which was the case in 1967. At that time, when we met in Baghdad, the need to use oil as a weapon was discussed at the conference, and the Baghdad conference decreed that it would be possible to use oil as a weapon only if production was completely halted in all Arab oil-producing countries.

That was out of the question, and is out of the question now, because, to stop production in Kuwait, for example, would mean suspending the use of gas in the production of electricity, the desalination of water and other industries. This also applies to the Eastern Province of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to other countries. Therefore it was not possible to use oil as a weapon then. The situation is the same now, as it was in 1967 and will be for a relatively short period. We hope that our pricing policy, that of fighting extremism in raising prices, will persuade some parties that we are restoring political power to our Arab nation.

Liuestion In the same context, people opposed to you observe that your oil policies are continuously responding to the international economy and the countries in it, in spite of the lack of response on the part of the countries concerned and their economies to our political rights and interests, or our needs for technology or appropriate methods for transferring technology to our economies! What methods must we use in the future to increase these countries readiness to respond to our interests and rights?

Answer One must first distinguish between an economic response, or our concern over the course of the international economy, and these countries' political response. We are concerned over the international economy because we have an interest in it. First we are a country that is temporarily investing its money (in the west); if the international economy collapses, all our investments will erode away. On top of that, indeed more important than that, our concern over the international economy arises from our desire to industrialize ourselves, and we cannot do that at all if the international economy is collapsing!

With regard to the transfer of technology, the fact is that this is a process that is subject to struggle and to give and take. We enter into this struggle with all our force, and so far we have received what we consider satisfactory as a result of the conduct I have described.

As regards political matters, one can gain the compliance of biq powers only if there are deep economic interests through which you can exert influence. Israel enjoys great influence in the West because the Jewish community in a country has great economic power and political power is derived from this. We want to follow suit.

_Question/ Does what you have obtained in the context of the transfer of technology satisfy you, as you have said?

Answer As far as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia goes, the fact is that we have carried out the plan we set forth and we have acquired a response, though it was not easy. We have the resources and inducements that enable us to achieve that.

[Juestion] Could you explain?

Answer/ I can give examples of this in the industries that have been established and are being established in the petrochemical sector, the iron and steel industry, oil refining and many projects in more than one sector of economic activity.

Question Studies, opinions and expectations conflict greatly over conditions and the future of oil energy in the Soviet Union. In the light of this conflict, what general picture have you formed of these conditions?

Answer All the studies related to the petroleum and energy situation in the Soviet Union are based either on predictions or on figures that Russia issues itself. What we do know, on the basis of various objective studies, is that the Soviet Union has tremendous petroleum resources but does not have adequate technology to extract these tremendous reserves. For that, it needs the technology and the capital of the West.

The Soviet Union will be entering a period in which it will no longer be able to export oil to the West. One should bear in mind that it now exports 1 million barrels a day to the West, from which it gets more than 50 percent of its hard currency needs. These exports will gradually fall off and perhaps stop completely in 1987. On the other hand, there are the Soviet Union's oil exports to the countries of the Communistic bloc, which are now estimated at 2 million barrels a day: it is expected that this volume will decline as this bloc's needs and the oil it will obtain from the Soviet Union will of course come from countries outside the Eastern camp. Therefore the Communist bloc, in its totality, will become an oil-importing bloc. The Soviet Union itself is expected, in the worst of cases, to be self-sufficient; then a period might come in the future when it will be able to regain its oil power. The problem lies in the period in which the entire Eastern bloc will be importing oil.

Auestion In a statement he issued recently, the deputy minister of oil in Iraq said that Iraq wants to construct a pipeline from its fields to Yanbu' across Saudi Arabia, that an economic study of the project has been made, and that the following step is up to Saudi Arabia, or the ball of the project is in its court.

Answer The fact is that we do not view this project as a soccer game. Rather, we look at it as an oil outlet for the fraternal country of Iraq. We are anxious that it should meet Iraq's need and that it should find an outlet for itself on the territory of its brother Saudi Arabia. We have engaged in complete comprehensive cooperation with our brother Iraq in order to enable it to carry out field studies for this project.

Some detailed studies are now being started that are related to economic and financial matters. They are being rapdily pursued in the kingdom. We will begin rapid negotiations, God willing, with Iraq, and these will result in the commencement of construction on this project in file.

<u>/Question</u>/ What is the status of the idea of transporting the Arab Gulf countries' oil via a pipeline going around the Strait of Hormoz and skirting the problems of a cutoff of oil transportation through it?

Answer This is an old idea, one from the past. It has not yet been subjected to adequate study from the economic or technical standpoint.

<u>[Juestion]</u> In spite of the growing volume of Saudi investments in advanced industrial countries, it is observed that none of these investments have focussed on the oil or energy sector, and that Saudi Arabia, for example, has not made any investments in this field similar to those Kuwait made in the Santa Fe company, or even less than that!

Answer That is true, and perhaps in the future we will find ourselves in need of this kind of investment. I hope we will not miss the boat.

CSO: 4404/328 NATION PLANS FOR PROSPERITY IN POST-PETROLEUM ERA

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 259, 6 Feb 82 pp 53-56

[Interview with Minister of Planning Hisham Nazir by 'Abd-al-Karim al-Khalil: "The Kingdom Has Managed To Import the Technology Without the Ideology"; date and place not specified]

/Text/ Following the first meeting, with Shaykh Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's minister of petroleum and mineral resources (AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-IQTISADI, Number 91, dated 23 January 1982), here is a second one, with Shaykh Hisham Nazic, the minister of planning. The two meetings are part of several that our colleague 'Abd-al-Karim Khalil carried out with some ministers and officials in the kingdom as part of a general tour of the Saudi economy. AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-IQTISADI will publish these subsequently, and will follow them with impressions and observations inspired by the discussions, meetings and observations.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: In very country, there are a strategy and long-range or medium-range approaches to planning. Let us start by determining the planning strategy and goals the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has specified for itsel?, under its own circumstances.

Hisham Nazir: The basis of the development process that is taking place in the Kingdom (and planning is a part of that process) is that development should take place in a manner that brings welfare to the Saudi citizen without, of course, infringing on the bases and foundations of Saudi society. In all the plans we have prepared, we always refer to, and point out at the beginning, the fact that their first objective is to preserve the Islamic and Arab values in our society.

Here, a question arises: how can one preserve these values in the context of the broad, deep development process that it is carrying out? The answer to this question, though, does not require much sophistication.

In the first place, we do not start anything that deviates from what is carried in the book of God and the sayings and doings of his prophet. Proceeding with this premise, and on this basis, there is a restriction, acceptable by choice, which dictates the preservation of the values through which we can /act/.

In the second place, we stress this in our educational programs.

The only weak point in this area, and this not a major one, lies in the third aspect of the relationship between planning and the citizen. This is connected to the educational responsibilities of parents in the home: the government cannot control

education in the home -- in fact, it leaves that to the citizen, while not neglecting to urge them by various means to devote attention to the dictates of strategy in this matter.

AL-MUSTAGBAL: Perhaps this is what you meant by a statement that you have been quoted as making: "Development in the kingdom imports the technology without importing the ideology."

Nazir: Most certainly. The strategic long-term objective of planning is to preserve the kingdom's true personality, regardless of the improvement in the standard of living the development process is simed at.

AL-MUSTAGBAL: Inspired by this strategic goal, before moving over to other strategic goals that are connected to it, can one say that you have succeeded in this? To what extent, and how?

Nazir: In our opinion, so far we have succeeded in this matter although there is a large foreign workforce of diverse cultures in the kindgom. The kingdom applies its statutes to all workforces and these workforces are not able to apply their own conception.

In another area, our importation of foreign manpower is connected for the most part to the construction of basic facilities and, after these are constructed, they go back to their own countries. This bloc accounts for more than approximately 60 percent of the foreign manpower and is working in the construction sector. In any event, the kingdom does not allow this force to bring in its families, to take out permanent residence, or to slack off. Given these facts, I do not see how these forces could bring us any kind of ideology if we do not want it or it is not suitable for us or consonant with our values and heritage.

AL-MUSTAGBAL: Following this explanation, we can go back and follow up on the definition of the other strategic goals of the planning and development process in the kingdom.

Nazir: The second aspect, or the second dimension, of planning strategy is Saudi man. This is natural, considering that the development process in reality is aimed at man and is based on man, as ultimately it is for him. One cannot complete this long-range process, arrive at its results, or even feel these results in a plan or two, or in three plans; rather, they come about through persistent work in educational programs, training programs, and the realization that the education levels, the health levels and psychological levels that the citizens will enjoy generation after generation will have an effect on succeeding generations until, ultimately, there comes the final generation, which, in reality, will be the product of the experiences and accumulated background that has been formed over the generations.

Uf course there is a third long-range goal, which is the defense and protection of the nation and defense of the Arab and Islamic nation. That goal will always be reiterated, in every plan. It was present in the first plan and in the second one. It is present in the third plan. It will exist in any future plan. That goal of necessity requires that one take all needed measures to strengthen the kingdom intrinsically and as a basic part of the development operation as a whole.

AL-MUSTAGBAL: In the light and context of this strategy, you have had short-term quals in the course of the three plans, or in each one of them. How would you define those in terms of the points of difference and similarity between each and their necessary interrelationships?

Nazir: The short-term goals of each of the three plans were set out as follows:

The first stage consisted of construction of the basic facilities to prepare for economic takeoff. That, with thanks to God, has been carried out with great success, and I believe that you will not need a planning minister to rule on that statement. Anyone can move about among the various areas of the kingdom and see the results of the efforts that have been made to create the basic environment for the economy.

In the second stage, which began with the start of the third plan, the attempt and objective has been to diversify income sources by concentrating on new sectors outside of oil, especially in the sectors of industry, agriculture and mining. This stage will continue in the course of several plans until it is completed and will be accompanied, of necesity, in addition to the construction of other basic facilities, by the construction of such other facilities as training, mining and various health facilities and the construction of institutions which will help with development, such as the Real Estate Development Fund, the Industrial Development Fund and the Social Insurance System.

Results Have Exceeded Expectations

AL-MUSTAGBAL: Through the development process which has taken place in the first and second plans so far, and the period of the third plan now underway that has been completed, could we hear about positive and negative developments in the processes of execution, in terms of volume and percentages, in terms of the level of performance and rates of production, in terms of the inflationary effects on the economy, and in terms of costs and the struggle against waste?

Nazir: One cannot evaluate the success or failure of any plan in terms of figures. I do not believe that there is a scientific method for making such an evaluation.

Of course one can calculate it in some sectors that are based on numerical goals, such as road and building construction and corresponding basic facilities. As regards these sectors, or most sectors of basic facilities, I can say that we have attained results and achievements which exceed the basic goals that were set out for each of them.

However, there are sectors that one cannot measure in terms of specific quality. We have reached complete goals, or almost complete goals, in the preparation of students, teachers and schools. What we cannot measure here is related to quality as regards the level and quality of education, especially since it is related to a number of criteria, including the type of teacher, the school, the class and the response of the people concerned.

In general I can say that our success has been obvious and apparent in terms of basic installations, while success as regards human installations has been more gradual, since one cannot rule on people's conduct in any circumstance.

However, and this is important, there is no doubt that our experience in planning and execution now through the third plan, now that two plans have been completed, has become much deeper and stronger than it was in the period when we began. This is normal, considering the expertise accumulated between the two times.

Therefore, we faced great inflation and high costs in the first stage. Part of that was imported, and part of it was the result of the smallness of the infrastructure that existed in the kingdom when the plans began. We managed to overcome the latter cause in the second stage of planning; the infrastructure now exists, and the Saudi economy's ability to absorb expenditures has become much greater than the volume stipulated in any plan. That is one of the major reasons for the drop in inflation rates in the kingdom at the present time.

One can observe the same thing as regards costs. In the first stage, costs were revolving in a vicious circle. The cause of some of them really was the lack of infrastructure, but the remainder resulted from the presence of some companies, Western ones specifically, that acted on the basis of the feeling that the kingdom was committed to a schedule and had no choice in the matter. However, we actually acted to stem that when we abrogated a large number of bids and informed the companies that commitment to the construction schedule was something we wanted, but not at any price.

In addition, we also managed to eliminate some rises in costs also as a result of our increased expertise and the increased competence of the technical and managerial agencies we had, which now enable us to control costs more than in the past.

There is absolutely no doubt that the results have been excellent. Of course that does not mean that there have not been flaws, but results are always measured by their positive and negative features, within the circumstances governing the development process in every society.

We Have Enough Oil for 60 Years

AL-MUSTAQBAL: In the context of the non-Saudi employees in the kingdom, Arabs and foreigners, what are your observations on the development of their rates of output in the kingdom? Have these also increased as the Saudi citizen's rates of output have increased?

Nazir: Without a doubt. Experience has benefitted the people residing in the kingdom, Saudi and non-Saudi. It has been possible to observe that many of our Arab brothers who have worked in the kingdom and have been exposed to work with equipment, machinery and technology they were not familiar with in their own countries, as a result of interacting with development activities, have really benefited a great deal from it. Our Egyptian, Jordanian and Lebanese brothers, the people from Pakistan, and so forth are on a par in this regard.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: Let us assume that the basic goal of planning in the kingdom, on the material level, is gradually to prepare the Saudi economy for the post-oil stage. Has that started to be done? Where have you gotten on this?

Nazir: Naturally, the third 5-year plan involves basic goals in this direction in the sectors of industry, mining and agriculture, which have started gradually to entail the diversification of income sources and increased incomes from non-petroleum sectors.

The realization of this absolutely cannot occur in the short range under the circumstances and the state of affairs that exist in the kingdom's economy, but the kingdom is fortunate in this regard in that the life of the oil it has is not short. Rather, it is relatively long, estimated, on the basis of the volumes of proved reserves and reserves that can be produced, and anticipated stipulated production rates, at more than 60 years, in the course of which it will be possible to do many things and achieve many goals, especially now that it is proved through preliminary mineral reconnaissance and exploration that there are substantial amounts of these and brief tests up to now in the agricultural sector have revealed worthwhile resources.

To that one might add that we consider that the most important thing that can qualify us to cope with the post-oil stage is the fact that Saudi people and citizens enjoy the expertise and the technical and managerial ability necessary to develop the king-dom's economy, starting now, and subsequently, in accordance with the appropriate options evailable and those which will be available. Preparing Saudis to carry out the development process is the main point we are concentrating on now, so that they will be able to cope with any stage through their own expertise and technological ability. It is necessary that we continue to achieve this goal in each successive stage in order to arrive at the final generation, with the expertise accumulated over the various stages and generations.

Here, as evidence of this, we can give the experience of our brothers in Jordan. The basic capital in the development process there is not natural sources of wealth but Jordanian man, his expertise and his technology.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: In mentioning the non-petroleum sectors in the post-oil stage, you restrict yourself to, or emphasize, the industry and mining sectors. What is your opinion on the claim or the idea that lays emphasis on the kingdom's religious tourist sector, considering that this country is the main center of Islamic holy places?

Nazir: When the sectors of industry, mining and agriculture are mentioned, we do not mean that they are the only non-petroleum sources of income and economics; we just mention them as sectors that we have started to explore and in which we can expand. Other sectors, including the religious tourist sector, will constitute the various options available to Saudi society, from which it can take what it wants, relying on those that are suitable within all its circumstances and the technical, managerial and productive premises that will be present to Saudis in all the options at their time.

A Gulf Common Market

AL-MUSTADBAL: In the light of increasing coordination among the Arab Gulf countries, especially with the establishment of the Arab Gulf State Cooperation Council and the submission of the council countries' united economic cooperation agreement, modifications or changes will be necessary in planning and development orientation in the kingdom. What do you predict these modifications or developments will be, in the foreseeable future?

Nazir: The basis for the Arab Gulf States' Cooperation Council is coordination, first of all. Coordination takes place by linking member countries to a system of basic facilities that will facilitate movement and the transfer of goods, people and money among the countries concerned, through coordination, and will provide the circumstances

for establishing mutual activities, programs and projects. While some of these facilities are now being established, and some circumstances and processes exist, especially in the private sectors of the council countries, the establishment of the Cooperation Council will of course lead to an expansion of the cooperation that exists, indeed to its qualititative development in various sectors, especially on the basis of the criteria of the economic feasibility of projects and the avoidance of harmful duplication. The unified economic agreement which the first conference of finance ministers of the council countries set out is the first fruit to ripen with the continued activities of the conferences of the ministries that are competent to carry out the sections of the agreement. The ministers of planning, or people concerned with planning, in the council countries will soon hold their first conference to set out the broad outlines for cooperation in the field of planning and the coordination of planning programs and approaches.

AL-MUSTAGBAL: It has been noted that all the development programs and projects included in the plans are organizationally and administratively subject to the ministries and traditional general departments, according to their fields of specialization except for development projects and programs in the Yanbu' and al-Jubayl areas, for which a special royal commission has been established. What is the planning thinking or justification that prompted the adoption of this approach?

Nazir: The establishment of the Royal Commission for Yanbu' and al-Jubayl was actually one of the new ideas that appeared in the second development plan, and it was a success! We now have a truly beneficial experience in this field.

The goal behind this idea was that we had some projects that it was not possible to execute competently through the official agencies that existed at that time. Some of these projects involved a specific short period of time, or were connected to other projects. These included the connections between the basic facilities for al-Jubayl and Yanbu' and the industrial projects; it is not permissible for us to build up an industry and leave it idle until roads and desalination plants are built. If deadlines differ and there is confusion in the proportion of the construction completion in these projects, confusion will arise regarding the project as a whole. In order to avoid that, the government considered it necessary to establish a new agency that would assume all the powers of the other agencies as far as this program alone was concerned, in order to enable it to conduct coordination among program projects and consolidate performance, with the goal of lowering costs. That was done with great success, and it may be appropriate to have the government pursue the same method in other programs or projects. One should bear in mind that the government relies on the same or almost the same method in the pilgrimage projects at Mina each year. assigning the management of all the activities bearing on the projects to a single agency which carries them out in a coordinated fashion.

AL-MUSTARBAL: In spite of the relatively immense size of the kingdom's investments abroad, it has been observed that those made in Western countries (which absorb the bulk of total foreign investments) are still in the form cash, in deposits in banks or various forms of financial paper, contrary to Kuwait, which is making many different direct investments in industry, most recently with its purchase of all the stocks of the American conglomerate Santa Fe, in the energy sector. What is your opinion on what is being said about flaws in the kingdom's policy in this regard, especially since direct investment in industrial countries could help the kingdom and further facilitate the conditions for its people to obtain the appropriate technology abroad?

Nazir: First, to be fair, one cannot compare the size of development in Kuwait with that in the kingdom. While Kuwait has started and has been greatly successful in this area, it was assisted in this by circumstances. We in the kingdom still believe that we will need our reserves that have been invested in the form of savings and bonds in the future. Why? To function and be invested in the kingdom, as well as for marketing investments outside. We have actually started to enter the world market with Arab countries, through shipping companies, and joint drilling companies and other investments.

However, our need for reserves at the present time does not rule out the possibility that we might turn to or go into the investment sectors you asked about.

A Tax System Is Coming

AL-MUSTAGBAL: As a minister of planning, how do you view the notion that calls on the kingdom to establish an integrated tax system in which everyone, foreigners more than citizens, will pay taxes on incomes and profits to the government and the society, especially since their income and profit levels in the kingdom are substantial compared with most countries?

Nazir: In actuality, the kingdom has a tithe system, and we also have a tax system that is applied to oil and other companies, but is not applied to individuals.

A review of this matter as a means for increasing the government's incomes is not appropriate; the government does not need such an increase at the present time.

However, a review of this matter as an economic instrument for controlling inflation or attempting to direct investments into certain sectors and keep them away from others will be made someday.

At the present time, we, in the Ministry of Planning, take a different attitude toward the matter, which entails making the citizen feel true participation in development. However, we are in reality proceeding from the following angle: participation in development takes place through trained citizens, and one should not be afraid of such citizens or their feeling the need to participate in and contribute to the process.

Conversely, there is the other segment of the population, which has been taken by surprise over the planning process and has essentially not been prepared for it. At the present time we cannot cause this group any kind of confusion through taxes. The statutes are silent and cannot discriminate among individuals.

While taking that into consideration, the likelihood of resorting to a tax system in the sense you are talking about is a reality and I would not rule it out at all. In fact, I see some advantages in it in some features and at some times.

There Is No Difference between Saudis and Non-Saudis

AL-MUSTA;BAL: There is another question of the same nature on the broad subsidies of many goods and services that the kingdom is financing which foreigners as well as citizens benefit from, and which benefit the rich and the well off, in accordance with the volume of their consumption, more than people with relatively low or limited

incomes. What is your opinion on the theory that calls for amending the subsidy systems, eliminating some and replacing them with others that would give subsidies as compensation for people with low incomes and save the government money it might not need but that foreigners and the well to do do not have any right to?

Nazir: The fact is that there are two reasons which cause us to avoid adopting this notion.

The first reason is purely humanitarian. We absolutely do not want to draw a distinction between citizens and non-citizens in the market. It is true that we feel pressure on our hospitals because of free care, and on our schools, because we deal with people who come to the kingdom on a par with the citizens as far as services go. However, our policy in the kingdom is to avoid making distinctions. If this policy is compared with the procedures followed by many countries in the world, the noble side of the Arab nation in this area will be apparent.

The second reason is that the administrative efforts and costs that the policy of amending the subsidies and discriminating among a number of groups with respect to these subsidies might be greater than the savings that could arise from them. Here we are talking from experience, having found that the negative aspects that might arise through discrimination could be greater than its advantages.

AL-MUSTAGBAL: As a planning minister, how do you anticipate the Saudi economy in general will look in 5 years or at the end of this decade, through the current approaches to development in the Saudi economy and actual conditions in it?

Nazir: Today I received an item of news on the data on the number of graduates in the kingdom. In less than 10 years, the number of graduates in agricultural, industrial, medical and engineering sciences in the kingdom came to 28,000.

This figure is below our needs. However, it means that much progress has been achieved, and it gives evidence of greater figures in the near and distant future; these will arise as a result of the large number of pupils and students in schools, totalling more than 1.5 million, whereas they came only to 100,000 a few years ago.

These figures acquire real meaning when one considers that trained people who have graduated in all the various sciences are the most important capital in the Saudi economy of the future. If the number of Saudi graduates in all applied sciences is increasing every year and they are accumulating expertise, competence and experience, that is the best sign or index of the state of Saudi economy and society will be in, not just at the end of this decade but also at the end of all other following ones.

11887 CSO: 4404/329 FINANCE MINISTER DISCUSSES VARIOUS DOMESTIC, FOREIGN PROJECTS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 260, 13 Feb 82 pp 55-58

[Interview with Minister of Finance Muhammad Aba-al-Khayl by 'Abd-al-Karim al-Khalil: "No to Taxes, Yes to Retention of the Subsidy System"; date and place not specified]

Text AL-MUSTAGBAL AL-IGTISABI is continuing the publication of various conversations on issues and domestic trends in the Saudi economy. Following the first conversation with the minister of petroleum and minerals, Shaykh Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani, and the second conversation, with the Planning Minister Dr Hisham Nazir (AL-MUSTAGBAL, Nos 258 and 259, dated 30 January and 6 February 1982), the tird conversation, with the Saudi minister of finance and national economy, Shaykh Muhammad Aba-al-Khayl, follows herewith.

AL-MUSTAGBAL: The last few years, in particular the last 2 years, have highlighted developments in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's relations with the international monetary system, in terms of the volume and types of relations it has with the International Monetary Fund, which looks over this system, or through the declaration of specific acts of faith and initiative to distribute the kingdom's financial investments. However, this development has not prevented continuous complaints about the unjust basis on which this system is founded. What can Saudi Arabia, by itself or in cooperation with others, inside or outside Europe, do to develop this basis and develop this system in a more just manner?

Aba-al-Khayl: The kingdom's relations with the international monetary system and the institutions in it, including the International Monetary Fund, have developed in the recent period, based on a number of facts or actual situations:

In the first place, the tensions and weakness that have befallen international financial and economic conditions. These are tensions that have appeared in us and in other countries - industrialized ones, oil states, and newly industrialized and developing countries.

In the second place, the growth of the kingdom's financial resources. These are leading to increased relations and contects with the basic international financial institutions.

These facts have meant that it was necessary to increase the kingdom's information about what was happening in the international monetary system and to subject every development to followup and review.

The industrial countries are the major, or sole, source of all financial organizations, and they are the ones that have the real say. They are the ones in which the financial institutions, money markets, banks and so forth are located. This provides them with actual power to take major decisions. In these countries there are the institutions in which policies are discussed and determined, such as the OECD group, the Bank of International Settlements, or, within these two organizations, the group of five, the group of ten, which is broader than that, and so forth. Decisions are taken in these organizations and these policies are discussed in the International Monetary Fund on a broader scale.

The kingdom has been and still is in contact with these groups. To summarize the answer: what is going on now indicates that the international organizations are concerned that the kingdom should have an opinion and should participate in them, just as this is of concern to the kingdom itself.

As regards the International Monetary Fund, our relations with it in the kingdom are actually very good.

On this occasion I would like to correct what has been said on other occasions to the effect that an increase was made in the kingdom's share in the International Monetary Fund in exchange for the loan the kingdom provided to the fund. In reality, the two issues are totally separate and there was no correction between them. All that happened was that the issue of increasing the kingdom's share in the fund was discussed, and that took place at the same time as a discussion of the kingdom's making a loan to the fund. This is a pure coincidence in timing and nothing else. Perhaps it was the reason why the false feeling was created that one took place in exchange for the other.

We in the kingdom had been wanting to increase our share in the International Monetary Fund, but our desire was simultaneous with the request or desire on the part of others in the fund that the kingdom's share to be increased and that it be represented in the fund's Executive Council. Perhaps others' desire for this was greater than ours. Perhaps giving the kingdom a permanent seat in the fund's Executive Council expressed a consecration of the kingdom's financial and economic status. Proof of that might be the fact that countries like Canada and Italy voluntarily and without reservation or negative attitudes agreed that the kingdom's share in the fund should become larger than either of theirs and consequently that it should be above them in the rank of countries taking part in the fund's structure and foundation.

As regards the possibility of developing the international monetary system at present on behalf of the interests of the developing countries, I believe that that is not very likely now. There was a possibility, and there were hopes of that before the Cancun conference in Mexico. It would have been possible for things to develop in the direction of granting developing countries a greater role in the international system by amending the rules on voting, for instance, or taking other measures. However, what happened at Cancun and after showed that the industrial countries would not easily relinquish their distinctive position, their louder voice or their greater weight in financial affairs. It also became apparent that the industrial countries had agreed not to discuss anything related to the international financial organizations outside these organizations, and they agreed not to amend the rules on voting, as they hoped to keep what they had.

In this climate, the kingdom wishes and strives to have its role be always one of bringing views closer together. The representative of Saudi Arabia in the International Monetary Fund has often performed this role of arriving at reasonable solutions.

AL-MUSTARBAL: On this subject, how do you view the Europeans' position? Does it correspond completely with the Americans' or is it different and in conflict with it, and to what degree? Do you believe that there is scope for carrying out some joint activity with Europe in this direction?

Aba-al-Khayl: As regards the situation you are talking about, I believe that all industrial countries adopt the same position. It is true that we sometimes observe some differences among them, but these differences are over details, while the basic conception and the premise is the same as far as they all go.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: With the establishment of the Council of Cooperation of the Arab Gulf States, hopes have increased that it will be possible to turn the countries of this council as a group into a more powerful force in the international economic and financial context, especially since they have ventured toward an economic and monetary union. Do you expect this to happen soon? Might that be the basis for a positive new change in the area's relations with the international monetary system?

Aba-al-Khayl: As we pointed out above, the actual brackdown of the group of nations into developing countries and industrial ones, in economic terms, no longer holds as it did before. Rather, it now comprises four main groups - the group of industrial countries, which contains the industrialized countries; the group of recently-industrialized countries such as Brazil, India, Korea and so forth; the group of petroleum states, which export petroleum; then the group of developing countries. Even the last group is no longer united -- rather, one can make out a special group within it, the countries that suffer from major problems and are sometimes called the poorest countries.

As far as the Cooperation Council goes, that includes petroleum countries; indeed, the countries in it represent the petroleum countries with the greatest surpluses. There are almost no petroleum countries with a surplus outside the council, with one or two exceptions.

From this standpoint, specifically, the Cooperation Council countries certainly can speak with a single voice and be stronger. They certainly can have greater influence specifically as regards international investments and money transfers, and matters concerned in general with the international monetary system, especially in the context of attempts to arrive at acceptable practical conditions in terms of morth-south relations.

AL-MUSTA BAL: In your statement do I see some grounds for optimism that the Council of Cooperation of the Arab Gulf Countries will soon be performing a distinguished mission in the economic, financial and monetary area and will take steps toward unification or coordination?

Aba-al-Khayl: We are countries that are greatly similar in many areas, not just economic but also social, political and other areas.

The new aspect of the situation is that we now have an organization that did not exist in the past, the Cooperation Council of the Arab Gulf Countries, its secretariat general, and its various agencies. This organization is now able to provide periodic conferences, a specific agenda and meetings of officials in every sector in a set fashion from time to time in order to discuss the problems of their sectors.

Now the organization exists, and its existence naturally means that the member countries are brought closer together, not just in their format but also in their measures and activities.

AL-MUSTATBAL: On the eve of your meeting at the conference of ministers of finance and economy, let us assume that your measures toward unification and coordination will now begin, if only slowly. Within what time frame will it be possible for us to conceive of the Cooperation Council countries arriving at a unification of currency or a unification of financial and economic policies, or some of these policies?

Aba-al-Khayl: The Arabs of the south, as it is said, do not differ from the Arabs of the north, but some, or most, of the time they are careful to be more certain of their steps. Therefore the Cooperation Council countries, in their way of dealing with things, are similar. On most occasions they deal with them calmly and in a manner that shows appreciation of the atmosphere and circumstances on the other side.

The first conference of the financial ministers in the Cooperation Council countries constitutes the start of the adoption of executive measures to put the unified economic agreement into practice. The agreement contains clear commitments, and we must act to issue the necessary unifying instructions to customs authorities to eliminate customs tariffs from locally produced goods, as with instructions on the issuance of certificates of origin of goods, instructions and measures to unify customs policy regarding imports, and so forth.

What I can say is that the Cooperation Council countries are turning into an economic group that will be an actual fact in a year, God willing.

As regards monetary unity, it is not possible to expect this in a short time, because changing currency is a means, not a result. However, I anticipate that single banking systems, united purchasing systems and united customs systems will be established in a short period of time.

AL-MUSTARBAL: In development aid abroad, and in development loans, to what extent do you prefer the system of bilateral cooperation to collective or multilateral cooperation? Can the establishment of the Gulf States Cooperation Council develop things in this field more in favor of the multilateral system?

Aba-al-Khayl: It is true that we prefer bilateral cooperation in the field of development cooperation but we do not see anything in that that calls for any comments. Rather, bilateral cooperation is not the only approach that the kingdom, or any Cooperation Council country, has pursued in development aid or development loans. The kingdom, for example, as is well known, contributes not less than 20 percent of the financial resources of about 13 international and regional financial organizations. The fact is that the Arab group has established more channels and instruments of mutual cooperation than any other region or area in the world. They established the Arab Fund for Economic Development, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Arab Development Fund

for the African Countries, another fund with the Islamic countries and a fund for the whole world with OPEC. If we tabulate the Gulf Cooperation countries' contributions in these funds (the kingdom, Kuwait, the emirates and Qatar) we will find that the proportion of our participation in them is not less than 60 or even 70 percent. Therefore we cannot at all say that by giving preference to the system of bilateral cooperation we have inhibited reliance on the approach of collective cooperation. Indeed, we can look at the matter from the standpoint that we use both methods together. I do not believe that it is in the mind of any person or body to abstain totally from the approach of bilateral cooperation, or for us to let all our aid flow into one approach or corresponding channels.

I would like to point out here that one of the Cooperation Council's goals, and one of those of the unified economic agreement within it, is the unification of council country policy as regards foreign aid. The fact is that this point embraces many aspects, because four Cooperation Council countries have domestic foreign development funds. There is now a sort of cooperation and coordination among these funds. The establishment of the Cooperation Council means the establishment of greater coordination among these funds, and that is a very easy matter. The essence of this subject is the spirit of cooperation and the desire to have it continue. As for its forms, these are particular, detailed and tactical in nature.

AL-MUSTAGBAL: Will the Cooperation Council bring about the establishment of joint Gulf investment policies?

Aba-al-Khayl: Yes, certainly. This is stipulated in the unified economic agreement. There is a project to establish a joint investment company. This company will not be the sole means for investment. Rather, it will be a major one. Through that, ideas and approaches might possibly arise which will result in putting the goal of coordinating investment policies mentioned in the agreement into practice. (The conversation with the Saudi finance minister took place before the announcement of the establishment of the common Cooperation Council country investment organization.)

I believe that this organization will be one agency playing a role in this direction, although it will not be responsible for all investments.

AL-MUSTAGBAL: Much talk has taken place about the relationship between surplus countries and deficit countries on the subject of liquidity. The dominant opinion is that money does not flow from the former to the latter in an appropriate volume and manner that will offer a greater payout in conditions in the latter countries than in the former. Don't you consider that surplus countries, which need to invest their surplus in more feasible, assured ways, free from shock, should establish a sort of aggressive policy to make the deficit countries better able to receive investments than the surplus countries, rather than continuing with a defensive position vis-a-vis the charges of shortcomings that are directed against them?

Aba-al-Khayl: That is true. We are taking a defensive position. It happened that I took part on more than one occasion in working meetings and symposia and noticed what you are mentioning. It is easy to understand this point, even when it concerns people who are the most impulsive in heaping abuse.

We do not need to point out at length that money is like commodities -- it moves around when it is allowed to have investments and organizations managing it. Thus,

the issue always, or most of the time, requires two sides. In specific cases individuals and governments that have a surplus take the initiative of making investments with organizations in countries that ask for them, and it is then observed that the investor's money is immediately moved to the foreign investment institutions that we are complaining about. More than once, Party A from the surplus countries will venture to deposit a sum with Party B from the deficit countries and it appears that the amount is transferred to a European or in general Western financial institution the next day.

We for our part do not say that what has happened is not fact. Money needs investments and it moves on when it does not find scope for investment. It is the economic activities that demand the money, and not the opposite. In any event, there are many investment channels and institutions now in the Arab world, from joint companies in the private sector to joint companies in the public sector. Investors from Arab countries of necessity prefer investing in these countries to others; they know them and know how how to get along with the people in them, and they want to invest in them, especially since in recent years the increasing dangers of investing abroad have been revealed. However, if the Arab investor is not allowed to invest, he cannot push his investments through, especially in countries which have adopted specific economic systems by which governments dominate all economic activities. That is a fact on which we have no observations to make, except that it really prevents the flow of investments.

In my apinion, the subject of the flow of investments between two parties has been inflated as a result of controversy in public circles, not as a result of actual viewpoints or the actual state of affairs. Arab investments exists. Whenever a country raises incentives and facilitates the flow of investments, these investments rain down on it.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: On the same subject, we have a side observation on the Tunisian case. In addition to a mutual desire for Arab financial investments in Tunisia, Tunisian laws arose which encourage foreign investments and facilitate their flow, with a concormitant development in Tunisia's relations with all Arab parties, greatly helping the flow of Arab money into Tunisia. However, it has been observed that this money, except for some ordinary loans, has flowed into Tunisia only toward loans of a touristic character, which may benefit a few groups in Tunisian society but do not strengthen its economy or consolidate its productive foundations — as opposed to European capital, which has been directed toward productive projects there. What are your observations on that?

Aba-al-Khayl: That is true. The observation is well put. I previously discussed it with some Tunisian brothers and some Arab investors. It seems it is the general atmosphere that has pushed matters in this direction. Of course, the easy nature of these projects may have helped. For our part, in Saudi Arabia, we are striving to make the Tunisian-Saudi Development Company which was established recently a means for investment in productive sectors in Tunisia. One thing we have agreed on in the company, and have requested from his excellency our brother Mansour Moalla, the minister of finance of Tunisia, and Saudi representatives on the board of directors, is that they should not get into tourist areas. I recommended that they get into the agricultural processing sector, thereby, benefiting from Tunisia's location and soil and export orientations in the Tunisian economy, which will help make investments of that type a success. On this subject that company is now studying an investment in the dairy sector, preparatory to carrying it out. I hope that this will be the beginning of a shift in Arab investments.

AL-MUSTAGBAL: With regard to the kingdom's investments abroad, especially in America, Europe and Japan, it is observed that most, if not all, of these investments are financial and monetary in nature and have not yet entered in a serious manner into productive and technological investments, contrary to Kuwait, for example, which has made and is making substantial investments in this direction. What are your observations on this subject in general?

Aba-al-Khayl: We, in the kingdom, have the goal of investing domestically. Our investments abroad result from the fact that there is a financial surplus in the government and the Saudi private sector. These are investments which have resulted in turn in accelerating the rate of /growth of the/ absorptive capacity in the Saudi economy. All we are doing now, or our main objective, is to increase the absorptive power of the Saudi economy domestically so that it can absorb financial surpluses. This is a goal we are rapidly approaching. Therefore the existence of our investment abroad is temporary and for this we must choose temporary investments that are capable of being rapidly liquidated.

AL-MUSTADBAL: Might we infer, from that there is no intention of investing in productive projects in Western economies?

Aba-al-Khayl: With respect to the private sector, we do not have any restrictions on its investments abroad, but, as far as the government goes, there is no intention of making any long-term investments.

AL-MUSTAGBAL: Even when we consider that the Saudi economy might need such investments in the post-petroleum stage and that investments abroad at that stage might be a source of income?

Aba-al-Khayl: No, no, no. We do not believe in this. The Saudi economy will be productive in any case.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: What is your opinion on the view that holds that it is necessary to establish an integrated tax system in the kingdom that would be based on the spirit and system of the tithe, but take a clearer, more detailed form?

Aba-al-Khayl: We in the kingdom are trying to use petroleum revenues to establish alternative economic resources so that the country will not remain totally dependent on oil revenues. For a long time, directly or indirectly, petroleum will continue to be a major source of income, but with time it will be transformed into one of several sources. In order to reach this objective we must not erect any causes or barriers that may result in the failure to exploit it all possible resources and powers. While governments abroad sometimes reduce taxes to encourage investments, we in the kingdom represent the absolute version of this, that is, a version where we do not put any restrictions on investments, restrictions on imports, restrictions on the transfer of money, or any tax restrictions.

In this matter, we proceed from the fact that we are a newly-developing country, desert in nature, relying on a single resource owned by the government, which plays the role of a father who exerts every effort to look after his "children" and open the doors to growth to each and all of them. This is different from governments' traditional roles. Therefore our goal is to arrive at a strong, homogeneous, integrated economy that will require that we do not place any restrictions on investment.

AL-MUSTAGBAL: There also is a similar observation on the issue of domestic subsidies, from which foreigners benefit as do the citizens -- from which the well-off benefit, in proportion to their consumption, more than people with limited incomes do. Don't you believe that eliminating subsidies or modifying their systems in the direction of reducing them would have benefits that would go beyond financial and economic aspects and create better, more productive social habits?

Aba-al-Khayl: This observation may have arisen from increased aid and subsidies that have come to cover many fields and constitute a major portion of the government budget.

However, the philosophy of subsidies and aid is based on, and proceeds from, the Saudi reality and Saudi needs. Saudi Arabia is a new country. The Saudis are trying to develop themselves within their circumstances, and the development of human resources takes first place. However, the development of human resources takes a substantial amount of time; it is not easy to train technicians in the short time it would take to build a building to graduate these technicians. The rule is that an advanced society is one whose members can earn high incomes that enable them to obtain goods and services as part of a good standard of living. In order for the individual to acquire these incomes, he must have specific skills. We are working to develop these skills among Saudis, but getting everyone to that point will take substantial time. We now face a difference between the limited ability of the individual, or the limited ability of a large group of people, to become proficient at jobs that will yield them good incomes, and their expectations as citizens of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

This gap is dimishing with time the more trainees occupying positions or jobs increase. From now, until this gap is eliminated, it will be necessary to use aid in subsidies as a means to plug it.

AL-MUSTAGBAL: A final question, on the Islamic banking system. How do you view it, and the possibility that it will grow in the future, not just from your vantage point as minister of finance in the kingdom, but also from the vantage point of your knowledge of the international money and banking system and your constant dealings with it? Can this system penetrate the international system?

Aba-al-Khayl: The Islamic banking system can achieve good results in Islamic society. The Islamic system is based on participation, not on interest. The more Islamic financial institutions develop the system of participation and facilitate transactions through it and through its channels, the more people will agree to deal with it and join it. This will require that these means and instruments are developed within Islamic societies, not outside them.

Taking money from Moslem investors and investing it outside Islamic societies will undoubtedly entail numerous difficulties in investment, in accordance with the Islamic platform, because investments in the West are based on a different structural composition.

Thus, the more investment in Islamic forms within Islamic societies increases, the more the possibility of making this investment a success will increase. However, that will always require the facilitation and simplification of investment procedures, procedures for participating in investment, and measures for calculating profit.

11887 CSO: 4404/330

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS TO CONTINUE DESPITE OIL MARKET CONDITIONS

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 4 Mar 82 p 5

[Article: "In a Conference on Saudi Economy, Aba al-Khayl: Oil Market Conditions Will Not Affect Saudi Development Program."]

[Text] Shaykh Muhammad Aba al-Khayl, Saudi Minister of Finance and National Economy, declared that the basic objectives for [economic] development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in all developed countries is based on diversification of revenue sources as opposed to relying on a sole revenue source. In that respect he said that the Kingdom has gone a long way towards the objective of setting up the infrastructure which is considered a necessary element for economic development.

The Saudi Minister—who was speaking in a conference on Saudi economic conditions which was held by the Arab Association for Culture and Arts and in which Dr Mahsun Jallal and Dr 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Dakhil participated—added that Saudi Arabia has taken a huge step during the past few years, on different levels, in the field of education. Furthermore, he added that the elements for development require the presence of an atmosphere conducive to the economic activities which are currently underway in the Kingdom. He also said that one of those elements should be the encouragement of the domestic economic sector [locally-based industries] and giving it the best of chances for success.

He also indicated the importance attached to foreign relations and the role they play in aiding the process of investment of available economic resources; a process which is obviously enhanced when there are good relations between countries.

Concerning the 'Saudization' of the Saudi economy the minister said that the present economic activities should result in increased benefits to the public in the areas of administrative responsibilities, profits, and decision making. Furthermore, he said that Saudi Arabia is not against the idea of others [foreign nationals] participating in the areas of ownership, management and jobs as long as the Saudi's role in those firms is the larger one in the various aspects of such operations.

The minister also discussed the economic activity in the Kingdom and said that presently there are more than 25,000 kilometers of roadways and more than 100 port docks in addition to a modern wire and wireless communications network.

He emphasized that one of the elements for development is the excellent availability of capital and that Saudi Arabia is now considered as one of the leading countries that provide investment capital.

He further emphasized that the current year's budget for the Kingdom will not be affected by any conditions in the international oil market and that the temporary conditions will not affect the Kingdom's continued developmental programs or the planning of such programs.

At the same time the Saudi Minister emphasized that the Saudi riyal is not tied to the American dollar and that it does not have any monetary relationship with it. He said that sometimes what is said regarding the relationship of the riyal and the dollar is that the Saudi oil sales are consummated in dollars, which are collected as a major currency for the banks and which are then sold in the market. He said that that, however, does not constitute any relationship and that the Saudi riyal will remain a local currency so that it will not be subject to international fluctuations and, in that way, will help preserve the economic stability of Saudi Arabia.

In the words of Dr Mahsun Jallal, the Saudi economy was said to have witnessed unprecendented crystallization in all fields. He also said that there is a wide interest in scientific research with respect to development and that such research is getting more attention, which will have a greater effect on technological progress in the Kingdom. Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Dakhil also touched upon the elements of production: land, capital, and work force. As far as land is concerned, he said that the shortage of water and fertile land makes it important to get maximum use out of the land and that the Kingdom is suffering from a shortage of manpower, which is especially important with respect to economic development.

CSO: 4404/390 END

END OF FICHE DATE FILMED

April 26, 1982